Wargame on the NATO crisis scenario:
Wargame Analysis: NATO Crisis Over U.S. Attempt to Seize Greenland (2026)
Date: January 18, 2026
Executive Summary
This wargame paper evaluates the geopolitical, military, and legal ramifications of a hypothetical U.S. presidential order to seize Greenland by force in 2026. Greenland, although geographically distant, occupies a strategically vital position in the Arctic. It is a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark and under the umbrella of NATO’s collective defense due to Denmark’s membership.
The paper addresses three primary scenarios:
- A unilateral U.S. military action without prior NATO presence.
- U.S. action following preemptive NATO deployment in Greenland.
- Possible Russian involvement supporting American strategic objectives.
These scenarios illuminate emerging fractures in the post–Cold War alliance structure and test the legal and operational resilience of NATO. The analysis incorporates plausible military operations, strategic calculations, legal interpretations, and alliance politics. The findings underscore NATO’s vulnerability to internal aggression and the emerging complexities of Arctic geopolitics.
Scenario 1: Unilateral U.S. Military Action Against Greenland
In this scenario, the United States acts unilaterally without prior NATO presence on Greenland. The U.S. President, citing national security threats, Arctic resource access, and geostrategic competition with China and Russia, orders U.S. forces to take control of Greenland. This action bypasses Denmark’s sovereignty and the established NATO decision-making process.
Denmark lodges formal protests and convenes the North Atlantic Council (NAC). European NATO members quickly assess the implications for collective defense. The NAC faces an unprecedented challenge: the aggressor is a founding NATO member. Diplomatic channels are overwhelmed, and military planners in Brussels begin urgent consultations.
Potential responses include:
- Coordinated defensive deployment under Danish command.
- Invocation of Article 4 (consultation) but not Article 5 (collective defense).
- Unilateral actions by European states to oppose U.S. occupation.
The outcome hinges on political will and cohesion within NATO. A fragmented response would undermine alliance credibility; a strong unified stance might deter U.S. aggression or lead to internal alliance rupture. The scenario sets the stage for broader intra-NATO confrontations over norms, legality, and leadership.
Scenario 2: NATO Troops Already Deployed in Greenland
Anticipating potential U.S. coercion, Denmark initiates Operation Arctic Endurance with support from key NATO allies. Troops from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Norway, and Canada are pre-positioned across Greenlandic territory. Their presence symbolizes alliance solidarity and positions NATO forces to deter unilateral action.
Despite warnings, the U.S. President orders an amphibious landing in western Greenland. European troops, embedded with Greenlandic defense units, issue radio warnings and prepare for confrontation. As U.S. naval and air units approach, the situation escalates. Military deconfliction fails, and skirmishes erupt at key access points such as Kangerlussuaq and Thule. This intra-alliance combat marks an unprecedented development.
Politically, NATO enters a state of emergency. The NAC debates Article 5 invocation against one of its own members—a situation for which no legal precedent exists. European leaders call for the suspension of U.S. participation in NATO activities. The U.S. administration, facing Congressional opposition, accuses European allies of betrayal and threatens broader disengagement.
This scenario tests NATO’s institutional integrity and reveals critical flaws in its governance mechanisms under conditions of internal aggression.
Scenario 3: Russian Involvement Supporting U.S. Objectives
This scenario introduces an additional layer of complexity: covert or indirect Russian support for the United States. While no formal alliance is formed, Russia seizes the opportunity to weaken NATO’s cohesion.
The Kremlin launches disinformation campaigns portraying the crisis as European overreach. Simultaneously, Russian cyber units target European military communications in Greenland and NATO headquarters. In the maritime domain, Russian submarines and surface vessels begin Arctic maneuvers near Greenland and the GIUK Gap, signaling strategic alignment without explicit coordination.
This activity compels NATO to divide its attention between deterring U.S. aggression and monitoring Russian advances. Meanwhile, Moscow offers backchannel support to Washington—suggesting coordination on sanctions, Middle East posture, and Arctic economic zones.
The NATO alliance struggles to maintain coherence. Internal divisions deepen as member states disagree on the proper response to dual provocations. This scenario underscores the multidimensional threats posed by strategic opportunism and the vulnerabilities of alliance-based security architectures.
Combined Strategic Assessment
All three scenarios reveal core structural weaknesses in NATO’s design. Built for collective defense against external threats, NATO lacks the internal legal and procedural frameworks to manage intra-alliance conflict. The presence of European forces in Greenland represents a partial deterrent, but also escalates the risk of direct combat. Russia’s involvement exacerbates the crisis by introducing hybrid threats and diverting European resources.
Key strategic takeaways:
- NATO lacks mechanisms to address member-on-member aggression.
- European military cohesion is robust, but political unity remains fragile.
- Russian opportunism is highly effective in exacerbating transatlantic disunity.
This assessment suggests an urgent need for NATO reform, especially regarding Article 5 applicability, Arctic doctrine, and intra-member conflict protocols.
Legal and Political Implications
From a legal standpoint, any unilateral U.S. action against Greenland violates the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty. Denmark, as Greenland’s sovereign authority, is entitled to territorial integrity and protection from aggression—even by an ally.
