Yesterday’s resignation of Andrii Yermak, Volodymyr Zelensky’s chief of staff, strong right hand and eminence grise, is clearly a seismic shock to Ukrainian politics. In many ways especially as Zelensky was so often the ‘super foreign minister’ jetting from one foreign capital to the next to beg, cajole, encourage and browbeat allies to maintain their support, he was the man running much of the country, or at least managing its politics.
Whether one regards this as a sign of the preponderance of corruption in Ukraine (as Yermak resigned as NABU, the independent anti-corruption agency, was searching his apartment in connection with a high-profile investigation), or as evidence precisely that the country is willing to fight corruption even at the top of the system, it has at once delighted the Russian state but also provided something of a dilemma. How to report this news in such a way as to blacken Ukraine, manage hopes that this means peace, and also not to encourage the inevitable comparisons in the minds of Russian readers who will be painfully aware of the embezzlement at the top of their own state and the absence of some home-grown analogue of NABU?
The all-powerful head of the Ukrainian president’s office, Andrii Yermak, has resigned, as announced by his friend Zelensky in an address to the nation. The signed resignation decree has already been published.
This morning, after a series of clear warnings, the NABU and SAP finally reached Andrii Yermak, head of the Ukrainian presidential office. A search was conducted at the official apartment of the man named ‘Ali Baba’ in the elite corruption case.
Ali Baba was reportedly the codename used for Yermak in taped conversations amongst the conspirators involved in the scam. (SAP, by the way, is another independent anti-corruption watchdog)
However, anti-corruption authorities have not yet carried out the key procedural action capable of upending Ukraine’s domestic politics—filing charges against Yermak. And perhaps this will never happen.
… Andrii Borisovich [Yermak], also known as ‘Alla Borisovna’ by his subordinates, is anything but a fool in the everyday sense, and as a thief, he is a highly professional.
Let us reiterate, the mere fact of a search of Yermak’s home today, especially after his resignation, poses no threat, and is no more than the usual intra-elite battles familiar to ordinary Ukrainians since independence. The filing of charges would mean a trial, the selection of a preventive measure, the likely release on bail, disgrace, flight, and the inevitable loss of all the reins of power that Yermak zealously and painstakingly gathered into his own hands for over five years. This would constitute a full-fledged elite coup, turning Zelensky into a figurehead with no electoral prospects.
Yermak’s voluntary resignation without further charges is already an opportunity to continue influencing the proceedings from behind the scenes. Few doubt today that the connection between these two scoundrels will continue after their salutary resignation.
So, the prevailing line is that Yermak may have had to step down, probably as the price for avoiding a prosecution, the framework of a corrupt cabal running Ukraine is still in place, and Yermak will continue to be the ‘Grey Cardinal’ dominating it from behind the scenes. More to the point, the ‘two scoundrels’ line tries to connect Zelensky with the corruption, even if so far no evidence at all of such a link has emerged.
In this regard, Zelensky’s five-minute address to the nation regarding Yermak’s departure is particularly interesting. First, he repeated the word “pressure” several times in different places, as if implying that his friend’s resignation was forced and, in his view, unfair. The pressure, as the context suggests, was exerted by Americans, who were not directly named… Second, he made it clear that he still relies on Europe to achieve a ‘just peace,’ meaning the continuation of the war.
This is in many ways an encapsulation of two central talking points from the Kremlin:
1. NABU is essentially an instrument of the West, primarily the USA. It was used to target Yermak as Washington brings down the hammer on Zelensky, warning him to be good and accept whatever peace deal Trump hashes out with Putin. So not only can Russians be reassured that there is some hope of a victorious end to the war, but they are also encouraged to believe that even apparently independent agencies fighting corruption in Ukraine are no more than political contract killers working for foreigners. So, the subliminal message runs, don’t be disappointed that the same doesn’t happen in Russia.
2. The Europeans are the main obstacles to peace.
…Stripping away the emotional fluff about ‘unity’ and ‘struggle,’ which makes up a third of the address, Zelensky told Ukrainians that nothing terrible had happened and sternly urged them to refrain from insinuations. He also hinted to the opposition in the Rada that, although their demand for the resignation of their dear friend had been fulfilled, things wouldn’t get any easier for the deputies – they would vote as instructed and, for starters, practice on the budget drawn up by Yermak…
In other words, while there is hope, readers ought not to get carried away. Russia and the US may be trying to find a way to end the war, but the illegitimate (as far as the Kremlin is concerned) president Zelensky, backed or pushed by the nefarious Europeans, is going to try and maintain business as usual, Yermakism without Yermak, and that means maintaining a tight grip on the political elite. In short
1. Yes, there is hope of peace… but only limited, and if it fails, it will be Zelensky and the European who are at fault. That’s true in a way, in that the most likely outcome is still a ‘deal’ that Kyiv cannot accept.
