What's So "Intelligent" About "Intelligent Design"?

Many of the debates about "intelligent design" (ID) that I have read online have focused on the defintion of "intelligent". This is not necessarily because we all agree what "design" means, but rather because we know even less about that quality we refer to with the term "intelligent". If one cannot define what one means by "intelligent", then any attempt to define or investigate "intelligent design" would seem to me to be a futile exercise.

Some ID supporters have suggested substituting the term "purposeful design" for the term "intelligent design". To me, this sounds almost redundant; after all, design is all about "purpose", isn't it? And if that's the case, then "purposeful design" reduces to "purposeful purpose" or "designed design". Furthermore, it's not clear to me that the terms "intelligent" and "purposeful" are necessarily interchangeable, or mean even similar things.

Many ID supporters seem most upset about the implication that evolutionary theory is "random". That is, the processes by which new characteristics of living organisms come into being are not necessarily the result of intentional design. To many of them, this would eliminate a supernatural force or deity as the causal factor in biological evolution. Ergo, if one is committed to the intervention in nature of a supernatural force or deity, one must deny a priori the possibility that new characteristics of living organisms can come into being without "intention".

However, it is not necessarily the case that "purposeful" (i.e. teleological) objects and processes are necessarily non-random. First of all, it seems to me that "purposeful" is not an antonym for "random". For example, consider a falling rock: its movement as it falls is most definitely not random. Neither its trajectory nor its acceleration are "random" at all. On the contrary, they are predictable to such a degree that we call the mathematical description by which we can predict the movement of falling objects a "law" - the "law of gravity".

Ergo, it seems to me that the best antonym for "random" is "predictable", in the sense of being able to predict successive states in a dynamically changing system.

Given the foregoing, what is the best antonym for "purposeful"? Forgive me, but I think the only reasonable answer is "non-purposeful". This then forces one to define what one means by "purposeful". To me, the best definition of a "purposeful" (or "teleological", if you prefer the more technical term) object or process is "a dynamical process (or component of a dynamical process) in which the dynamical entity's actions are actively and homeotelically regulated by a cybernetic process that functions according to a pre-existing program, the outcome of which is a specified end state.

A homeotelic process is one in which a dynamical entity reacts to external perturbations from its original trajectory in such a way as to regain its original goal orientation. For example, an arrow fired from a bow is not homeotelic, whereas a heat-seeking missile is. By the same logic, a snowflake growing in a supercooled cloud is not homeotelic, whereas a virus replicating in a host cell is.

In my opinion, most of the arguments about "intelligent design" founder, not on the definition of "intelligent" but rather on the definition of "design". If one focuses not on "design" but rather on "purpose" (i.e. teleology), much of the disagreement (like a boojum) vanishes softly and silently away.

Indeed, I think the qualifier "intelligent" is unnecessary, and quite possibly redundant. Why argue over something – that is, "intelligence" – that is indefinable without self-reference?

That is to say, "purpose" is very clearly and unambiguously defined in cybernetics, as Gregory Bateson and Norbert Weiner pointed out a half a century ago. "Purpose" (aka "teleology") are what this argument is really about, and so it would help immensely if all of the participants on both sides of the debate would define it in such a way as to render its presence or absence empirically verifiable.

The same could also be wished about "intelligence", but I see no real hope for this, given that virtually every definition of "intelligence" given in this thread (and all previous threads) is neither empirically verifiable nor applicable to simple systems such as those found in viruses or very simple cells. How "intelligent" is the lambda bacteriophage? Compared to a human, not much; compared to a crystal of sodium chloride, tremendously so. Indeed, what separates crystallized viruses from crystallized salts is precisely the "quality" that separates life from non-life and "purposeful" from "non-purposeful" things.

Termites build termite mounds using a surprisingly simple set of "decision rules". For example, one decision rule (which is clearly "wired in" to the nervous system of worker termites) is the rule to stack particles of sand on top of each other and glue them together using a material like saliva in such a way as to produce an arch (this is beautifully illustrated in E. O. Wilson's masterpiece, The Insect Societies). In Höldobler and Wilson's new book, Superorganism, they explain in detail how insect societies produce astonishingly complex, adaptive, functional dwelling places, "highways" (army and driver ants), "farms" and "pharmacies" (leaf-cutter ants), etc. without anything that remotely resembles what we would call "intelligence" or "consciousness" (remember, their brains are smaller than a poppy seed and their life spans are measured in days).

Furthermore, none of the instructions for doing all of this "design" is encoded directly into the DNA of any given social insect. Rather, the instructions are "compiled" from the individual activities of thousands of individual insects performing very simple, stereotyped actions (mostly coordinated by chemical pheromones). In other words, the "intelligence" that produces the marvelous structures and functions of insect societies is a collective "intelligence" consisting of a small set of "decision rules" hard-wired into the nervous systems of individual insects.

Might it not be the case that this same process is the paradigm for all biological complexity? This would not only explain where the "designer" is (it's all around / inside us) and who the "designer" is (it's everyone, interacting collectively in producing the "superorganism"), it would also present what ID has so far completely lacked: an empirical research program. That is, one could search for the "decision rules" that produce biological complexity, in viruses, cells, insect societies, primate societies, and human societies, and figure out how the interaction of such rules produces biological complexity. And when you did that, you would have recreated the already-existing field of biology known as sociobiology, which is a branch of evolutionary biology.

Termites do not have "goals and foresight". Rather, they are quite literally programmed (i.e. "hard wired") to perform a surprisingly simple set of simple behaviors. They are born with this capability and do not have to learn it. Furthermore, their behaviors are extremely stereotyped and subject to quite a bit of essentially "random" variation. Despite this, and because there are so many of them (literally millions in some large hives), they collectively produce structures and functions that rival the most complex "artificial" factories and dwelling places designed by humans.

The point here is that "intelligence" is not being defined well at all, if it is restricted to humans and higher vertebrates, but not to insect societies. Each insect is definitely not "intelligent" (any more than each of our individual cells is), but collectively both the insect societies and our multicellular selves are intelligent. "Intelligence" is therefore an emergent property, rather than a pre-existing attribute. And evolution, of course, is all about emergent properties.

One of the points I tried to make earlier is that using human "intelligence" as a yardstick for intelligence in general is like using a Cray XMT as your yardstick for evaluating the "intelligence" of an abacus. In virtually every discussion I have read about "intelligence" at ID blogs, there seems to be an unspoken yet universal assumption that "intelligence" is an either/or phenomenon: either something is at least as intelligent as a human (or the Intelligent Designer aka God) or it isn't intelligent at all.

How "intelligent" a virus like the lambda bacteriophage? If "intelligence" is to be a useful (not to mention empirically measurable) phenomenon, it seems to me that it should fall somewhere along a spectrum, from the "intelligence" manifested by simple viruses up through the "intelligence" manifested by complex animal societies such as ours.

The latter point - that "intelligence" must somehow be massively multiplied as the result of social/collective interactions - is also non-trivial. As I pointed out earlier, an individual termite is extraordinarily "stupid", especially by human standards. Indeed, taken out of their social contexts, the behaviors of most social organisms seem pointless and almost random. However, what appear to be pointless and virtually random behaviors when viewed at the individual level become extraordinarily complex and "hyper-intelligent" when one moves up in organizational levels in animal societies.

How "intelligent" would each of us be, if we were forced to live in complete isolation from all other humans? If we were forced to do so from birth, our "intelligence" would be so limited as to result in almost instant death. Ergo, if one uses "able to live independently" as one's criterion for "intelligence", one would have to conclude that oak trees are immensely more intelligent than humans.

In my opinion, until ID theory comes to grips with the concept of "intelligence" in such a way as to make it both empirically verifiable and quantifiable, ID "theory" will continue to be not much more than unsupported speculation.

As a first approach to an operational definition of intelligence, consider whether learning is a necessary component of intelligence. Several commentators have strongly implied that this is the case. That is, the more an entity is capable of "learning", the more intelligent it is.

However, using the ability to learn as a criterion for intelligence is fraught with difficulties. For example, termites do not learn to build termite mounds, yet virtually everyone in this thread has agreed that mound-building behavior in termites indicates that termites (at least as a group) are indeed intelligent. Ergo, it is quite clear that an entity that is utterly incapable of "learning" can still qualify as being highly "intelligent".