Within the U.S., such military action would likely exceed the limits of executive authority and violate Congressional war powers. If the President bypassed authorization, legal and constitutional challenges would arise.
Politically, the crisis would damage transatlantic relations irreparably. NATO’s institutional credibility would be severely undermined. European states would likely explore alternative defense structures, while Greenland and the Arctic region would be militarized at a scale not seen since the Cold War.
Conclusion
The hypothetical crisis over Greenland reveals deep structural and doctrinal vulnerabilities within NATO. A unilateral U.S. attempt to seize Greenland—particularly against allied troops—would provoke military confrontation and potentially unravel the alliance. The added variable of Russian hybrid involvement raises the stakes further, drawing Europe into a multifront geopolitical contest.
The crisis scenario demands serious consideration of NATO’s future configuration. Without reforms to address intra-member aggression, hybrid warfare, and Arctic-specific threats, the alliance risks fragmentation in the face of 21st-century strategic realities.
Addendum: Strategic Benefits to the Russian Federation from the Greenland Crisis
Scenario 1: Unilateral U.S. Military Action Against Greenland
Putin’s Strategic Gains:
- Erosion of NATO Unity: A U.S. act of aggression against a NATO-aligned territory forces European allies to question the credibility of NATO’s core deterrent (Article 5), weakening the alliance from within.
- Legitimization of Russian Behavior: The U.S. use of force against a sovereign territory gives Moscow rhetorical ammunition to justify its own interventions in Ukraine, Georgia, and the Arctic.
- Diplomatic Leverage: Russia can position itself as a “rational actor” or even a mediator amid NATO chaos, gaining soft power and undermining Western moral high ground.
- Opportunity for Arctic Militarization: As NATO’s focus turns inward, Russia can accelerate its military and economic expansion across the Russian Arctic with reduced scrutiny or pushback.
Scenario 2: NATO Troops Already Deployed in Greenland
Putin’s Strategic Gains:
- Alliance Entrapment: A direct clash between U.S. and European NATO troops fulfills a long-term Russian goal: sowing conflict among Western states without direct intervention.
- Diversion of NATO Resources: European states and Canada would be forced to reallocate forces and funding toward Arctic defense and intra-alliance security, detracting from collective focus on Eastern Europe and Ukraine.
- Geopolitical Realignment: If NATO fractures or suspends U.S. participation, Russia can exploit the resultant vacuum to cultivate bilateral deals with disaffected NATO or EU states.
- Narrative Control: Kremlin propaganda would frame the crisis as proof that NATO is an unstable relic of the Cold War, justifying Russian-led alternative security frameworks (e.g., CSTO, BRICS security council).
Scenario 3: Russian Involvement Supporting U.S. Objectives
Putin’s Strategic Gains:
- Asymmetric Leverage: By covertly aiding the U.S. or simply exploiting the chaos, Russia gains maximum geopolitical return with minimal direct risk or cost.
- Operational Distraction: Cyber attacks and Arctic naval deployments tie down NATO resources and create vulnerabilities on NATO’s eastern flank.
- Testing Alliance Limits: Russia can observe NATO’s crisis response mechanisms in real-time, identifying gaps in cohesion, interoperability, and command-and-control.
- Strategic Normalization of Hybrid Tactics: As NATO struggles to define responses to internal aggression and hybrid threats, Russia can further normalize cyberwarfare, information ops, and economic coercion as legitimate statecraft tools.
Combined Strategic Assessment
Across all scenarios, the Greenland crisis offers Russia a unique geopolitical windfall:
- Internal NATO polarization benefits Moscow’s long-term goal of a fragmented and ineffective alliance.
- The Arctic, long seen as Russia’s strategic frontier, becomes less contested as NATO faces internal disruption.
- Russia can shift global narratives about the “rules-based order,” equating Western hypocrisy with its own authoritarian assertiveness.
Net Effect for Russia:
Without firing a shot, the Kremlin reaps strategic, psychological, and diplomatic gains from an alliance crisis it neither started nor controls, but can deeply exploit.
Cyberwarfare as Low-Intensity Conflict: Structural Coercion and the Exploitation of U.S. Instability
Abstract
This paper reconceptualizes cyberwar and cyberwarfare to include non‑kinetic cyber operations as legitimate and deliberate forms of warfare, rather than as peripheral or sub-threshold activities. It examines the evolving use of cyberwarfare as a modality of low‑intensity conflict in which foreign adversaries exploit legal ambiguity and internal political vulnerabilities within democracies such as the United States. Anchored in the theory of structural coercion, this analysis treats sustained non‑kinetic campaigns, those that degrade institutional capacity, erode public legitimacy, and impose cumulative strategic harm, as actual acts of war, even absent physical destruction or casualties. Moreover, it considers how such campaigns are increasingly used as strategic shaping operations, designed to deter or degrade the target’s capacity to project power while adversaries pursue kinetic, economic, or territorial objectives in other theaters. In this sense, cyberwarfare becomes both a tool of coercion and a force-multiplier, distracting and destabilizing high-capability adversaries like the United States to gain political and military advantage elsewhere. Drawing on real-world cases such as the 2023–2024 Volt Typhoon campaign and foreign interference in the 2024 U.S. elections, as well as detailed wargame simulations and legal scholarship, the paper argues that cyberwarfare has emerged as the preferred method for achieving wartime objectives without conventional escalation.