2. Ukraine is a corrupt snakepit (elsewhere, parallels are sometimes made with 90s Russia, which remains the Putinist cautionary tale), far worse than Russia. OK, Ukraine is no paragon, but the idea that NABU and SAP are just foreign tools is deeply questionable. One must recognise that there is a very real struggle going on genuinely to fight endemic corruption.
3. Democracy, anti-corruption, etc, as experienced in Ukraine – as in the West – are pretty facades, shielding the naked power struggles between individuals and factions, and the interference of foreign powers. Russia should be glad it is free of such hypocrisies! I don’t think I need to say what I think about this rationalisation of the Putin state!
I almost feel I should respect the propagandists’ capacities to turn the facts on the ground to effectively to their cause.
On 19 August 2025, the 24th anniversary of the 1991 August Coup, the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda ran an article New Twist in the GKChP case: Kryuchkov was in collusion with Yeltsin, planning to make him president of the USSR (Новый поворот в деле ГКЧП: Крючков был в сговоре с Ельциным, собираясь сделать его президентом СССР). The claim, coming from Valery Kostarev, then a Senior Investigator for Especially Important Cases at the USSR Prosecutor General’s Office, was that one of prime movers of the vosmërka (octet) of coup plotters behind the so-called State Emergency Committee (GKChP), Vladimir Kryuchkov, hard-line head of KGB, had actually intended to use it to hand power to Yeltsin as Soviet President in Gorbachev’s place, so that he would and could hold the Soviet Union together, but that for a variety of reasons, this failed to happen. I honestly don’t know how true it may be, although the account of Yeltsin in effect double-crossing both Kryuchkov and Gorbachev does sound plausible.
So far, so comspiratorial, the kind of story that Russians seem especially to love. The interesting thing is that within a week, the article had disappeared from the Komsomolskaya Pravda site, even scrubbed from its archive. There may be an entirely innocent explanation. There might not. Either way, if someone wanted the article memory-holed, well, it’s just as well that someone kept a copy! So for posterity, if nothing else, here’s a rough translation. NB, I have simply run the original Russian through Google Translate and scanned it quickly for particular howlers, but don’t treat this as a careful translation. I have also italicised the questions put Kostarev, in the name of clarity.
404. The plot thickens…
New twist in the GKChP case: Kryuchkov was in collusion with Yeltsin, planning to make him president of the USSR
On August 19-21, 1991, the Soviet Union was shaken by a blow that some called the State Emergency Committee’s “putsch,” while others called it the last attempt to save a great country.
34 years ago, the population of the USSR was informed on TV and radio about the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency and about President Mikhail Gorbachev who had “fallen ill” in Foros . And Russian leader Boris Yeltsin led the fight against the “putsch”. In three days, he “won”, Gorbachev returned to Moscow, and the “putschists” were arrested.
Senior investigator for especially important cases at the Prosecutor General of the USSR Valery Kostarev was working on the GKChP case at the time. Among his “clients” were the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union Valentin Pavlov , and Gorbachev’s chief of staff Valery Boldin , and generals of the special services.
Today Valery Evgrafovich made a sensational report at the Round Table in the House of Unions. Kostarev is sure: in the summer of 1991 there was a “conspiracy” between Yeltsin and the KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov .
We met with the former big shot the day before to find out the details of this high-profile version.
DISAPPOINTMENT AND HOPE
– Why did the all-powerful head of the KGB Kryuchkov go against Gorbachev? Was he disillusioned with him by 1991?
– Earlier. The President of the USSR also felt that things were bad in the country. That is why on March 28, 1991, he himself created the State Commission on the State of Emergency. He assigned Vice President Gennady Yanayev to head it . And Kryuchkov , Boldin and the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo were to develop how to apply this state of emergency. This commission included… 6 out of 8 members of the future State Emergency Committee! All except Starodubtsev and Tizyakov.
– And what did the members of this commission report to Gorbachev?
– There was a closed meeting of the Central Committee on June 17, 1991. At it, Kryuchkov and Prime Minister Pavlov seriously criticized Gorbachev. It was said: if we do not take emergency measures, the country will be bad. Gorbachev pretended to ignore it. He was more concerned about Yeltsin , the newly elected president of the RSFSR.
– And how did the special services treat Yeltsin?
– By the summer of 1991, the KGB saw that Gorbachev was rapidly losing both popularity and power, while Yeltsin’s authority in the country was growing at a furious pace. The KGB leadership realized that Gorbachev would be useless. And they decided to bet on Yeltsin.
– How is that?