This would also apply to some ID supporter's assertion that the Intelligent Designer is the God of the Abrahamic religions. This entity is universally recognized as being a "4-O deity": that is, He is omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient. However, this last quality also strongly implies that the ID/God does not learn from His actions, as to do so would be directly contradictory with His being forever omniscient (i.e. from the beginning to the end of time, assuming that time does indeed end). Ergo, the ability to learn is quite clearly not a criterion for determining intelligence, if one assumes that the Intelligent Designer of ID theory is the God of the Abrahamic religions.

If one is familiar with so-called "expert systems" in computing, the same would be the case. Expert systems (ESs) do not "learn" to do anything in the sense that animals with "wet" minds do. On the contrary, an ES performs a complex (sometimes recursive) calculation using data embedded in one or more "truth tables", producing a calculated outcome. This outcome is sometimes hedged with statistical error calculations, but it is a calculated (i.e. not learned) outcome nonetheless. While the final calculation produced by an ES can be modified, this happens only when the values in the "truth tables" are modified. Otherwise, the outcome is simply a calculation. Ergo, expert systems do not actually "learn" anything, at least in the same way that animals (and some other living organisms) do.

So, I believe that it is fair to conclude that the ability to "learn" is quite clearly not a necessary criterion for intelligence. Some highly intelligent entities (such as termite colonies and the God of Abraham) are clearly incapable of true "learning". Conversely, some very unintelligent entities, such as bacteria, are nonetheless capable of changing their behavior over time in response to changes in their environment (the standard operational definition of "learning" in the cognitive sciences).

CONCLUSION: Intelligence is fundamentally unrelated to the ability to learn.

Which brings us back once again to the fundamental question: what is "intelligence", how can it be observed, and can it be quantified in any way? If not, then ID is quite literally a "science" without an empirically definable subject, and therefore a pointless exercise in mental masturbation.

One might also be tempted to define "intelligence" as "adaptability". That is, an "intelligent" entity has the ability to adapt its behavior (and, presumably, its underlying cognitive machinery by means of which its behavior is generated and regulated) in response to changes in its environment. However, this presents two serious problems to an ID supporter:

1) "Adaptability" is what natural selection is all about. Why posit the existence of an "intelligent" entity that is capable of "adapting" to changes in the environment, when this is precisely what natural selection is supposed to be able to do?

2) Since ID is supposed to be a theory that explains adaptation, then saying that the Intelligent Designer (i.e. the entity that moulds adaptations) is adaptable is essentially defining "intelligence" via constructing a tautology:

• "intelligence" = "ability to produce adaptations"

• "intelligent design" = the process by which adaptations are created

Ergo, "intelligent design" reduces to "adaptability producing adaptations".

This is what is sometimes referred to in logic as the "dormative principle" argument, from Moliere's "The Imaginary invalid". When asked how or why opium produces sleep, the learned doctor replies "because it contains a 'dormative principle'"; that is, it causes sleep because it contains a material that causes sleep. In the same way, defining "intelligence" as "the ability to adapt to changes in the environment" (including changes that have not yet happened, i.e. foresight) reduces to "design that is 'adaptable' because it is 'adaptable'".

Where does this leave us in a search for an empirically quantifiable definition of "intelligence"? And if the answer is, "nowhere", then where does this leave "intelligent design"?

In the same line of argument, one clearly cannot define "intelligence" as "that principle/process/quality by which complex specified information is produced". To do so would once more be arguing via tautology:

Question: What produces "complex specified information"?

Answer: Intelligence.

Question: What is "intelligence"?

Answer: That principle/process/quality that produces complex specified information.

Ergo, "the principle/process/quality that produces complex specified information" is what produces "complex specified information".

Again, a pointless exercise in semantic gymnastics.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

More on Teleology in Evolutionary Biology

I’ve been corresponding via email with a fellow evolutionary biologist (who shall remain nameless). I thought that some of her/his comments might be useful or interesting to those who read this blog, as they have a direct bearing on the "problem" of purpose (i.e. teleology) in evolutionary biology.

My correspondent's comments and questions are in block quotes:

I’ve been following the ‘Survival of the Sickest’ thread at Uncommon Descent, and have some comments on it and on your essay on the (un)reality of adaptations.

First, a major area of agreement between us is that the original post is fatally flawed by:

1) the assumption that “Darwinism” implies “constant progress”, and

2) failure to understand that fitness is always defined relative to a particular environment, and that environments change over time.

Now, on to some points of disagreement:

You mentioned Gould and Vrba’s 1982 paper on exaptation, and wrote:

"The reason is quite simple: if (as Gould, Lewontin, and Vrba argue) adaptation isn’t legitimately part of what evolutionary theory is about, then the whole idea of “design” and “function” is read completely out of evolution, leaving only descent with modification."

I have been very strongly influenced on this topic by Warren Allman, director of the Paleontological Research Institute here in Ithaca. He asserted that all adaptations should be considered to be exaptations. His rationale for this assertion was that the term “adaptation” has built into it an assumption of teleology. Literally translated, the word "adaptation" means “toward usefulness”. It’s the “toward” part that is the problem. As you and I both understand it, evolution (including natural selection, but not artificial selection) does not tend toward anything. It has no goal as far as we can tell. Ergo, it builds on what has gone before, but without any specific goal “in mind”.

This is why “exaptation” expresses better how we understand natural selection. It builds “away from” non-functionality (or even away from previous functionality), but never really “toward” anything at all as far as we can tell. And, if Sewall Wright’s “shifting balance” theory is a reasonable model of evolution, then it never really “arrives” anywhere at all, since the “goal” is constantly shifting anyway.

I’m wondering why you think that Gould and Vrba regard adaptation as being outside the legitimate scope of evolutionary theory. My take on the paper is not that they regard the concept of adaptation as illegitimate, but just that it has been typically construed too broadly and should be broken down into the categories of true ‘adaptation’ and ‘exaptation’, where they define a true adaptation thusly:

“Following Williams, we may designate as an adaptation any feature that promotes fitness and was built by selection for its current role.”

The problem I have with this definition is the inclusion of the words “promotes” and “for”. “Promotion” means exactly what it says: “motion towards” something. Ergo, using this word immediately suggests teleology, and as I have pointed out above, teleology cannot be a valid assumption in the origin of the products of evolution at any level. This is not because including teleology allows for “a divine foot in the door” (c.f. Lewontin, 1997), but rather because it requires that the “plan” for the teleological process must exist prior to the coming into being of that process. When we do things, this assumption is perfectly valid, but when something happens in nature, such an assumption is entirely unwarranted. Where, in nature, could such a pre-existing plan exist?

As for the word “for, I always point out to my students that teleological explanations virtually always reduce to sentences that include the phrase “in order to”. This can be shortened even further to “to” (leaving out the “in order”). However, the entire phrase “in order to” can be replaced with the word “for” without changing its meaning. Ergo, the definition quoted above is still irreducibly teleological, and therefore includes an assumption that we should not make in evolutionary biology.

In my paper on the evolution of the capacity for religious experience, I began with a succinct definition of “adaptation”, from which I lay out four criteria that a characteristic (i.e. a “trait”) must meet to be considered a genuine adaptation.

An evolutionary adaptation is any heritable phenotypic character whose frequency of appearance in a population is the result of increased reproductive success relative to alternative versions of that heritable phenotypic character.

Here are the four criteria that I believe must be met for a characteristic to be considered to be an adaptation:

1) An evolutionary adaptation will be expressed by most of the members of a given population, in a pattern that approximates a normal distribution;

2) An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with underlying anatomical and physiological structures, which constitute the efficient (or proximate) cause of the evolution of the adaptation;

3) An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with a pre-existing evolutionary environment of adaptation (EEA), the circumstances of which can then be correlated with differential survival and reproduction; and

4) An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with the presence and expression of an underlying gene or gene complex, which directly or indirectly causes and influences the expression of the phenotypic trait that constitutes the adaptation.

I would now modify criterion #4 to state that such genes/gene complexes must be shown to have been conserved, relative to other sequences in the genome. However, one must keep in mind that such conservation, while necessary, is not sufficient. As we know now, some sequences are conserved, but can be knocked out, with no discernible effect on phenotype. Ergo, to fully satisfy criterion #4, a characteristic must be shown to be associated with a particular gene or gene complex, the knocking out of which can be shown to have significant negative effects on fitness.

Obviously, this means that a great many characteristics that we observe in living organisms will not qualify as adaptations. I believe that this is fully justified, following Williams’ assertion that the concept of adaptation is “onerous” and should only be resorted to “in the last resort”. It is only by doing so that we may avoid the otherwise almost inevitable pitfall of appealing to teleology in our explanations.