Introduction
Cyberwarfare increasingly exists in a legally ambiguous zone, its activities often fall below the conventional definitions of “armed attack,” yet they accomplish many of war’s strategic functions. Non-kinetic, state-directed cyber operations aim to degrade the opponent’s governance capacity, sow public distrust, and induce policy shifts, all without physical violence or traditional battlefield confrontations (Structural Coercion in Cyberspace, n.d.).
Cyber Conflict and Legal Liminality
International law defines the use of force under the UN Charter based on observable physical effects: death, destruction, or significant material damage (United Nations, 1945). Under this framework, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies only when these kinetic thresholds are met. However, most cyber operations, such as disinformation campaigns, infrastructure probing, or disruptions to institutional processes, produce processual and systemic harm rather than immediate physical consequences (Structural Coercion in Cyberspace, n.d.). As a result, such operations are frequently excluded from LOAC applicability, shielding them from legal classification as acts of war and precluding collective military response.
This legal gap has contributed to the strategic normalization of cyber coercion, where adversarial states engage in persistent, deniable campaigns that erode governance, sow public distrust, and paralyze national decision-making, often without triggering international retaliation (Structural Coercion in Cyberspace, n.d.). Yet this effect-based legal model fails to account for indirect but lethal consequences of cyber actions. For instance, cyberattacks targeting electrical grids, hospitals, emergency services, and water treatment systems can result in real-world fatalities, including deaths from medical equipment failure, traffic accidents, and delayed emergency responses. These are not hypothetical risks; they represent collateral damage directly attributable to cyber actions, even in the absence of traditional kinetic force.
By maintaining a narrow focus on direct physical effects, international law overlooks the cascading and often deadly impacts of modern cyber operations on civilian populations. This oversight not only undermines accountability but also incentivizes the continued use of legally insulated but strategically lethal cyber campaigns, many of which would likely be classified as warfare under any other technological paradigm.
Internal Instability as Strategic Terrain: The Trump-Era Legacy
The Trump administration’s erosion of democratic norms, through politicization of law enforcement, undermining electoral integrity, and disinformation, created an environment ripe for exploitation. A scenario modeled in the Structural Coercion Under Internal Strain wargame imagined a future United States already weakened by a consolidating authoritarian regime, further targeted by a foreign adversary (Russia) using non-kinetic hybrid operations (Tabletop Wargame, 2023).
This internal vulnerability enables a feedback loop where foreign interference accelerates domestic dysfunction, and the state’s responses, often involving repression or over-centralization, further degrade democratic legitimacy.
Real-World Case Study 1: Volt Typhoon and Chinese Cyber Pre-Positioning
In 2023, U.S. cybersecurity agencies publicly identified Volt Typhoon, a Chinese state-sponsored cyber operation targeting critical infrastructure across multiple sectors, including communications, energy, water, and transportation (CISA, 2023). These activities emphasized long-term access and stealth, not immediate disruption, consistent with Chinese doctrine emphasizing “systems confrontation” and political warfare (CISA, 2023; War on the Rocks, 2024).
Volt Typhoon exemplifies how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) utilizes cyber pre-positioning to prepare the battlespace for potential leverage, especially in the event of an Indo-Pacific contingency such as Taiwan. These campaigns do not aim to destroy infrastructure but to undermine confidence in its reliability and increase response friction during crises (Tabletop Wargame: With Chinese Characteristics, 2024).
Real-World Case Study 2: Foreign Interference in the 2024 U.S. Elections
The 2024 U.S. presidential election again became a target for foreign influence operations, with both Russia and China exploiting partisan polarization, social media amplification, and AI-generated disinformation. While kinetic attacks were absent, intelligence reports and academic monitors documented persistent narrative manipulation, especially targeting swing-state voters and undermining trust in electoral outcomes (Metacurity, 2024).
In line with previous efforts from 2016 and 2020, these campaigns focused on:
- Amplifying distrust in voting systems;
- Discrediting political opponents with fabricated leaks;
- Echoing domestic narratives to evade attribution.
Like the Volt Typhoon activities, these tactics were strategically deniable, designed to complicate legal or diplomatic response while imposing strategic cost, not by changing votes directly, but by weakening democratic legitimacy.
Strategic Logic: War Without War
These campaigns confirm what the Structural Coercion framework predicts: adversaries engage in continuous, non-spectacular operations that degrade a state’s political and operational capacity (Structural Coercion in Cyberspace, n.d.). They aim to coerce rather than destroy, often by creating scenarios where the target state overreacts, further undermining its internal legitimacy (Tabletop Wargame, 2023).
China’s focus on systems degradation and Russia’s emphasis on information overload both seek to manipulate the tempo and credibility of U.S. decision-making. The success metric is not military victory but internal paralysis or foreign-policy self-deterrence (Tabletop Wargame: With Chinese Characteristics, 2024).