– Replace Gorbachev with Yeltsin. Kryuchkov decided so. At that time, the idea was already in the air that a firm hand was needed to save the Union. That is why Yeltsin was considered a likely replacement. At one meeting of the Chekists on Lubyanka, Kryuchkov was asked: “What about Yeltsin?” Kryuchkov answered that Yeltsin would agree with them and support their decision…
– How did you know that the KGB then decided to rely on Yeltsin?
– The first to publicly state this was in our time, in 2017, General Nikolai Leonov , former head of the analytical department of the KGB of the USSR. He said that in May 1991, in defiance of the Union State Security Committee, Yeltsin decided to create his own, republican one. Kryuchkov and Leonov went to Yeltsin to convince him not to split up state bodies . Before the meeting, Leonov told Kryuchkov: “ Yeltsin is gaining weight, and Gorbachev has deflated. Yeltsin is the real master of the country. The main thing is that the state remains united. Yeltsin will preserve the state for us .”
– Did Kryuchkov agree with this?
– Yes. I met with Leonov, he confirmed it. And he told me some details. Yeltsin met with Kryuchkov several times in 1991. After one of the meetings, Yeltsin’s confidant Yuri Skokov (in the summer of 1991 he was a state adviser. – Author) came out rubbing his hands: ” Now we’ll show Gorbachev .” Witnesses heard this remark. And Yeltsin’s head of security Korzhakov confirmed to me that there were several meetings with Kryuchkov. Including at the beginning of August – before Yeltsin flew to Alma-Ata to see Nazarbayev. A week before the “putsch.”
THERE WAS NO CHOICE
– How did Kryuchkov plan to “promote” Yeltsin?
– They thought about removing Gorbachev and electing Yeltsin legally – at the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR. Lubyanka knew that the deputies were ready to agree to remove Gorbachev. But Kryuchkov was not sure that they would vote for Yeltsin. So they decided to “remove”. Moreover, there was information that Yeltsin’s team also had a plan to remove Gorbachev. But the option with the State Emergency Committee came up and Yeltsin took advantage of it.
– Were the facts of contacts between Kryuchkov and Yeltsin confirmed during the investigation into the GKChP case?
– We didn’t figure it out then – we found out about it later, when all the GKChP members were amnestied.
– Kryuchkov didn’t talk about this during interrogations?
– No. He behaved slyly during interrogations. He told them everything they asked him about. Yes, he mentioned that he had meetings with Yeltsin. But there was no talk of them agreeing on anything. And the investigator who was in charge of Kryuchkov did not develop this topic. Because it was known that the Chekists hated Yeltsin – why would they contact him?
– Why did the head of the KGB do this?
– At that time, Kryuchkov had no other candidates to save the Union.
WHO KNEW?
– Who else among the members of the State Emergency Committee knew about Kryuchkov’s agreement with Yeltsin?
– Just a few people, the closest ones. Possibly Pavlov. But Boldin, Gorbachev’s chief of staff, knew for sure. He said: yes, there were such agreements. I asked him for details – he told me: it’s not time to tell yet.
– Did Pavlov, whom you interrogated, believe that Yeltsin would support the “putschists”?
– Pavlov had a bad relationship with Yeltsin. But there is a video recording where Pavlov says that Yeltsin should become the president of the USSR. However, during interrogations, most of the GKChP members said that Yeltsin is our enemy, and we are against Yeltsin.
ISOLATE “UNTIL THE SITUATION IS CLARIFIED”
– What role did Kryuchkov play in the State Emergency Committee?
– On August 18, there was a meeting of the “conspirators” in Pavlov’s office, where they decided that it was time to introduce the State Emergency Committee, the decree was ready. And it was Kryuchkov who led all of this.
– But formally, Vice President Yanayev was supposed to be in charge?
– The core was Kryuchkov, Baklanov and Shenin (the last two flew to Gorbachev in Foros. – Ed.). On August 18, there was talk about Yeltsin’s plane, which was returning from Alma-Ata that day, having to land at the Chkalovsky military airfield, not at Vnukovo. Kryuchkov recommended sending Pavlov and Yazov to Yeltsin. They were supposed to present him with a fait accompli: we have the State Emergency Committee, what about you? If Yeltsin refuses, he should be taken to the Defence Ministry’s dacha in Zavidovo. And isolated “until the situation is clarified.”
– And where is the Kryuchkov-Yeltsin conspiracy here?
– Kryuchkov called his deputies and ordered them to be ready in Zavidovo to receive the high-ranking guest. He also ordered Alpha to move to Yeltsin’s dacha in Arkhangelskoye and be ready to detain him. At the same time, Pavlov said that he was shocked that he had to go “to meet Yeltsin” – they couldn’t stand each other. But by the end of the meeting, they “forgot” about going to the airport. Neither Pavlov nor Yazov went to Chkalovsky. And Yeltsin “went on a bender” with Nazarbayev and arrived two hours later. And his plane landed at Vnukovo.