Gould and Vrba close their paper with this:

“The argument is not anti-selectionist, and we view this paper as a contribution to Darwinism, not as a skirmish in a nihilistic vendetta. The main theme is, after all, cooptability for fitness. Exaptations are vital components of any organism’s success.”

There’s that nasty little word “for” again! Fitness is immediately measurable as relative differential reproductive success, but “adaptation” can only be legitimately inferred retrospectively. We can’t say that something is a genuine adaptation until it already is, and this seems to me the kind of logical circularity that has also plagued Herbert Spencer’s phrase “survival of the fittest”. If we stick to the four criteria listed above, we will rarely fall into the trap that teleological thinking always sets for us.

Also, you later wrote the following, which seems to acknowledge that Gould and Vrba did regard adapation as a legitimate part of evolutionary theory:

“Yes, indeed, except that I believe that Gould, Lewontin (and later, Vrba) were, like Darwin, unwilling to take their principles to their logical conclusion: that adaptations (like species) are a figment of the human imagination, and do not actually exist in nature (or, to be even more precise, do not have to exist in nature).”

What I meant by this is that the only way we can actually “detect” the presence of adaptation is by inferring it. In that sense, adaptations are not “primary” characteristics; that is, characteristics that can be directly observed (such as differential reproductive success). Rather, such “secondary” characteristics must be indirectly inferred. In that sense, they are indeed “imaginary”; we must “imagine” that they exist (as the result of our application of inferential logic), as we cannot observe them directly.

Am I missing something? Are you trying to say that although Gould and Vrba regarded adaptations as real, they nevertheless thought they should be excluded from evolutionary theory?

No, I’m saying what Williams was saying, only I’m saying it more strongly and consistently: that we should never include any hint of teleology in our explanations, as such inclusion includes the biological equivalent of that old bugaboo of physics: “action at a distance” in physics is the equivalent of “goals preceding causes” in biology.

When I reread Williams’ famous 1966 book, Adaptation and Natural Selection, which supposedly reads teleology out of evolutionary biology, I was astonished to find it shot through with the same kind of teleological reasoning that he was supposedly trying to eliminate. I think I could find all the “hidden teleology” in Williams because I have spent so much time debating with ID supporters. They are the ultimate teleologists, and can always find where we have subtly woven teleological assumptions into our biology.

Finally, you wrote:

“To be as clear as I can, I believe that asserting a position of “metaphysical materialism” is just that: a metaphysical, not a scientific assertion. Confusing metaphysics with science is nearly as pernicious as confusing “ought” and “is”. The former makes for questionable science and the latter makes for questionable ethics.”

I would agree that science has no say on metaphysical questions that don’t have observable consequences (although I would argue that even then, Ockham’s razor should cause us to prefer simpler metaphysical systems to needlessly complex ones). However, some metaphysical assertions do have observable consequences. For example, I consider the existence of the Young Earth Creationists' God to be a metaphysical assertion that has nevertheless been decisively falsified by science.

I agree, but the same cannot be said for the more subtle versions of teleology found in Michael Behe or William Dembski's works. Their books (especially Dembski’s) present a much more subtle and less easily refuted version of teleological explanation, one that is easily reinforced by our own unwitting resort to teleological explanations.

Evolutionary adaptation is where the rubber of both evolutionary theory and ID hit the road.

Now on to your essay “Are Adaptations ‘Real’?”

You wrote:

“...although there are characteristics of organisms that are correlated with relatively high reproductive success (and would therefore be considered by most evolutionary biologists to qualify as “adaptations”), it becomes problematic to decide exactly which of those characteristics are the “real” adaptations and which are merely ‘accidental’”.

The problem, of course, is the words “real” and “accidental”. If we are genuinely dedicated to rooting out teleology in all of our explanations of the origins of biological objects and processes, then all adaptations are “accidental”, in the sense that they are all unplanned. We perceive them as having “functions” because our naive viewpoint of reality is always teleological. We can think non-teleologically only with very great difficulty. It’s like special relativity or quantum mechanics. We have to twist our minds to be able to even begin to conceive of them, and even then we constantly slide back into our naive (and unwarranted) views of reality.

True, if by “accidental” adaptations you mean exaptations. But while it may sometimes be difficult to tell whether an adaptation is “real” or “accidental”, that is not evidence that “real” adaptations don’t exist. Indeed, the only scenario I can envision in which “real” adaptations would not exist would be one in which every fitness-enhancing feature was an exaptation.

Exactly!

But that would mean, among other things, that every incremental improvement to the eye would have to have been the accidental result of changes that were selected for some reason other than improved vision. That seems far-fetched to me. Am I misunderstanding your position?

It’s not that that every incremental improvement to the eye would have to have been the accidental result of something, it’s that every incremental change to the eye would have had to originate accidentally, but then increase in frequency as the result of differential survival and reproduction. If we think the way you worded it (and we almost always think that way), then the teleological trap is that all of the incremental changes are somehow “predestined” and that complex eyes must be the inevitable result.

But this just plays into the hands of intelligent Design supporters. When we argue that “half an eye is still adaptive” we unwittingly include the assumption that “half an eye” is just that: half of what will ultimately evolve by natural selection. But our knowledge of the natural history of vision has shown us over and over again that “half an eye” is the whole thing in many cases. We can only say that the eyes of, say, flatworms, are “half an eye” because we already know that such a thing as a “whole eye” exists in cephalopods and vertebrates. We have to disabuse ourselves of the idea that any characteristic is only partially the whole deal. All characteristics of all organisms are the whole deal for those organisms, period, end of story, that’s all She wrote. Anything else contains the beginnings of teleology, and that way lies error, endlessly compounded.

We now have the ability to selectively delete individual characteristics from many different organisms. This makes possible something that natural selection does not: the precise determination of the selective “value” of particular characteristics. This has already been done, and the surprising outcome has been that even some gene sequences that were thought to have been very important in selection (due to having been “conserved” over deep evolutionary time) are apparently insignificant or useless. We know this because knocking them out of the genome has no discernible effect on the survival or reproduction of the “knock-out” progeny.

Precisely my point, above.

That interpretation seems to depend on the hidden assumption that the environment hasn’t changed significantly in the recent history of the organism, and that the experimental environment is fully representative of the historical environment over the entire time during which the features in question evolved. In the case of knocked-out sequences that have no apparent effect on fitness, how sure are we that the experimental environment is fully representative in this way?

No, but to assume that we are making the opposite mistake - assuming that some characteristic really has some function, even if that function is entirely unobservable - is once again to fall into the “teleology trap”. This is essentially the same argument that ID people make about “junk DNA”. Just because we haven’t found any function for it, doesn’t mean that all of it has no function. They argue that all of it must have some function. They are, like the evolutionary biologists for whom Williams, Gould and Lewontin, and Gould and Vrba wrote their warnings about, assuming teleology in evolution: they are, in a word, “pan-adaptationists”.

As a hypothetical example, imagine a bacterial DNA sequence that is expressed only during the formation of spores to protect the organism during periods of extreme environmental conditions. Knock out the sequence and test the viability of the resulting variant. If the experimental environment doesn’t include the extreme conditions that induce spore formation, the organism will never attempt to express the knocked-out sequence, and so its absence will not be noticed. If the experimenter concludes that the sequence is insignificant or useless, she is mistaken.

True, but I would strongly prefer that adaptation be considered a “diagnosis by exclusion” rather than our first and most important resort. By focusing on adaptation and natural selection, we teeter on the edge of the “teleology trap” and often (maybe even usually) fall in, despite our best efforts to avoid doing so.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Teleology vs Teleonomy: Can a "Program" Exist Before Its "Programmer"?

This post is a follow-up to the previous post on the subject of the "randomness" in the processes that generate the variation that is necessary for biological evolution.

Can a "program" exist before its "programmer" (and therefore bring it into being)? This seems to be the core of the disagreement between ID supporters and mainstream scientists. The former (which include Charles Darwin's very close friend, Asa Gray) advocate the idea that the variation upon which natural selection and other evolutionary processes work is neither random nor unintentional. The latter (which include Darwin and his intellectual heirs) do not disagree with the idea that such variation is not "random". What they disagree with is the idea that there is some "intention" or "plan" guiding the variation that occurs, so that certain outcomes (including, but not limited to, the origin of humans) are more likely than others.

To answer the question that stands at the head of this post, I think it's essential to emphasize (as I did in the original blogpost) that the terms “foresighted” and “goal-oriented” are not equivalent, nor are the processes to which they are applied. As I have pointed out in many posts, there is no inherent contradiction between a process being purely "natural" (i.e. the result of the operation of purely natural processes) and being "goal-oriented".