Normative Implications and Policy Recommendations
The legal tolerance of these operations is not indicative of their benign nature. Instead, their ambiguity frustrates attribution, complicates proportional response, and enables strategic erosion without triggering collective defense mechanisms like NATO’s Article 5 (Structural Coercion in Cyberspace, n.d.).
Policy reforms must address:
- The development of international norms that recognize cumulative non-kinetic harm;
- Domestic resilience investments in election integrity, critical infrastructure, and information ecosystems;
- Attribution transparency mechanisms to improve public understanding and diplomatic consensus.
Conclusion
The campaigns of Volt Typhoon and foreign electoral interference in 2024 reflect the reality that low-intensity cyber conflict is now the dominant form of great power competition. These are not isolated incidents but components of sustained, strategic warfare that avoids the battlefield while reshaping the balance of power.
If democracies fail to adapt legally, strategically, and institutionally, structural coercion will become the defining feature of 21st-century conflict, eroding sovereignty without ever firing a shot.
References
CISA. (2023). People’s Republic of China state-sponsored cyber actor living off the land to evade detection. U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. People’s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection | CISA
Brookings: How disinformation defined the 2024 election narrative
Structural Coercion in Cyberspace. (n.d.). Why it remains below armed conflict yet constitutes low-intensity warfare[PDF].
Tabletop Wargame: Structural Coercion With Chinese Characteristics. (2024). PRC hybrid campaign targeting U.S. system cohesion and legitimacy [PDF].
UN Charter. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. UN Charter | United Nations
War on the Rocks. (2024). China’s Three Warfares perspective. China’s ‘Three Warfares’ in Perspective
A Physical Security Primer For Lawful, Peaceful Protesting In The United States Today
Introduction
Public protest has always carried physical risk. What has changed is the density, speed, and unpredictability of today’s protest environment. Large crowds form rapidly, law enforcement tactics shift with little warning, vehicles move through mixed-use streets, and bystanders with no stake in the event can become sudden variables. None of this requires bad intent to become dangerous. Most injuries at protests occur not because someone planned harm, but because people were unprepared for how quickly conditions can deteriorate.
This guide exists to address that reality. It is a physical security primer for lawful, peaceful protest, focused on injury prevention, situational awareness, and safe movement before, during, and after an event. It does not advocate confrontation, evasion of law enforcement, or unlawful behavior. It is grounded in the same principles used in crowd safety, emergency management, and occupational health: anticipate hazards, reduce exposure, preserve mobility, and plan exits before you need them.
Physical security at a protest is not about gear, bravado, or “holding ground.” It is about understanding how crowds behave, how stress propagates through a space, and how ordinary environmental factors—heat, fatigue, noise, and confusion, can compound into real harm. A single fall can become a crush injury. A blocked intersection can become a trap. A moment of panic can ripple outward faster than anyone can correct it.
This primer is written for people who want to participate while minimizing preventable risk to themselves and those around them. It emphasizes preparation over reaction, de-escalation over confrontation, and early exit over endurance. It assumes that you may be surrounded by people with different goals, tolerances for risk, and levels of experience, and that your safety is tied to how well you can read and respond to those dynamics.
Nothing in this guide is legal advice. It is not a substitute for local knowledge, medical judgment, or professional training. It is a practical framework intended to help you think clearly under pressure, make conservative decisions when conditions change, and return home safely.
This is not legal advice.
Threat model for physical security at protests
Most real-world harm at protests comes from predictable and recurring categories. Understanding these risks in advance allows participants to make conservative decisions before conditions deteriorate.
Crowd dynamics
Crush injuries, surges, panic waves, stampedes, falls, and loss of mobility are among the most common sources of serious injury at protests. These risks increase rapidly when exits narrow, density increases, or people panic in response to sudden movement, loud noises, or perceived threats. Crowd danger often escalates faster than individuals realize.
Vehicle threats
Risks include accidental traffic contact, hostile or reckless vehicle behavior, and poor perimeter control at intersections. Protesters pinned between vehicles, curbs, and dense crowds face elevated injury risk. Vehicle threats are especially acute at night, during dispersals, or when demonstrations spill into mixed-use streets.
Interpersonal violence
Counter-protester conflict, opportunistic assaults, and flashpoint moments near police lines or barricades can emerge quickly. These incidents often begin with verbal escalation and become physical within seconds, drawing in bystanders who did not intend to engage.
Law enforcement control measures
Crowd-control tactics such as kettling, dispersal orders, physical pushes, and deployment of chemical irritants or impact munitions can affect large numbers of people indiscriminately. Even when you are not the intended target, these measures can cause serious injury, particularly to the head, eyes, and respiratory system. Rapid changes in law enforcement posture are a strong indicator that conditions are becoming unsafe.
Environmental hazards
Heat illness, dehydration, hypothermia, smoke exposure, and poor air quality regularly contribute to medical emergencies at protests. These risks compound under stress, prolonged standing, noise, and limited access to water or shade.
Detention-related risk
Separation from your group, loss of personal property, inability to communicate medical needs, and confusion during detention increase physical and psychological stress. Basic preparation, including knowing how to assert medical needs and having emergency contacts accessible, reduces downstream harm.