– Why didn’t the head of the KGB push the topic of the meeting with the Russian president?
– Precisely because there was an agreement between Yeltsin and Kryuchkov! After the investigation was completed, I spoke with people from Kryuchkov’s inner circle. They told me a lot.
MENTAL PROBLEMS
– For example, what?
– Kryuchkov and the head of the 4th Department of the USSR Ministry of Health, Yevgeny Chazov, had a very good relationship. Kryuchkov, by virtue of his job description, was obliged to know about the health of top officials. But Yeltsin took a dislike to Chazov, gave the order that he not be allowed to treat him, and eventually got rid of him altogether. Chazov told Kryuchkov that with the lifestyle Yeltsin was leading, he would not last long. He indulged, abused sleeping pills. And all this against the background of vegetative and hypertensive crises.
– Did Yeltsin have problems before?
– When Gorbachev removed him from the post of first secretary of the Moscow city party committee, Yeltsin tried to commit suicide – with scissors. He cut himself and was hospitalized. Chazov assembled a council, the commission was headed by Ruben Nadzharov , a corresponding member of the Academy of Medical Sciences. Research showed that this man had mental disorders.
– Was this confirmed later?
– When on August 26, 1991, I interrogated General Vyacheslav Generalov , appointed by Kryuchkov as the head of security at the residence in Foros, he confirmed that Yeltsin had mental health problems. Generalov said that he had a copy of Yeltsin’s medical history in his safe. I didn’t include it in the protocol, but I remembered it. I asked the guys – they later confiscated this history. And they confirmed: the medical history noted both an attempted suicide and other mental health problems . By the way, among Boldin’s papers they found a letter from Yeltsin’s attending physician from Sverdlovsk, written when Boris Nikolayevich was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. The doctor also confirmed that not everything was all right with Yeltsin .
– But if Kryuchkov knew about such problems, why did he rely on Yeltsin?
– Kryuchkov assumed, based on information from Chazov, that if Yeltsin continues in the same spirit, he will “retire” quite soon. That is, he is a convenient temporary figure . Who will preserve the Union today, and tomorrow will be replaced.
“THE SENT COSSACK”
– But the first person in state security didn’t speak out loud about Yeltsin’s “difficulties”?
– No. But Kryuchkov wrote about his contacts with Yeltsin in his letter of repentance to Gorbachev on August 25, 1991. He confirmed that there were contacts. But where, when and for what purpose – he did not specify. This letter is in the case materials, and Russian Prosecutor General Stepankov also recalled it .
– Can we assume that Kryuchkov was preparing Yeltsin for the role of “saviour of the Union”?
– Kryuchkov gave the order to his employees, Zhizhin and Egorov – one a general, the other a colonel, analysts, smart guys – to assess the situation, make their proposals, to introduce the State Emergency Committee or not? And through Yazov he suggested to the then commander of the Airborne Forces Pavel Grachev to participate in this commission. There was a safe house in the village of Mashkino outside Khimki. They wrote this analytical report there for several days. Grachev later admitted that he reported all this to Yeltsin .
– Why then did Kryuchkov “pull in” Grachev?
– I think Kryuchkov specifically included Grachev in this commission so that Yeltsin would be aware of what was happening. So that he would know about the preparation of the State Emergency Committee. And that this work was going against Gorbachev. Well, and Yeltsin himself was simply biding his time.
– That is, thanks to the “Cossack” sent by Kryuchkov, the President of Russia knew in advance about the “undermining” of the President of the USSR?
– Mikhail Poltoranin, the Russian Minister of Press, recalled that when Yeltsin fell ill, he brought him herbs and infusions from Altai. They had a good time. And Yeltsin said: think about how the media will work in a state of emergency. The meeting took place in the summer of 1991. Poltoranin was surprised: are such events really coming? Yeltsin said: I don’t really know yet, but you, just in case, be prepared.
WHO’S ON THE HOOK?
– There is an opinion that Kryuchkov went against Gorbachev because he felt that the chair under him was shaking and they wanted to replace him.
– When Kryuchkov spoke at the Supreme Soviet with criticism of Gorbachev, the latter had already decided to replace the head of the KGB with Vadim Bakatin . Boldin asked Gorbachev about this directly. Mikhail Sergeyevich began to make excuses.
– What other complaints did Kryuchkov have against Gorbachev?
– When the head of the KGB came to the head of the country, he reported classified information and left secret documents with Gorbachev. Then Kryuchkov learned that for some reason the West learned about some secrets. After that, he stopped leaving documents in the head of state’s office.