Ernst Mayr (surely no advocate of "intelligent design") argued forcefully (and, in my opinion, convincingly) that biological organisms are indeed "goal-oriented". That is, their genomes provide a program, the function of which is to bring about a particular state of affairs: the survival and reproduction of the organism via its interactions with its environment.

The origin of the genome (i.e. the "program" itself) is an entirely different situation, however. Ever since Darwin it has been a standard assumption that the evolutionary processes by which the genetic "programs" that direct the assembly and operation of living organisms are not goal-oriented. These evolutionary processes – natural selection, sexual selection, founder effects, genetic bottlenecks, neutral "drift" in deep evolutionary time, exaptation, heterochronic development, changes in homeotic development, interspecific competition, species-level selection, serial endosymbiosis, convergence/divergence, hybridization, phylogenetic fusion, background and mass extinction/adaptive radiation, and internal variance – do not require any kind of "goal orientation" to produce the living entities and processes we observe around and within us. And, since such processes do not require goal-orientation or intentionality, these are not included in evolutionary explanations. Some, but not all, evolutionary biologists extend this idea to the assumption that goal-orientation or intentionality do not exist in nature, in the absence of pre-existing genomic "programs").

The main reason for this assumption has been that it is extremely problematic to agree on how one would go about showing that the aforementioned evolutionary processes have indeed been goal-oriented. The most serious objection to this idea is that there seems to be nowhere for such a "directing agency" to exist in material form, nor any natural means by which its goals could be impressed upon physical organisms.

The genomes of organisms are physical/chemical "stuff", which is translated via physical/chemical "machinery" into biological entities and processes. That is, there is a physical/chemical "vehicle" in which the information for assembling and operating organisms is carried and expressed.

The same would not the case for the putative source of the "evolutionary program" which might direct the evolution of the genomes of living organisms. Since such an "evolutionary program" would cause the evolution of the "genomic programs" which direct the assembly and operation of living organisms, such a program would necessarily have to exist before the origin and evolution of biological genomes, as it would be necessary for it to do so to direct their coming into being.

This presents two serious problems:

• By what mechanism(s) would such an "evolutionary program" cause "genomic programs" to come into existence, and

• Precisely where in the physical universe would such a pre-existing "evolutionary program" itself exist?

We seem to have two direct logical contradictions in terms:

• How can a non-natural "evolutionary program" cause a natural "genomic program" to come into existence, and

• How can a programmer pre-exist the program which brings itself into existence?

There is a proposed answer to these two questions, but one which most ID supporters seem loathe to invoke:

• That the "pre-existing program" that directs the evolution of the genomic programs of living organisms is woven into the structure of physical reality itself.

This is the line of inquiry pursued by Ilya Prigogine and Stuart Kauffman (among others), but which is rejected out-of-hand by nearly all ID supporters (most notably Michael Behe, William Dembski, and Phillip Johnson), who prefer a purely "supernatural" source for the "pre-existing program" by which evolution has been directed).

As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

The "Intelligent Design" Movement on College and University Campuses is Dead

AUTHOR: Allen MacNeill

SOURCE: Original essay

COMMENTARY: That's up to you...

On 22 December 2005, I posted a critical analysis of a press release on the Kitzmiller v. Dover decision, written by Dr. William Dembski, one of the founders of the "intelligent design" movement (Dr. Dembski's press release is apparently no longer available online). My analysis of Dembski's press release was hosted by Ed Brayton at his blog, Dispatches from the Culture Wars (you can find it here). In my analysis, I noted that Dr. Dembski had made a series of statements that were so divergent from the actual facts that they could be interpreted as symptoms of delusional thinking on the part of Dr. Dembski, if not deliberate falsehoods.

Here's the claim by Dr. Dembski that I would like to re-examine in this post:

Three years ago, there was one Intelligent Design and Evolution Awareness (IDEA) Center at the University of California-San Diego. Now there are thirty such centers at American colleges and universities, including UC Berkeley and Cornell. These centers are fiercely pro-ID. [emphasis added]

Dr. Dembski strongly implied in his press release that these IDEA Centers were essentially research centers, such as those commonly found at college and university campuses.

Well, they aren't...or, rather, weren't. They weren't "research centers" or anything like it. They were clubs, similar to the kinds of student-centered special interest clubs that abound on most college and university campuses. Such clubs have several characteristics in common:

1) they are founded, supported, and run by students (sometimes with support from affiliated national organizations),

2) they often have to have permission from the administration to use classrooms or other facilities for meetings, and

3) they sometimes receive funding from students, derived from student activities fees.

To do these things, campus organizations typically have to show that they have no political or religious requirements or ties, as this could jeopardize the academic institution's not-for-profit educational status. This was a problem for IDEA Clubs, for several reasons:

1) they were usually founded, supported, and run by students who received encouragement and training to do so from the national IDEA Center, a spinoff of the Discovery Institute in Seattle, Washington, the political "nerve center" of the "intelligent design movement";

2) the IDEA Clubs often met in campus classrooms or other facilities; and

3) some IDEA clubs did in fact receive funding derived from student activities fees.

This was problematic for two simple reasons:

1) the Discovery Institute receives much of its funding from religious organizations, especially those supported by Christian "reconstructionist" Howard Ahmanson (that this is the case can be easily verified by reading the so-called "wedge document", formulated by the Discovery Institute as a fund-raising tool);

2) the IDEA Center required that the founders and officers of the IDEA Clubs they helped organize and support be Christians.

This was the case for the IDEA Club chapter founded at Cornell University, with whom I had several debates and public meetings. The requirement that the Cornell IDEA Club's officers be Christians was withheld from its membership by its founders until it was made public by their opponents. This caused dissension within the club and eventually led to the modification of this policy by the national IDEA Center administration.

And so, to the purpose for this post: it appears from all indications that the IDEA Club "movement" (and, by extension, the "intelligent design movement" as a whole) is dead. You can verify this by going to the website of the national IDEA Center and clicking through the various links located there. I did that this morning, and found it very enlightening. To save you time, here is what I found (the links are listed first, followed by what they lead to):

Upcoming Events: empty (no events listed)

Press Releases:: except for a press release on "Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed" (the movie) and the online publication of the Spring, 2008 Light Bulb Newsletter (see below), the most recent press release is dated 11/11/06

Classes & Seminars: last updated spring 2004

IDEA Conferences: none

ORIGINS News Updates: last updated 2005

The Light Bulb Newsletter: started publication online (.pdf format) in 2002; listed as quarterly, but only eight out of twenty-six issues have been posted; most recent issue (Summer 2008) consisted almost entirely of a review of the movie "Expelled" (see link, above)

Listserves & Discussion Boards: none

Events Archive: last updated 05/24/07, previously updated on 07/26/03

Student Training Conferences: (for students interested in forming an IDEA Club) last conference held on 09/27-28/02

Ah, but this only indicates that the national IDEA Center is now moribund. Surely something is happening in the 35 international chapters, located at high schools, community colleges, colleges, and universities around the world? Well, here's the list, followed by what you find when you click on the link:

Armstrong Atlantic State University (GA): last updated 01/09/06; virtually no content

Baraboo IDEA Club (academic affiliation not listed) (WI): 404:File Not Found

Braeside High School, Nairobi, Kenya: IDEA Center press release, dated 09/15/03; when link to actual site clicked, received 404:File Not Found

California State University, Sacramento (CA): no events, no content, last updated 11/14/02

Cornell University (NY): when link to actual site clicked, received 404:File Not Found; blog last updated on 03/11/07

Fork Union Military Academy (VA): IDEA Center press release, dated 08/14/04; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

Franciscan University of Steubenville (OH): IDEA Center press release, dated 03/12/04; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

George Mason University (VA): IDEA Center press release, dated 04/06/05; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

Hillsdale College (MI): IDEA Center press release, dated 09/20/03; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

James Madison University (VA): IDEA Center press release, dated 04/06/05; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

Midwestern State University (TX): IDEA Center press release, dated 04/13/04; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

Myers Park High School (NC): when link to actual site clicked, received 404:File Not Found

Poway High School (CA): no content or events listed (no date listed for last update)

Pulaski Academy (AR): IDEA Center press release, dated 09/15/03; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

Scripps Ranch High School (CA): IDEA Center main website homepage; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

Seattle Central Community College (WA): when link to actual site clicked, received 404:File Not Found