Lethal force considerations in the post-ICE incident environment
Recent lethal force incidents involving federal immigration enforcement have changed the physical risk landscape around some protests. When demonstrations occur in the aftermath of, or in proximity to, federal enforcement actions, particularly those involving shootings, the probability of rapid escalation increases even for peaceful participants.
Key characteristics of this risk environment include:
- Heightened emotional volatility: Protests responding to lethal force incidents often involve grief, anger, and fear, which can amplify crowd reactivity and shorten escalation timelines.
- Increased federal presence: Federal agents may operate alongside or independently of local law enforcement, sometimes in unmarked vehicles or less familiar uniforms, complicating situational awareness.
- Different engagement rules: Federal agencies may operate under distinct use-of-force policies and command structures, increasing uncertainty about how situations will be handled.
- Narrative conflict: Public disputes between federal authorities, local officials, and eyewitnesses can fuel mistrust and unpredictability in crowd behavior.
- Expanded tactical posture: Additional deployments, perimeter shifts, or rapid response movements by law enforcement are more likely in the wake of lethal force incidents.
Practical safety implications for protesters:
- Treat areas near active or recent federal enforcement operations as higher-risk zones, even if a protest is peaceful.
- Avoid proximity to law enforcement vehicle movements, arrests, or enforcement activity unrelated to the protest itself.
- Do not assume all armed or tactical personnel are operating under the same rules or command as local police.
- Prioritize distance, visibility, and exits over proximity to flashpoints or symbolic locations.
- Be prepared to leave earlier than planned if enforcement posture changes or crowd emotions spike.
This section is not about intent or legality; it is about risk recognition. Lethal force incidents introduce uncertainty, compressed decision timelines, and a higher consequence floor. Conservative movement, early exit decisions, and avoiding convergence zones are the most reliable ways to reduce exposure.
Physical security objective:
Your physical security goal is not to win a contest, hold ground, or test limits.
It is to reduce exposure to risk, preserve safe movement, maintain communications, and keep clear exit options before you need them.
Pre-protest planning that actually changes outcomes
Decide your personal risk ceiling
Before you go, decide what you will do if:
- the event is declared unlawful,
- police issue dispersal orders,
- crowd density becomes unsafe,
- chemical irritants are deployed,
- counter-protesters arrive, or
- someone in your group is injured.
Having these thresholds in advance prevents bad “in-the-moment” decisions.
Choose a buddy system and a rendezvous plan
- Go with at least one person; designate a “lead” and a “rear” in your micro-group.
- Pick two meetup points: one close and one far (in case the close one becomes blocked).
- Pick a “hard stop time” (a time you leave no matter what). This is basic crowd-risk discipline.
Medical and accessibility plan
- If you have asthma, diabetes, severe allergies, or heat sensitivity, plan around that first. Carry required meds and tell your buddy where they are.
- Heat risk is common in prolonged outdoor actions; CDC/NIOSH guidance emphasizes proactive hydration and recognizing heat illness symptoms.
Clothing and PPE: practical, non-theatrical
This section is about injury prevention and environmental exposure, not escalation.
Footwear and clothing
- Closed-toe shoes with traction (no sandals). Expect broken glass, curb edges, and sprinting in a crowd.
- Long sleeves/pants (as weather allows) reduce abrasions.
- Avoid loose scarves or dangling items that can snag.
Eye protection (high value)
Eye injuries are a major severity driver in crowd-control contexts; even “less-lethal” projectiles and chemical irritants can cause lasting harm. Choose impact-rated eye protection if you can tolerate it. (PMC)
Respiratory considerations
- If you’re sensitive to smoke/irritants or have asthma, a well-fitting mask can help with particulates. Prioritize breathability and fit over theatrics.
Hands and head
- Light gloves can prevent cuts if you fall.
- A basic hat reduces heat load; CDC heat guidance stresses sun mitigation and cooling strategies.
“Carry kit” checklist for physical safety
Keep it small. Mobility is safety.
Core
- Water (and electrolytes if you’ll be out for hours)
- Small first-aid items: bandages, gauze, tape, antiseptic wipes
- Your critical medications (in original container if feasible)
- ID and a small amount of cash
- A portable phone battery
Optional but useful
- Saline solution (for eyes; used for irrigation)
- Earplugs (noise fatigue is real)
- Sunscreen (reapply)
- A simple paper card with emergency contacts and medical notes
The ACLU’s protest guidance emphasizes preparation, documentation of injuries, and practical steps if rights are violated.
Movement discipline: how people avoid getting hurt
Think in “exits,” not “frontlines”
Continuously identify:
- nearest side street,
- nearest open area,
- barriers that could become choke points,
- the direction the crowd is compressing.
If density increases so you cannot freely turn your body or raise your arms, you are entering a crush-risk zone. Leave early.
Avoid the most dangerous geometry
High-risk locations:
- between opposing groups,
- directly in front of police lines,
- against fences/walls, and
- narrow bridges, tunnels, or stairwells.
De-escalation posture
Your physical security is strongly correlated with how “available” you look to conflict:
- keep hands visible,
- do not engage provocations,
- do not run unless there is a clear safety reason (running creates panic waves).
Vehicle risk is real—treat streets as hostile terrain
- At intersections, position yourself so you can move laterally, not just forward/back.