– Was Kryuchkov “digging” under Gorbachev?
– During a search in August 1991, American Express traveler’s checks for 100 thousand US dollars were found in Boldin’s office. And there was a note: this was a bribe of an especially large size to Gorbachev from the President of South Korea Roh Tae Woo .
– Did this become material evidence?
– Yes. And earlier Kryuchkov and Yazov found out about this money. They said: Mikhail Sergeyevich, this is not right. And he told them: I will give this money to charity! Kryuchkov and Yazov did not make this fact public. But they could have started an investigation and opened a case.
– Under the article “treason”?
– First under the article “Bribe”. And then it would have been possible to go deeper. That is, it would have been possible to remove the President of the USSR legally. And the country would have understood everything. But nothing was explained to it about these strange affairs !
BURST BUBBLE
– When on the morning of August 19 Khasbulatov (then the 1st Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR) came to Yeltsin in Arkhangelskoye and announced that the “putsch” had begun, why did the State Emergency Committee “forget about Yeltsin”?
– And there was no need to “remember” him. I think Kryuchkov himself maintained contact with Yeltsin. Even when the State Emergency Committee meetings were going on, Kryuchkov would go out somewhere and make phone calls. But if it was possible to track when and to whom other members of the State Emergency Committee called on those days, then it was impossible to track Kryuchkov.
– But in the end, Kryuchkov’s hopes for Yeltsin were not justified?
– As one of Kryuchkov’s deputies told me, on August 21 he came to him with a report on the situation in Moscow. Kryuchkov picked up the phone in his presence and called Yeltsin. On speakerphone! “Boris Nikolayevich, we need to fly to Gorbachev and resolve issues .” Yeltsin replied: “ The situation has changed, there is no need for this .” That is, Yeltsin turned 180 degrees in a day. And that deputy chairman of the KGB told me: “ I look at Kryuchkov, and his face is ashen. And he said with such annoyance: “That’s it, we’ve lost… ” Meanwhile, a few hours later, Yeltsin’s team released Gorbachev from the custody of the GKChP supporters in Foros with one specific goal: they still needed him to formalize the legality of the seizure of power.
– Kryuchkov’s goal – the removal of Gorbachev and his replacement with Yeltsin – was not achieved?
– Not in that form. Yeltsin, having waited for the moment, made a U-turn. And he himself dealt a blow simultaneously to both Gorbachev and the State Emergency Committee. He effectively deprived Gorbachev, the CPSU, the Union government, and even the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of power. But if it had not been for the “putsch”, Yeltsin would not have become what he became – a man at the pinnacle of power in a nuclear power.
DECEPTION AND DEBT COLLECTION
– A Ural builder outsmarted the head of state security?
– Once Yeltsin said: I did not outplay Kryuchkov, I deceived him . And this also testifies to the fact that he had an agreement with Kryuchkov before August 19. There is another point that confirms the collusion between Kryuchkov and Yeltsin.
– Which?
– The members of the State Emergency Committee were tried, but not sentenced – they were granted amnesty. But according to the law, amnesty is only applied to those who pleaded guilty. None of them pleaded guilty, and everyone agreed to the amnesty except General Varennikov . They all got their state awards, titles, and salaries back for the time they spent in pretrial detention. Kryuchkov joined AFK Sistema, Pavlov headed one of the banks, and others found themselves in business. The members of the State Emergency Committee were not considered enemies by the authorities in Russia.
– Is this Yeltsin’s gesture of gratitude “for the dirty work done”?
– If they were his enemies, he would hardly have let them get off so easily. I believe that the topic of Kryuchkov’s collusion with Yeltsin requires the most careful study by historians. In the meantime, there are too many lies surrounding the events of the State Emergency Committee, which distort the real picture and the actions of the participants in those events.
This is a summary of the discussion at the latest of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 9 December 2024 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants.
Introduction
On 8 December 2024, President Bashar al-Assad fled Syria for Moscow (where he was granted asylum “on humanitarian grounds”), as an alliance of Syrian rebel groups led by militant Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its partner, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), marched into Damascus unopposed. Their uprising began on 26 November and the speed of the Assad regime’s collapse (which ended five decades of family rule), stunned observers. The Russian air force had carried out airstrikes in northern Syria’s Aleppo and Idlib provinces on 30 November up to 6 December against HTS “terrorists” (Russian and US terminology). By 8 December Russia referred to HTS as “the opposition” rather than “terrorists”.