South Mecklenburg High School (NC): IDEA Center press release, dated 08/14/04; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

Stanford University (CA): IDEA Center main website homepage; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

Tri-Cities IDEA Club (WA): no events listed; last updated on 05/08/08

University of California, Berkeley (CA): 403:Access Forbidden

University of California, San Diego (CA): when link to actual site clicked, received 404:File Not Found

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (IL): IDEA Center press release, dated 04/06/05; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

University of Mississippi ("Ole' Miss") (MS): IDEA Center main website homepage; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

University of Missouri (MO): IDEA Center main website homepage; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

University of Nebraska, Lincoln (NE): when link to actual site clicked, received 404:File Not Found

University of Oklahoma (OK): when link to actual site clicked, received 404:File Not Found

University of the Phillipines: IDEA Center press release, dated 07/11/04; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

University of Texas, Dallas (TX): no events listed; last updated on 06/14/05

University of Victoria (BC): no events listed; last updated May, 1999

University of Virginia (VA): IDEA Center press release, dated 08/14/04; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

Vanderbilt University (TN): IDEA Center main website homepage; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

Wake Forest University (NC): IDEA Center press release, dated 04/06/05; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

Western Baptist College (OR): IDEA Center press release, dated 04/06/05; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

Westminster College (MO): IDEA Center press release, dated 04/06/05; no actual website or content linked or listed at associated institution

And there you have it: not one of the IDEA Clubs affiliated with an academic institution is still functioning. Indeed, only one of the clubs listed has even updated its website during the past year (the Tri-Cities IDEA Club).

UPDATE (01/04/09): The Tri-Cities IDEA Club website has now descended into "Under Construction/Placeholder" Hell, and so all of the current links to IDEA Clubs at the national IDEA Club website are currently non-functional.

Furthermore, a quick statistical analysis is also illuminating:

1) there are 39 IDEA Clubs listed, not 35 (as stated at the IDEA Club main website);

2) of the 39 listed IDEA Clubs, eight (21%) are located at high schools or community colleges;

3) four (17%) are located at religious institutions;

4) nine (23%) simply do not exist (i.e. have 404: File Not Found at their link); and

5) 18 (46%) have links that simply redirect to either a national IDEA Center press release or main website homepage.

These are the "intelligent design research centers" about which Dr. Dembski spoke so glowingly in his analysis of the effects of the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Board decision.

What can one conclude from this analysis? I conclude five things:

1) that the national IDEA Club website is essentially what is known online as a "shell site" (that is, a place-holder with no real content);

2) that the "movement" represented by the IDEA Club organization peaked in late 2005 or early 2006 (around the time of the Kitzmiller v. Dover trial);

3) since then (i.e. since Judge Jones issued his now-famous decision) it has died almost everywhere;

4) the majority of the output of the "intelligent design movement" consisted of press releases (and produced no empirical science of any kind); and

5) my conclusion in my critical review of Dr. Dembski's analysis of the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Board decision was essentially correct: he was (and probably still is) either delusional or a bald-faced liar.

So, why did I illustrate this post with a picture of a dodo? Because, like the "intelligent design" movement, the dodo was notorious for its stupidity and that fact that it is extinct.

UPDATE (09/01/09): All of the current links to IDEA Clubs at the national IDEA Club website are currently non-functional; if this keeps up, they may fossilize.

As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

On the Detection of Agency and Intentionality in Nature

AUTHOR: Elena Broaddus

SOURCE: Evolution and Design

COMMENTARY: Allen MacNeill

First, many thanks to the faithful readers who have also continued to pay attention to the Evolution and Design website (the weblog of the "notorious Cornell evolution and design seminar" and the contents contained therein. I am particularly pleased that the hard work and careful thought of the students whose papers have been posted has been recognized, and even moreso that they have been given the highest praise possible: that is, critical analysis.

I would like to draw some more attention to E. Broaddus paper on the “innate” tendency to infer purpose in nature. I have long suspected that humans (and perhaps many vertebrates, especially mammals) have this tendency. As an evolutionary psychologist, I at least partially subscribe to the idea that the human mind is composed primarily of “modules” whose functions are to process particular kinds of sensory information in such a way as to yield adaptive responses to complex environmental information. This is precisely what Broaddus argues for in her paper: that the human mind (and, by extension, the vertebrate “mind” in general) has a module that is adapted specifically for the precise and rapid inference of intentionality in nature. That such an “agency detector” (to use the commonly accepted term for such a module) would have immense adaptive value is obvious. In an environment in which other entities do indeed have “intentions” (i.e. predators, competitors, potential mates, etc.), the ability to detect and infer the possible consequences of acting upon such intentions would confer immense adaptive value on any organism with such an ability.

Furthermore, as Broaddus points out (and as we discussed briefly in the seminar), to be most effective such a detector should be tuned in such a way as to detect virtually all such “intention-indicating” behaviors. This would have the effect of producing a significant number of “false positives,” as any detector that is tuned high enough to detect all actual cases would have such a side-effect.

As Broaddus points out, one of the side-effects of such an “agency detector” would be the detection of intentionality in entities that clearly had no such intentions. If, for example, one of the most important functions of such a detector in humans is to quickly “read” and assess the intentions betrayed in human facial expressions, then it would almost certainly detect human facial expressions in objects in the environment that clearly do not have such expressions, such as rocks, foliage, water stains, etc. This would explain the ability of many humans to “see” human facial expressions in such things as water stains, cinnamon buns, rocks, etc.

Clearly, there are some “natural objects” that do, indeed, have human facial expressions impressed upon them: the faces of the presidents at Mount Rushmore are an example cited ad nauseam by ID theorists. However, I am much more interested in “faces” that humans detect in rocks and other environmental objects that are clearly not produced by human agency. Indeed, the faces at Mount Rushmore constitute a kind of “control” for this ability, as they are clearly the result of intentionality, and therefore can be used to anchor that end of the “agency detection” spectrum (at the other end of which are things like “faces” in clouds, tree foliage, etc.). Somewhere in this spectrum is a cross-over point at which actual intentionality/agency disappears and facticious intentionality/agency takes over. It is the location of that cross-over point that constitutes the hinge of the argument between evolutionary biologists and ID theorists.

Broaddus’s analysis of autism as a possible example of malfunctioning “agency detection” is, IMO, brilliant, and presents an immediately testable hypothesis: that autistic children lack well-tuned “agency detectors,” and that this at least partially explains their well-known indifference to intentional agents, such as other people (including their parents), animals, etc. In people with both full-blown autism and the milder Asperger’s syndrome (sometimes called Aspies”), a common attribute is an impaired ability to infer intentionality (or, in many cases, the mere existence of other minds) on the part of autistics and Aspies. As Broaddus points out, there are clear anatomical and functional differences between autistics, Aspies, and non-impaired people, and that these differences may be correlated with the etiology of these conditions. For example, it is very interesting that there appears to be more (rather than less) neurons in the brains of autistics than in non-impaired people.

This lends credence to the generally accepted hypothesis that the information processing “modules” proposed by evolutionary psychologists are the result of “pared down” neural networks that are speciallized for particular cognitive tasks. Clearly, the agency/intentionality detector in humans functions extremely well and, as the parlance goes, “in the background.” We are rarely conscious of its operation, despite the fact that it is virtually always “on.” This explains, for example, something I first noticed as a young child: that no matter how much I tried, I couldn’t NOT see faces in the patterns in the linoleum on the floor of my grandmother’s kitchen, in the foliage of trees, in rocks, and in photographs of billowing smoke, splashing water, etc. The agency/intentionality detector works extremely efficiently in people of all ages, but especially in children. Indeed, as Broaddus points out, part of becoming an adult consists in learning (usually by trial-and-error) which of the seemingly intentional entities which we perceive all the time actually are intentional agents and actually have intentions vis-a vis ourselves. We must learn, in other words, to critically analyze the constant stream of “positive” agency/intentionality detection events, and discriminate between those that affect us and those that do not. It may be that this discrimination process actually involves the neurological “re-wiring” of the parts of the sensory/nervous system that produces such detection events, and this might explain, at least in part, the decreased ability of adults to believe in the existence of intentional agents in the natural environment.

Broaddus not only presents a cogent hypothesis concerning the existence of such an agency/intentionality detector/module in humans, she proposes several possible ways of testing whether or not such a detector actually exists, and to “map” its dimensions, capabilities, biases, and limitations. I believe that this opens up a very fruitful area of empirical research into such detectors, and can ultimately lead to much more clarity about an issue that so far has generated much more heat than light. I hope that her ideas and suggestions will be followed up by others (I certainly intend to do so), and that further empirical research into this fascinating and little-known capability will add to our understanding of what makes us the peculiar creatures we are.