- Avoid being pinned between a crowd and a curb line.
- If marshals are present, follow routing away from active traffic lanes.
This is one of the most overlooked physical risk channels, especially at night.
If crowd-control measures appear
I will keep this high-level and safety-oriented.
Early indicators
- Officers changing formation, bringing out specialized launchers, moving barricades, or issuing repeated amplified instructions.
- Crowd compression near fixed barriers.
What reduces injury probability
- Increase distance from the focal point.
- Move perpendicular to the “pressure gradient” (away from where the crowd is densest).
- Maintain buddy contact; do not let one person become isolated.
Less-lethal systems are widely documented as capable of serious harm; U.S. government and medical literature both describe risks, including head/eye trauma.
Detention and separation: physical-security priorities
If you are stopped or detained:
- Stay calm, do not physically resist, and state clearly if you need medical attention.
- Your rights vary by context, but the ACLU’s general guidance on police encounters and the right to remain silent is a baseline many people rely on.
- Consider carrying the phone number for legal support on paper (many groups recommend this practice). The National Lawyers Guild provides “know your rights” resources oriented to protest contexts. (nlg.org)
Post-protest safety: the part most people skip
Safe exit and decompression
- Leave with your buddy.
- Do a quick injury check: feet, ankles, wrists, eyes, breathing.
- Rehydrate; monitor for heat illness signs after you’re home.
If you were injured or witnessed misconduct
The ACLU advises gathering witness contact info, photographing injuries, and documenting details for later complaints.
Home and personal safety after visibility
If you are concerned about doxxing or harassment after a public action:
- tighten privacy on your public-facing profiles,
- review what your vehicle and home exterior reveal (stickers, visible addresses, etc.),
- coordinate with trusted friends for check-ins for 24–48 hours after high-tension events.
A simple one-page “go / no-go” decision checklist
Do not go (or leave early) if:
- you cannot identify at least two exit routes,
- crowd density is increasing and movement is constrained,
- you are alone and cannot maintain buddy contact,
- you have a medical condition that is destabilizing (heat, asthma flare, etc.),
- the environment is deteriorating (smoke, severe cold, escalating conflict).
Proceed (lower risk) when:
- there is visible route control and open space,
- you have water, meds, and a rendezvous plan,
- you are staying out of choke points and away from flashpoints,
- you can leave quickly without crossing police lines or opposing groups.
Physical Security Playbook for Protesting in Today’s Environment
Informed by Recent ICE-Related Protests and Violent Encounters
Context and Rationale
In early January 2026, the fatal shooting of 37-year-old Renee Nicole Good by a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer in Minneapolis sparked widespread protests both in Minnesota and across multiple U.S. cities. Demonstrations include rallies in Indianapolis, Philadelphia, Kansas City, and other major population centers demanding accountability and changes to enforcement practices. The incident, captured on video and widely shared online, intensified criticism of federal immigration enforcement and led to heightened tensions between protesters and federal agents. (CBS News)
Additional reported incidents include other federal immigration agents shooting and wounding individuals during enforcement operations, such as in Portland, Oregon, further fueling protest activity and public calls for restraint and transparency. (AP News)
Protesters are responding not only to singular events but to a pattern of aggressive engagements by federal immigration agents that have raised both local and national concerns about excessive force and the safety of peaceful demonstrators. (Just Security)
In this environment, physical security planning is essential, not only to minimize the risk of injury during demonstrations but also to enable lawful expression while avoiding escalation and preventing opportunistic harm.
Core Principles
- Lawful, Non-Confrontational Conduct
Actions should remain peaceful, lawful, and constitutional. Security planning enhances safety, not escalation. - Risk Awareness and Adaptability
Recognize that enforcement dynamics, crowd behavior, and public safety conditions can shift rapidly. - Preparation for Environmental Stress
In high-tension protests, especially those with recent police or federal agent violence, crowd size, police posture, and local policies (curfews, declared assembly zones, dispersal orders) determine the physical conduct of action. - Prioritize De-escalation
Avoid actions that could be construed as threatening, aggressive, or provocative; these increase risk to participants.
Section A: Pre-Protest Physical Security Planning
Site Assessment and Selection
- Reconnoiter the location in advance to identify entry and exit routes, chokepoints, safe havens (e.g., adjacent parks, medical tents), and potential high-risk zones such as federal buildings where heavy enforcement presence may exist.
- Understand terrain limitations: tight corridors, dead ends, narrow sidewalks, and heavy traffic intersections create entrapment risk.
Intelligence on Enforcement Posture
- Monitor local law enforcement and federal agency announcements regarding planned enforcement activity.
- Review recent news coverage (e.g., Minneapolis, Portland incidents) for patterns of federal agent use of force or crowd-control tactics at similar protests.
Team Roles and Responsibilities
- Safety Marshals: trained volunteers responsible for observing crowd dynamics and helping prevent harm.
- Medical Support: volunteers identified in advance with basic first-aid supplies; accessible at designated points.
- Communications Anchor: a person responsible for staying in contact with coordination leads and relaying real-time developments.
Personal Physical Preparedness
- Wear sturdy, comfortable footwear suitable for prolonged standing or movement.