For Russia, Assad’s fall represents a strategic reversal but cannot yet be characterized as a terminal blow to Russia’s position in the wider region. Russia can reset, adjust and recalibrate relations with other partners and a weaker Iran increases Russia’s relative weight in their bilateral relationship (Russia and Iran are looking to sign a strategic partnership treaty). As Russia withdraws its military observers from the Golan Heights its relationship with Israel can evolve. Nonetheless, Russia’s client Assad has been defeated. Russia’s “permanent” (Putin’s words in 2017 when christening them) air and sea bases in Syria have drawn down and may be withdrawn. In the region, not only is Russia’s military footprint rapidly reducing and will probably be extinguished, but Russia’s reputation and the perception of its reliability is under question.
This seminar identifies and explores these and other implications for Russia. As such it provides an immediate analysis that can act as a baseline of understanding for subsequent revisions.
Russia’s Military Footprint
Russia’s “Grouping of Forces” in Syria is estimated to be corps-sized (12-15,000), primarily located in Khmeimim airbase on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. Russia had other tactical bases, including at the Qamishli Airport in northeastern Syria, and Kuweires Air Base east of Aleppo City. Prior to Assad’s fall, the number of Russian warplanes at Russia’s Khmeimim Air Base has fallen to almost a quarter of previous numbers (from 80 to between 15 and 20 planes and helicopters). When the rebels captured Aleppo International Airport on 29 November, they seized significant amounts of Russian-made military equipment, including a Pantsir air defence system, BM-27 Uragan multiple rocket launchers, L-39 aircraft, ammunition, and a Mi-8 helicopter. Of the 6 vessels docked, frigate Admiral Gorshkov of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, auxiliary ship Yelnya and the cargo ship Inzhener Trubin of the Northern Fleet had already in the preceding days departed Tartus.
As of 8 December, Syrian rebels reportedly capture Jableh, which acts as checkpoint for Khmeimin air base and rebels had entered the town of Tartus. Both bases are now within rebel artillery and drone strikes. The Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Russian State Duma Andrei Kartapalov stated: “There are no military units that are separated [from the Russian bases]. Everyone is where they are supposed to be by the orders of the command unit, and are carrying out their tasks. There are no problematic issues there at the moment, security [of the Russian military contingent] it fully ensured.” (“Senior Russian MP says country’s bases in Syria ‘secure’”, Interfax news agency, Moscow, in Russian, 9 December 2024.) This statement is best possible reading of the precarious position of Russian military.
Russia’s ability to continue to use these bases for power projection in Mediterranean and Red Seas, Middle East and North Africa and threaten NATO’s southern flank, is in serious doubt. The function of these bases for resupply, rotation of ‘Africa Corps’ personnel deployed in support of the constellation of Russia-backed military juntas in the Sahel (e.g. Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic), and transit will be very difficult to replicate elsewhere. Russia’s naval base at the Port of Tartus has storage, maintenance and repair, lubricants and a Kalibr missile loading crane for Kalibr-capable Russian submarines and surface vessels that dock at Tartus. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) has one other such crane in Novorossiysk, which took six months to build after the BSF evacuated the port of Sevastopol in Crimea.
It looks increasingly unlikely that Russia can recover its heavy military weaponry from Syria, including capable air defense systems if forced into a rapid withdrawal, though personnel and aircraft can be evacuated. Traversing the Turkish Straits and Turkish airspace is not a guaranteed option for Russian military and auxiliary vessels. In the event of total withdrawal, Russia needs to develop new naval bases in the region in order to relocate what equipment it can and as a launchpad for power projection to shore up its African operations. It takes years to negotiate access and the control Russia exercised at its Syrian bases would not be replicated elsewhere. Tobruk and Benghazi in Eastern Libya, controlled by Khalifa Haftar, are mentioned as possible alternatives, but Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi—and the West—would oppose. Port Sudan in the Red Sea is a possibility but stability in Sudan brings it into question. Russia might look to Algeria, its largest arms export market in Africa, accounting for 80 per cent of all arms exports to the continent.
Russia and the Regional Fallout
HTS success is in part due to Russian and Iranian weakness, with Assad’s external sponsors distracted by conflicts in Ukraine and Lebanon respectively: Russia is overstretched and the mobility of Iran-affiliated groups reduced as Hezbollah had withdrawn its forces from Aleppo, Hama and Homs for Lebanon. Putin had disbanded Wagner PMC following Prigozhin’s uprising in June 2023. Is the conclusion in Moscow and Teheran that both states failed together and that shared strategic defeat brings them closer together or does the dual debacle destabilize the bilateral relationship? Might Iran’s gamble of 7 October 2023 even bring about that regime’s downfall? What of the regional impact for Russia?