Update on the Cornell Evolution and Design Seminar

Things have been developing in rather interesting ways in the Cornell "Evolution and Design" seminar. We have worked our way through all of the articles/papers and books in our required reading list, along with several in the recommended list. Before I summarize our "findings", let me point out that for most of the summer our seminar has consisted almost entirely of registered students (all but one undergrads, with one employee taking the course for credit), plus invited guests (Hannah Maxson and Rabia Malik of the Cornell IDEA Club). Two other faculty members (Warren Alman and Will Provine) attended for a while, but stopped in the middle of the second week, leaving me as the only faculty member still attending (not all that surprising, as it is my course after all - however, at this point I view my job mostly as facilitator, rather than teacher).

Anyway, here is how we've evaluated the books and articles/papers we've been "deconstructing":

Dawkins/The Blind Watchmaker: The "Weasel" example is unconvincing, and parts of the book are somewhat polemical, by which we mean substituting assertion, arguments by analogy, arguments from authority, and various other forms of non-logical argument for legitimate logical argument (i.e. based on presentation and evaluation of evidence, especially empirical evidence). Dawkins' argument for non-telological adaptation (the "as if designed" argument), although intriguing, seems mostly to be supported by assertion and abstract models, rather than by empirical evidence.

Behe/Darwin's Black Box: The argument for "irreducible complexity", while interesting, appears to leave almost all of evolutionary biology untouched. Behe's argument is essentially focused on the origin of life from abiotic materials, and arguments for the "irreducible complexity" of the genetic code and a small number of biochemical pathways and processes. Therefore, generalizing his conclusions to all of evolutionary biology (and particularly to descent with modification from common ancestors, which he clearly agrees is "strongly supported by the evidence") is not logically warranted. Attempts to make such extensions are therefore merely polemics, rather than arguments supported by evidence.

Dembski/The Design Inference and "Specification: The Pattern that Signifies Intelligence": Dembski's mathematical models are intriguing, especially his recent updating of the mathematical derivation of chi, his measure for "design" in complex, specified systems. However, it is not clear if empirical evidence (i.e. counted or measured quantities) can actually be plugged into the equation to yield an unambiguous value for chi, nor is it clear what value for chi would unambiguously allow for "design detection." Dembski suggests chi equal to or greater than one, but we agreed that it would make more sense to use repeated tests, using actual designed and undesigned systems, to derive an empirically based value for chi, which could then be used to identify candidates for "design" in nature. If, as some have suggested, plugging empirically derived measurements into Dembski's formula for chi is problematic, then his equation, however interesting, carries no real epistemic weight (i.e. no more than Dawkin's "Weasel", as noted above).

Johnson/The Wedge of Truth: To my surprise, both the ID supporters and critics in the class almost immediately agreed that Johnson's book was simply a polemic, with no real intellectual (and certainly no scientific) merit. His resort to ad hominem arguments, guilt by association, and the drawing of spurious connections via arguments by analogy were universally agreed to be "outside the bounds of this course" (and to exceed in some cases Dawkins' use of similar tactics), and we simply dropped any further consideration of it as unproductive. Indeed, one ID supporter stated quite clearly that "this book isn't ID", and that the kinds of assertions and polemics that Johnson makes could damage the credibility of ID as a scientific enterprise in the long run.

Ruse/Darwin and Design (plus papers on teleology in biology by Ayala, Mayr, and Nagel): Both ID supporters and evolution supporters quickly agreed that all of these authors make a convincing case for the legitimacy of inferring teleology (or what Mayr and others call “teleonomy”) in evolutionary adaptations. That is, adaptations can legitimately be said to have “functions,” and that the genomes of organisms constitute “designs” for their actualization, which is accomplished via organisms' developmental biology interacting with their environments.

Moreover, we were able to come to some agreement that there are essentially two different types of “design”:

• Pre-existing design, in which the design for an object/process is formulated prior to the actualization of that object/process (as exemplified by Mozart’s composing of his final requiem mass); note that this corresponds to a certain extent with what ID supporters are now calling “front-loaded design”, and

• Emergent design, in which the design for an object/process arises out of a natural process similar to that by which the actualization takes place (as exemplified by Mayr’s “teleonomy”).

In addition, the ID supporters in the seminar class agreed that “emergent design” is not the kind of design they believe ID is about, as it is clearly a product of natural selection. A discussion of “pre-existing design” then ensued, going long past our scheduled closing time without resolution. We will return to a discussion of it for our last two meetings next week.

As we did not use the two days scheduled for “deconstruction” of Johnson’s Wedge of Truth, we opened the floor to members of the class to present rough drafts/outlines of their research papers for the course. It is interesting to note that both papers so presented concerned non-Western/non-Christian concepts of “design” (one focusing on Hindu/Indian and Chinese concepts of teleology in nature, and the other on Buddhist concepts of design and naturalistic causation).

Overall, the discussion taking place in our seminar classes has been both respectful and very spirited, as we tussle with difficult ideas and arguments. For my part, I have come to a much more nuanced perception of both sides of this issue, and to a much greater appreciation of the difficulties involved with coming to conclusions on what is clearly one of the core issues in all of philosophy. And, I believe we have all come to appreciate each other and our commitments to fair and logical argument, despite our differences…and even to have become friends in the process. What more could one ask for in a summer session seminar?

Detailed Syllabus for Cornell Evolution/Design Course

BioEE 467/B&Soc 447/Hist 415/S&TS 447: Seminar in History of Biology

Summer 2006 - Syllabus

PREREQUISITES: None (introductory course in evolutionary biology recommended, but not required)

CREDIT HOURS: 4 (does not count toward evolution distribution requirement in biological sciences)

CLASS TIMES: Tuesdays and Thursdays 6-9 PM

CLASS LOCATION: Whittaker Seminar Room, 409 Corson-Mudd Hall.

COURSE FORMAT: The format for each class will be a 90 minute interactive discussion/seminar, in which all participants present their interpretations and opinions of the concepts and readings under consideration. Participants will also have the opportunity to make presentations of their original work. Grades will be based on the quality of a term research paper, due at the end of the course, plus attendance and class participation.

GRADE BASED ON: Attendance and participation in seminar discussions, plus a letter grade on the final research paper (maximum length = 20 pages), for a total of 100 points (electronic/email submission encouraged, but not required):

Course Grade Components................Due On

Proposal for final research paper.......Fri07Jul06
Draft/outline of research paper.........Thu20Jul06
Final research Paper:= 75 points.......Thu03Aug06
Attendance..............= 10 points........overall
Participation............= 15 points........overall

COURSE TITLE: Evolution and Design: Is There Purpose in Nature?

COURSE DESCRIPTION: This seminar addresses, in historical perspective, controversies about the cultural implications of evolutionary biology. Discussions focus upon questions about gods, free will, foundations for ethics, meaning in life, and life after death. Readings range from Charles Darwin to the present (see reading list, below).

The current debate over "intelligent design theory" is only the latest phase in the perennial debate over the question of design in nature. Beginning with Aristotle's "final cause," this idea was the dominant explanation for biological adaptation in nature until the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species. Darwin's work united the biological sciences with the other natural sciences by providing a non-teleological explanation for the origin of adaptation. However, Darwin's theory has been repeatedly challenged by theories invoking design in nature.

The latest challenge to the neo-darwinian theory of evolution has come from the "intelligent design movement," spearheaded by the Discovery Institute in Seattle, WA. In this course, we will read extensively from authors on both sides of this debate, including Francisco Ayala, Michael Behe, Richard Dawkins, William Dembski, Phillip Johnson, Ernst Mayr, and Michael Ruse. Our intent will be to sort out the various issues at play, and to come to clarity on how those issues can be integrated into the perspective of the natural sciences as a whole.

In addition to in-class discussions, course participants will have the opportunity to participate in online debates and discussions via the instructor's weblog at http://evolutionlist.blogspot.com/. Students registered for the course will also have an opportunity to present their original research paper(s) to the class and to the general public via publication on the course weblog and via THE EVOLUTION LIST.