- Dress in layers appropriate to climate, with non-restrictive clothing that facilitates mobility.
- Carry minimal personal items; avoid backpacks or gear that could be grabbed or could impede movement.
- Bring sufficient water and necessary medications; ensure medications are easily accessible.
Section B: On-Site Physical Security Procedures
Situational Awareness and Movement
- Continuously scan the environment quietly and unobtrusively, identify exits, shifts in crowd energy, and approaching enforcement actions.
- Maintain spacing within the crowd that allows for rapid movement; avoid congregating in tight clusters near enforcement lines.
- Establish and communicate multiple escape routes beforehand.
Crowd Flow and Bottleneck Avoidance
- Avoid areas where the crowd is compressed between physical barriers such as fences, walls, or building corners.
- If movement stalls unexpectedly, reposition laterally rather than deeper into the crowd to prevent being trapped.
- Encourage participants to stay near peripheral areas initially and flood toward safer ground if an aggressive tactical response begins.
De-escalation Posture
- Maintain calm body language; avoid gestures that could be misinterpreted as antagonistic.
- Do not engage with counter-protesters or provoke enforcement officers.
- If chanting, do so in ways that highlight peaceful intent (e.g., “Peaceful assembly,” “We stand for justice”).
Section C: Responding to Enforcement Actions
Federal and Local Response Awareness
- Recognize that federal agents (including ICE) sometimes deploy crowd-control tools—pepper balls, tear gas, flash bangs, or physical formations, especially near federal buildings.
- Avoid confrontation lines; withdraw calmly to secure zones if dispersal orders are issued.
Handling Aggressive Tactics
- When tear gas or irritants are deployed:
- Move upwind if possible.
- Cover nose and mouth with cloth if no protective gear is available.
- Blink rapidly; avoid rubbing eyes with hands if contaminated.
- Do not attempt to disarm, seize, or interfere with law enforcement devices; such actions dramatically increase risk.
Legal Orders and Compliance
- Comply precisely with lawful orders to disperse, particularly from clearly identified law enforcement officers.
- If you believe an order is unlawful, comply first and contest later; refusal in the moment increases risk of injury or arrest.
Section D: Group Conduct and Safety Nets
The Buddy System
- Participants should attend in pairs or small groups with pre-defined check-ins.
- Establish a meeting point outside the main protest area if separation occurs.
Communication Signals (COMMS)
- Agree in advance on simple, calm verbal or visual cues to indicate:
- Need to withdraw
- Enforcement action nearby
- Medical emergency
Medical and Legal Support
- Ensure teams know the location of volunteer medics if available.
- Keep a record of local legal observers and emergency contacts.
Section E: After-Action Safety
- After the immediate action, reunite with your group before dispersal.
- Avoid lingering near enforcement apparatus or aggressive crowds.
- Encourage debriefing and reporting on any observed injuries or threats; community reporting can assist in accountability efforts.
Section F: Special Considerations for ICE-Related Protests
Given recent incidents involving federal immigration enforcement, including the fatal shooting of Renee Nicole Good and subsequent multi-city protests, organizers and participants should be cognizant of:
- Heightened tensions at federal enforcement sites and near courthouses.
- Rapid mobilization of protests following news of violence by federal agents, sometimes in multiple states on the same day.
- The potential for federal agents to be present beyond routine local police, including in riot gear or crowd-control formations. This may change the dynamic of street safety even for peaceful demonstrations.
Summary Checklist: Physical Security
Before
- Assess site, exits, and terrain.
- Assign roles and safety teams.
- Prepare personal gear and hydration.
- Learn enforcement patterns in the area.
During
- Maintain situational awareness.
- Avoid confined spaces or crowd compression.
- Withdraw calmly at the first sign of aggressive tactics.
After
- Reunite with a group and disperse methodically.
- Document any injuries or unusual enforcement conduct.
- Debrief for future planning.
This document is intended to be integrated with broader protest planning materials and updated as conditions on the ground evolve. It reflects the current environment of heightened protest activity around ICE actions and aims to give lawful protesters practical guidance to reduce physical risk in volatile contexts.
A practical Technical Security playbook oriented toward lawful, peaceful protest in the United States.
Designed to reduce avoidable risk from surveillance, device seizure, data exposure, doxxing, and opportunistic violence, without advising wrongdoing or evasion of lawful processes.
This is not legal advice.
Introduction
Public protest has always carried risk. What has changed in recent years is the density and permanence of that risk. Surveillance is no longer exceptional or episodic; it is ambient. Data collection is not limited to state actors; it is embedded in consumer devices, platforms, cameras, and data markets that operate continuously before, during, and long after a protest ends. At the same time, enforcement environments have become less predictable, accountability less certain, and post-event retaliation, through doxxing, employment pressure, or targeted harassment are more common. For many participants, the most serious consequences now occur after they have gone home.
This document is written for that reality.
It does not assume criminal intent, nor does it advocate evasion of lawful authority. It assumes lawful, peaceful protest conducted in an environment where risk is unevenly distributed, rules may be applied selectively, and mistakes compound quickly across technical, physical, and personal domains. In such conditions, safety is not achieved through any single tactic or tool. It is achieved through discipline, preparation, and an understanding that phones, bodies, identities, and communities are all part of the same security system.