In Syria, Türkiye-backed rebels are victorious and Türkiye is the clear net beneficiary, alongside Israel, with Iran and Russia the losers. Türkiye can expand its buffer zone along the Turkish-Syrian border and pushback against Kurdish paramilitary forces. Ankara now has unrivalled leverage over post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts, whereas by contrast Russia lacks financial resources and credibility. HTS has issued a number of inclusive statements to assuage the fears of minorities and foreign powers, not least “Syria for the Syrians”. Turkish pro-government media coverage suggests that the rebel seizure of Aleppo could pave the way for the return of millions of Syrian migrants from Türkiye. Can Erdogan set the terms of HTS-Russian negotiations for Russia to symbolically maintain control of its air and naval base? Ankara’s leverage over Moscow will increase at the end of December, when the Russian-Ukrainian gas deal expires and the only transit route for Russian gas export to Europe is through Türkiye. Syria hadn’t exported any oil, for example, since 2019 (and almost all the oil and much of the gas is actually in Kurdish hands) which entities secure the concessions Assad awarded Lukoil and Gazprom in return for Russian support? Which illicit groups will manage lucrative drugs exports from Syria? They will not be Russian.
In Russia’s media space we see that the specter of contagion in the shape of foreign fighters and exported “Color Revolutions” increases. From a Russian perspective, the threat of Syrian fighters with links to Central Asia and North Caucasus returning is understandable, the IS Caliphate operating in the North Caucasus is not aligned with HTS. Since 2022, the “Special Military Operation” (SVO) in Ukraine has become the organizing principle and top priority of the Putin regime. In this period, Russian influence in Armenia, Moldova and now Syria, has demonstrably weakened. Georgian developments run in parallel with those in Syria. Russia currently supports the Georgian Dream Party which uses violence to suppress the Georgian opposition which refuses to accept the November electoral results. Events in Syria likely heighten paranoia in Moscow, exacerbate its fear of domino effects and reinforce a perceived need to show no weakness. Might Putin push the pro-Russian ruling party to institute a harder crackdown, which may become self-defeating as the government oversteps?
From September 2015 onwards, Russia offered direct political, logistical, military, intelligence and propaganda assistance to the Assad regime. This support played a critical role in Syria and this in turn strengthened Russia’s role in the Middle East as it built relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates. Russian disinformation operations in support of Assad to obfuscate his use of chemical weapons, torture, rape and deaths in the civil war will now be exposed and uncontested as prisons are opened and corrupted kleptocratic Assad elites flee or are held to account. Such revelations delegitimize Moscow-based Assad and Russia’s reputation, spotlighting Russia’s complicity and enabling function in support of a hated regime. The Syria debacle brings into question the reliability of Russia as an ally. It undercuts, to put it mildly, Putin’s pretensions expressed at the 22-24 October BRICS+ summit that Russia is the “informal leader” of the “global majority”. As Ruslan Pukov notes: “Moscow does not have sufficient military forces, resources, influence, and authority to intervene effectively by force outside the former Soviet Union, and it can operate there, in fact, only with the condescending tolerance of other strong powers and as long as they allow it. After 2022, this is even more evident. It is quite possible to bluff with power and opportunities on the world stage, but it is important not to believe in your own bluff too much.” (Lessons from Syria: Why the Assad regime fell)
Conclusions: Who is to blame for Moscow’s strategic defeat?
In September 2015 Russia’s Syria intervention was Putin’s “strategic surprise”, as Putin committed Russia’s military to coalitional expeditionary warfare outside the historic border of 400-year-old empire. In February 2022, Putin was the strategic decision-maker regarding the “SVO”, gambling on a quick victory. As a result, Russia’s military is tied down in Ukraine and it lacked the reserves and resources to continue to support Assad. Immediate context also tells a story. On 7 December, President Zelensky met President-Elect Trump and gives an upbeat assessment of prospects for a just and durable peace. On 8 December, Trump posts: “Assad is gone. He has fled his country. His protector, Russia, Russia, Russia, led by (President) Vladimir Putin, was not interested in protecting him any longer. There was no reason for Russia to be there in the first place. They lost all interest in Syria because of Ukraine … a war that should never have started, and could go on forever.”
In Russia, though, Putin cannnot be blamed. With regards to public sentiment, Syria is not high on the agenda. Russian state-controlled media can scapegoat Assad. For example, Grigory Lukyanov, a researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, attributed to the failures of Assad to address the root causes that led to the Arab Spring in 2011 and the civil war – “corruption, ineffective governance, nepotism in the civil service and the armed forces. Added to them was the lack of progress in economic recovery, which has been greatly hampered by US sanctions.” (Russian press mulls reasons for fall of Syria’s Assad, 9 December 2024.) These characteristics are a little close to the bone as they appear also to apply to Russia.