INTENDED AUDIENCE: This course is intended primarily for students in biology, biology and society, history, philosophy, and science & technology studies. The approach will be interdisciplinary, and the format will consist of in-depth readings across the disciplines and discussion of the issues raised by such readings. Although there are no prerequisites, a knowledge of evolutionary biology (equivalent to BioEE 207 and/or BioEE 278) is highly recommended. In addition to registered students, course participants will also include invited guests from the Department of Ecology & Evolutionary Biology, the Paleontological Research Institute, and the Cornell IDEA Club. Members of the general public may only attend class discussions with prior permission of the instructor.

REQUIRED TEXTS: (all texts will be available at The Cornell Store, http://www.store.cornell.edu/)

Behe, Michael (2006) Darwin's black box: The biochemical challenge to evolution. New York, NY, Free Press, 352 pages.

Dawkins, Richard (1996) The blind watchmaker: Why the evidence of evolution reveals a universe without design. New York, NY, W. W. Norton (reissue edition), 400 pages.

Dembski, William (2006) The design inference : Eliminating chance through small probabilities. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 272 pages.

Johnson, Phillip E. (2002) The wedge of truth: Splitting the foundations of naturalism. Downers Grove, IL, InterVarsity Press, 192 pages.

Ruse, Michael (2006) Darwin and design: Does evolution have a purpose? Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 384 pages.

OPTIONAL TEXTS: (all texts will be available at The Cornell Store, http://www.store.cornell.edu/)

Darwin, Charles (1859) On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life, 1st Edition (E. Mayr, ed.), Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 513 pages.
Available online at: http://pages.britishlibrary.net/charles.darwin/texts/origin1859/origin_fm.html

Darwin, Charles (E. O. Wilson, ed.) (2006) From so simple a beginning: Darwin's four great books. New York, NY, W. W. Norton, 1,706 pages.
Available online at: http://pages.britishlibrary.net/charles.darwin2/texts.html#books

Dembski, William & Ruse, Michael (2004) Debating design: From darwin to DNA. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 422 pages.

Forrest, Barbara & Gross, Paul R. (2004) Creationism's trojan horse: The wedge of intelligent design. New York, NY, Oxford University Press USA, 416 pages.

Graffin, Gregory W. (2004) Evolution, monism, atheism, and the naturalist world-view. Ithaca, NY, Polypterus Press (P.O. Box 4416, Ithaca, NY, 14852), 252 pages.
Can be purchased online at: http://www.cornellevolutionproject.org/obtain.html

Perakh, Mark (2003) Unintelligent design. Amherst, NY, Prometheus Books, 459 pages.

Ruse, Michael (2000): The evolution wars: A guide to the debates. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 326 pages.

COURSE PACKET: (all items will be available online at the course website)

Ayala, F. (1970) Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 37: pages 1-15.

Binswanger, H. (1992) Life-based teleology and the foundations of ethics. The Monist, pages 84-103.

Behe, M. (2002) Intelligent design as an alternative explanation for the existence of biomolecular machines. Unpublished manuscript.

Dembski, W. (2005) What every theologian should know about creation, evolution, and design. Orthodoxy Today. Available online at: http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles/DembskiDesign.php

Discovery Institute (1999) The wedge. Available online at: http://www.antievolution.org/features/wedge.html

Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District (2005) Complete trial documents and references. Available online at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kitzmiller_v._Dover_Area_School_District_trial_documents

Mayr, E. (1974) Telological and teleonomic: A new analysis. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, XIV, pages 91 to 117.

Nagel, E. (1977) Teleology revisited: Goal-directed processes in biology. Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 74, No. 5, pages 261-301.

COURSE SCHEDULE:
As noted in the Course Format (above), each class will be a 90 minute discussion/seminar, in which all participants will have an opportunity to present their interpretations and opinions of the concepts and readings under consideration. Only the first two classes will depart somewhat from this format. In these, the instructor will lay out the ground rules for the course and present some basic information on evolution and some of its philosophical implications. Notice that two classes have been *rescheduled* due to holidays and time conflicts. Also note that there is an optional picnic/campfire scheduled for Friday 28 July 2006 at the instructor’s home.

DAY & DATE: Tuesday 27 June 2006
6:00-7:30 Course ground rules and an introduction to evolution, "Darwin's dangerous idea"
7:30-9:00 The Natural Selection Game and discussion of the results and implications

DAY & DATE: Thursday 29 June 2006 *NO CLASS-SCHEDULING CONFLICT*

DAY & DATE: Friday 30 June 2006 *Rescheduled from Thursday 29 June*
READINGS:
Dawkins/The Blind Watchmaker
Ruse/Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? chapters 1 & 2
6:00-7:30: Natural selection and scientific reasoning
7:30-9:00: Discussion of natural selection, scientific method, and philosophy of science

DAY & DATE: Tuesday 4 July 2006 *NO CLASS-INDEPENDENCE DAY*

DAY & DATE: Thursday 6 July 2006
READINGS:
Dawkins/The Blind Watchmaker
Ruse/Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? chapter 3 & 4

DAY & DATE: Friday 7 July 2006 *Rescheduled due to Independence Day Holiday*
READINGS:
Dawkins/The Blind Watchmaker
Ruse/Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? chapters 5 & 6

RESEARCH PROPOSAL DUE: All students must submit a tentative proposal on Friday 7 July 2006

DAY & DATE: Tuesday 11 July 2006
READINGS:
Behe/"Intelligent Design as an Alternative Explanation for the Existence of Biomolecular Machines" (provided in course packet)
Behe/Darwin’s Black Box
Ruse/Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? chapter 7

DAY & DATE: Thursday 13 July 2006
READINGS:
Behe/Darwin’s Black Box
Ruse/Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? chapter 8

DAY & DATE: Tuesday 18 July 2006
READINGS:
Dembski/”What Every Theologian Should Know About Creation, Evolution, and Design” (provided in course packet)
Dembski/The Design Inference
Ruse/Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? chapters 9 & 10

DAY & DATE: Thursday 20 July 2006
READINGS:
Dembski/The Design Inference
Ruse/Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? chapters 11 & 12

DRAFT/OUTLINE DUE: All students must submit an outline and references on Thursday 20 July 2006


DAY & DATE: Tuesday 25 July 2006
READINGS:
Discovery Institute/The wedge. Available online at: http://www.antievolution.org/features/wedge.html
Johnson/The Wedge of Truth
Ruse/Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? chapter 13

DAY & DATE: Thursday 27 July 2006
READINGS: Johnson/The Wedge of Truth
Ruse/Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? chapter 14

DAY & DATE: Friday 28 July 2006
Optional barbeque/picnic and campfire at professor's home, beginning at 6 PM

DAY & DATE: Tuesday 1 August 2006
READINGS:
Ayala/Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology.
Binswanger/Life-based teleology and the foundations of ethics.
Mayr/Teleological and teleonomic: A new analysis.
Nagel/Teleology revisited: Goal-directed processes in biology.

DAY & DATE: Thursday 3 August 2006
READINGS:
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District (2005) Judge Jones’ decision.
Ruse/Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? chapter 15

RESEARCH PAPER DUE: All assigned written work due by 6:00 PM on Thursday 3 August 2006

PROFESSOR: Allen D. MacNeill
G-24 Stimson Hall
255-3357
adm6@cornell.edu
http://evolutionlist.blogspot.com/

WEBSITES:
For logistical reasons, there are two course websites.

The Course Blog is located online at http://evolutionanddesign.blogsome.com/. This website is administered and moderated by the course instructor (Allen MacNeill, adm6@cornell.edu), in cooperation with the blog webmaster Hannah Maxson (hom4@cornell.edu), founder and president of the Cornell IDEA Club. The course blog is open to the public and contains articles, commentary, papers, etc. by students in the course and participants online. Both the moderator and the webmaster are great admirers of the traditional values of the academy: intellectual freedom, personal responsibility, and respect for others. Therefore, the course blog has several rules, which will be strictly enforced:

1. Ad hominem attacks, blasphemy, profanity, rudeness, and vulgarity will not be tolerated (although heresy will always be encouraged). However, vigorous attacks against a member's position are expected and those who cannot handle such should think twice before they post.

2. Long-running debates that are of interest only to a small number of individuals should be taken elsewhere, preferably via private email (i.e. if the moderator gets tired of reading posts concerning the population density [N] of terpsichorean demigods inhabiting ferrous microalpine environments, the posters will be encouraged to "settle it outside").

3. Pseudonyms are permitted but real names are preferred. However, if the moderator suspects that someone is posting under multiple aliases or pretending to be someone else, they will be permanently banned from the blog.

4. Mutual respect and sensitivity towards those with opposing views is essential. In particular, posts containing what the moderator feels is "creation-bashing" by evolutionists or "evolution-bashing" by creationists, will not be tolerated.

The Course Website is located online at http://www.learningrefined.com/. This website is the source for course packets and lecture notes. All students registered for the course should also register at LearningRefined.com (just follow the onscreen instructions), where they can then download the course readings packet and lecture notes (some course packet items require payment before downloading; these items will also be on free reserve).

In addition to the course blog and website, the following websites are recommended as sources of information:

Access Research Network (information & research/intelligent design): http://www.arn.org/
Adventures in Ethics & Science (blog/evolutionist): http://scienceblogs.com/ethicsandscience/
Answers in Genesis (news & commentary digest/young-Earth creationist) http://www.answersingenesis.org/
Anthro-L list at SUNY Buffalo (anthropology listserve/evolutionist): http://listserv.buffalo.edu/user/sub.shtml
Austringer, The (blog/evolutionist): http://austringer.net/wp/
Concerned Scientist (blog/evolutionist): http://danielrhoads.blogspot.com/
Cornell Idea Club (information/intelligent design): http://www.rso.cornell.edu/idea/
Creation News (news & commentary digest/young-Earth creationist): http://www.nwcreation.net/news.html
Darwinian Conservatism (blog/politics/evolutionist): http://darwinianconservatism.blogspot.com/
Design Paradigm (blog/intelligent design): http://designparadigm.blogsome.com/
Discovery Institute (news & commentary digest/intelligent design): http://www.discovery.org/
Dispatches from the Culture Wars (blog/evolutionist): http://scienceblogs.com/dispatches/
Evolgen (blog/evolutionist): http://scienceblogs.com/evolgen/
Evolution at PBS (TV series/evolutionist): http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/evolution/index.html
Evolution at Wikipedia.com (encyclopedia-wiki): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolution
EvolutionBlog (blog/evolutionist): http://www.scienceblogs.com/evolutionblog/
Evolution List (blog/evolutionist): http://evolutionlist.blogspot.com/
Evolution News (news & commentary digest/intelligent design): http://www.evolutionnews.org/
Evolution Update (links & sources/evolutionist): http://users.mstar2.net/spencersa/evolutus/
Evolutionary Psychology (listserve/evolutionist): http://groups.yahoo.com/group/evolutionary-psychology/
Evolving Thoughts (blog/evolutionist): http://evolvethought.blogspot.com/
EvoWiki (encyclopedia-wiki/evolutionist): http://www.evowiki.org/index.php/Main_Page
Hpb. Etc/ (blog/history & philosophy of biology): http://drrob.typepad.com/hpb_etc/
ID in the United Kingdom (Blog/intelligent design): http://www.idintheuk.blogspot.com/
iDesign at UCI (blog/intelligent design): http://www.ics.uci.edu/~aasuncio/idesign.htm
Indian Cowboy (blog/evolutionist): http://www.indiancowboy.net/blog/
Intelligent Design at Wikipedia (encyclopedia-wiki): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligent_design
Intelligent Design The Future (blog/intelligent design): http://www.idthefuture.com/
International Society for Complexity, Information, & Design (info/intelligent design): http://www.iscid.org/
Intersection, The (blog/evolutionist): http://scienceblogs.com/intersection/
Loom, The (blog/evolutionist): http://www.corante.com/loom/
National Center for Science Education (news & commentary digest/evolutionist): http://www.ncseweb.org/
Nature (news, commentary, original research/scientist): http://www.nature.com/nature/index.html
New York Times/Science Online (commentary digest): http://nytimes.com/pages/science/index.html
Panda's Thumb, The (blog/evolutionist): http://www.pandasthumb.org/
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (links & sources) http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=114
Pharyngula (blog/evolutionist): http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/
ResearchID.org (online research/intelligent design): http://www.researchintelligentdesign.org/wiki/Main_Page
Science (news, commentary, original research/scientist): http://www.sciencemag.org/
Science & Technology Daily News (news & commentary digest): http://www.scitechdaily.com/
Science & Theology Daily (news digest): http://www.stnews.org/articles.php?category=commentary
Scientific American (news, commentary, original research/scientist): http://www.sciam.com/
Society for the Study of Evolution (information & links/evolutionist): http://www.evolutionsociety.org/
Stranger Fruit (blog/evolutionist): http://scienceblogs.com/strangerfruit/
Talk.Origins (online FAQs/evolutionist): http://www.talkorigins.org/origins/faqs.html
Telic Thoughts (blog/intelligent design): http://telicthoughts.com/
Terra Daily News (news digest): http://www.terradaily.com/
Understanding Evolution (museum website/evolutionist): http://evolution.berkeley.edu/

More on Parsimony in Biology

AUTHOR: Robert Skipper

SOURCE: Cladistic Parsimony and Ockham's Razor

COMMENTARY: Allen MacNeill

Robert Skipper has a report on his participation in the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology conference last weekend. He delivered a paper on Cladistic Parsimony and Ockham's Razor, a subject about which both he and I have blogged in the past. In a previous post, Skipper comes to the following (admittedly tentative) conclusions:

At the moment, my thinking is that cladistic parsimony is a special case of simplicity (if it is a case at all). But I won't make the case for that here....One thing I think we can say, from the examples, is that when we're in a situation in which we must choose among competing hypotheses or theories, and empirical evidence isn't definitive, use simplicity to make the choice.

Each of [the authors cited] urge us to run with the simplest model among the relevant alternatives unless we're forced to abandon that model for a more complicated one. What does the forcing is empirical evidence. Indeed, none of the biologists I quoted above said anything about the fact that simplicity is truth-indicative. Burnet in fact said that because the clonal theory is simplest, it's probably false! So, simplicity doesn't indicate the truth of some hypothesis or model or theory. Rather, it's a strategy that directs us toward the truth....At least we can say we've eliminated some fruitless paths of inquiry.

COMMENTARY:

I think it would be helpful to consider two possibilities vis-a-vis the application of parsimony in science:

1) Parsimony is merely "useful" in the sense that it reduces the complexity of hypotheses to a level at which they are empirically testable. When I teach my students about how science is usually done, I give them the "hypothetico-deductive" model first, and then point out that this model doesn't give you criteria for formulating testable hypotheses, it only gives you a method for testing them once they have been formulated. To formulate testable hypotheses requires an additional step: one must "mentally" test one's hypothesis to determine if:
• it's empiirically testable, and
• the emipirical test that one is considering can distinguish between it and alternative hypotheses
If the answers to these two questions are both "yes," then one is ready to actually run the experiment/make the observations to test the predictions that flow from the hypothesis.

In this view, parsimony is simply "useful" in that it is more likely (on average) to yield testable hypotheses whose empirical results are more likely to unambiguously validate or falsify one's predictions.

2) Parsimony might actually be an intrinsic feature of "natural causation" itself. In evolutionary psychology (my field, BTW) there is a concept known as "computational overload (CO)." Basically, CO is used as an argument against the "blank slate" hypothesis for human cognition and motivation. That is, if the mind is a "blank slate" (i.e. relies entirely on "trail and error/reinforcement" algorithms), CO rapidly overwhelms even the largest and fastest computer imagineable. Therefore, EPs like me assume that the brain is modularized, and that each module has a fairly stringent "perceptual filter" that limits inputs as a way of minimizing CO (such filters and modules having evolved by natural selection).*

The same concept could be applied to nature, and especially biology. Biological systems are fiendishly complex, much more so than physical or chemical systems. This complexity, if not minimized in some way, would result in biological systems "seizing up" as the result of CO (where "computation" is interpreted broadly as the binary and higher level interactions between multiple influences, some competing and some complementary).

Natural selection, in other words, has resulted in the evolution of biological systems in which "parsimony" has been encoded into the interactive structure of living organisms and systems of living organisms themselves, as a way of minimizing CO and maximizing effective interaction with one's environment.

Indeed, I would be tempted to argue that (1) may even be a consequence of (2), as our minds themselves are already adapted to minimizing CO, and therefore are predisposed to parsimonious solutions to problems in general, and therefore also scientific problems. In our interactions with nature as in our science, therefore, "good enough for now" is "good enough for all".
--Allen

*I also suspect that this phenomenon is the basis for the "Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE)" in humans, as a predisposition for making FAEs would be selected for as long as the results of doing so were as often adaptive as deleterious (i.e. a tendency toward "false positives" in making FAEs would simply be a kind of "worse case analysis", which is almost always adaptive...especially in a dangerous world such as ours, in which even paranoids have real enemies ;-)