Erdogan’s support for the rebels makes for a safer “stab in the back” betrayal narrative. Putin is humiliated by Erdogan three times: first, when the 2020 ceasefire deal was broken; second, when in a phone conversation on December 3, Erdogan (who made the call) reassured Putin about the limited goals of the rebel offensive; and, third, and ongoing, as Moscow has to beg for Ankara’s help in evacuations and withdrawals. Russian military bloggers also look to how the “Sandbox” (Russian military nickname for Syria) was used by the Russian General Staff to launder and rehabilitate the reputations of Russian generals who had failed in the SVO (e.g. Gen Sergei Kisel, Gen Aleksandr Chayko, and Col. Gen. Andrey Serdyukov). It is a short step from blaming Russian military high command to its commander-in-chief.
Russia’s current emerging narratives (in effect, when one door closes another opens, others are to blame and have lost more), will be seriously challenged if military withdrawal turns into a Saigon-type rout. A bloody and chaotic retreat will break into public consciousness and the sense of an unravelling of edge of empire and Navalny’s critique of Putin as the “old man in the bunker” will become more widespread. On 19 December Putin appears in his annual Direct Line phone in. If Putin feels the need to indulge in “Oreshnik-style” demonstrative grandstanding in order to compensate for the loss in Syria, his position will become weaker not stronger.
Disclaimer
This summary reflects the views of the authors (Dr. Pavel Baev, Dr. Mark Galeotti, Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg, Dr. Graeme P. Herd and Dr. András Rácz) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.
While my own In Moscow’s Shadows podcast is still going strong, of late I seem to have been featuring on a lot of other people’s, so here is a quick rundown of some (which all too often also seem to be videos…). Perversely, let me encourage you not to listen to them all, or at least not at once, as there is inevitably a great deal of overlap, but I have tried to indicate the particular focus(es) of each.
A two-parter with the ever-thoughtful Vlad Vexler, the first on the ‘stuff’ – Putin, Ukraine, etc – and the second on the ‘process’ – how we reconcile public intellectualism with fallibility, the role of informed debate in democratic society and the like. Each very different, but I thoroughly enjoyed recording both.
A two-hander with Anna Arutunyan about our book Downfall with the nattily-dressed Joshua Huminski, in this new and highly-recommended book-themed podcast
Also excerpted in a print interview, a wide-ranging conversation with Alasdair Craig for the Institute of Art and Ideas, on Putin’s style and structures of rule, the centrality of the ‘minigarchs’ – or the modern equivalent of the gentry – and what happens when he goes.
A three-parter with Pyotr Kurzin, covering everything from whether sanctions have failed (no, but they were never the wonder weapon some claimed) to whether Putin was ever really going to join NATO (again, no)
Various reports I have written over the years under the auspices of my consultancy Mayak Intelligence are now being posted on its site, here. So far there are three:
PUTIN’S PRAETORIANS: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE NATIONALGUARD AND THEIR CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE STREETS (2024, on the capabilities and problems of the Rosgvardiya, especially in light of their role in Ukraine)
SPETSNAZ: THE MEN BEHIND THE MISSION (2022, on the political attitudes of serving and former special forces)
THE SECRETARIAT: THE SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF AND RUSSIANPOLICYMAKING (2022, on what for me is the least-understood and most important national security body in Putin’s Russia)
More will follow, and you’re welcome to use them, but please do respect copyright and cite the original whe
This blog’s author, Dr Mark Galeotti has been researching Russian history and security issues since the late 1980s, and enjoyed regularly travelling there to study, teach, research and simply engage with the Russian people — until the Kremlin chose to ban him indefinitely in 2022.
Educated at Cambridge University and the LSE, he is the director of the consultancy firm Mayak Intelligence. He is also an Honorary Professor at UCL School of Slavonic & East European Studies, Ernest Bevin Associate Fellow in Euro-Atlantic Geopolitics with the Council on Geostrategy and a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, as well as a senior non-resident fellow at the Institute of International Relations Prague and an Associate Fellow of the Middle East Institute’s Frontier Europe programme. Previously he has been a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute, Head of the Centre for European Security at the Institute of International Relations Prague, Professor of Global Affairs at New York University, head of the History department at Keele University in the UK, an adviser at the British Foreign Office and a visiting professor at MGIMO (Moscow), Charles University (Prague) and Rutgers (Newark), as well as a visiting fellow with the ECFR.
His books include Downfall: Prigozhin, Putin and the new fight for the future of Russia with Anna Arutunyan (Ebury, 2024), Putin’s Wars (Osprey, 2023), The Weaponisation of Everything (Yale University Press, 2022), A Short History of Russia (HarperCollins, 2020/Ebury, 2021), We Need To Talk About Putin (Ebury, 2019) and The Vory: Russia’s super mafia (Yale University Press, 2018), and several Osprey books. He is a regular contributor to the Sunday Times and The Spectator Coffee House blog.
In Moscow's Shadows 
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