The playbook that follows treats technical security, physical safety, operational behavior, and personal exposure as inseparable. A compromised phone can lead to compromised relationships. A moment of physical isolation can create lasting digital consequences. An impulsive post can undo hours of careful on-the-ground decision-making. Conversely, small, well-chosen precautions, clear threat modeling, device hardening, role clarity, exit planning, can dramatically reduce harm without diminishing the expressive or democratic purpose of protest.
This document is intentionally conservative. It favors risk reduction over bravado, exit options over endurance, and community protection over individual visibility. It is designed to be useful to first-time protesters and experienced organizers alike, adaptable across roles, and readable without technical specialization. Where possible, it consolidates guidance from established civil-liberties, digital-rights, and safety organizations into a single, coherent framework.
Above all, this playbook starts from a simple premise: the goal of protest is not merely to show up, but to return safely, with your autonomy, relationships, and future intact. Everything that follows is in service of that outcome.
Start with a threat model (10 minutes that changes everything)
Before you optimize tactics, define what you are protecting and from whom.
Assets at risk:
Your identity, your contacts, your location history, message content and metadata, photos and video (yours and others’), and your online accounts.
Likely threats at protests:
Device loss or theft, device confiscation, account compromise, location tracking via routine phone telemetry, large-scale video capture, social media OSINT, and post-event doxxing campaigns. These threat categories; loss, confiscation, disruption, and targeted surveillance, are explicitly identified by Amnesty International.
Constraints:
Local laws and policies (mask restrictions, curfews, dispersal orders), your role (organizer, medic, marshal, journalist, attendee), and your risk tolerance.
This threat model determines whether you should bring a smartphone at all. Multiple civil-liberties organizations recommend considering leaving it at home if feasible.
TECHSEC: Hardening your phone so seizure or loss is less catastrophic
CAVEAT: BURN PHONES
Much has been said about obtaining a “Burn Phone” if you plan on protesting. While this might be a prudent measure, there are a few things you must do in order to insure the security you are attempting to create by getting one.
- First, pay with cash, do not have a paper trail from purchase
- Disguise yourself as much as possible when purchasing, avoid cameras, phones can be tracked all the way back to purchase
- Understand that this device is a throwaway, no personal data should reside on it.
- Do not load your apps you use every day
- Keep the contacts empty and always erase call logs if possible
- Do not assume that buying a new SIM card means your phone isn’t trackable. Each use should be its only use.
- Follow all of the rules below for the burn phone just as you would for your personal to minimize risk.
Device encryption and lock discipline (highest ROI)
- Ensure full-device encryption is enabled. Modern iOS and many Android devices encrypt by default when a passcode is set.
- Use a strong passcode (long PIN or alphanumeric) and set auto-lock to a short interval.
- Disable biometric unlock (Face ID, fingerprint) before arrival. Biometrics can be physically compelled in ways a passcode typically cannot.
(Encryption, passcodes, biometrics guidance: ACLU of DC)
Minimize exposed data on the lock screen
- Disable lock-screen message previews.
- Remove sensitive widgets (calendar, email snippets, smart-home controls).
Reduce radios and location leakage when not actively needed
- Use airplane mode when not communicating to reduce emitted signals and routine location updates.
- Turn off Bluetooth and Wi-Fi unless actively required.
- Use a reliable Faraday bag after putting the phone in airplane mode and turning off Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. Keep the device in the Faraday bag until far enough away from the event before taking it out and turning it back on.
(Radio and signal-reduction guidance consolidated from ACLU of DC and World Justice Project toolkits)
Pre-protest data minimization
- Back up your phone beforehand so it can be wiped and restored if needed.
- Remove or sign out of high-risk apps (primary email, banking, password managers) if not required onsite.
- Update the operating system and critical apps before you go.
(Backup and update guidance consolidated from protest safety toolkits)
COMMS OPSEC: Make coordination resilient and reduce collateral exposure
Prefer end-to-end encrypted messaging for coordination.
Signal is widely recommended in protest safety guides as an additional layer of protection.
Group hygiene to prevent cascade compromise
- Keep logistics in small, role-based groups (marshals, medics, legal observers), not mass chats.
- Use disappearing messages for operational chatter when appropriate, balancing legal and accountability needs.
- Treat anything sent digitally as potentially shareable later.
Non-digital fallback
- Agree on a rally point, an exit route, and a check-in time in case of network disruption.
(Encrypted comms and fallback planning consolidated from Amnesty and allied civil-liberties guidance)
PERSEC: Protect identity, relationships, and your wider community
Many harms occur after protests through doxxing, employer pressure, stalking, and targeted harassment.
Identity compartmentation
- Keep protest planning separate from personal accounts and personal devices when feasible.
- Avoid using primary social accounts for logistics; reserve them for public advocacy only.
Photography and community privacy
- Do not publish images that identify other attendees without consent (faces, tattoos, unique clothing, license plates).
- Strip location metadata before sharing images; treat live posting as a location broadcast.
Post-event doxxing resilience
- Lock down social profiles.
- Remove public phone numbers and addresses.
- Enable strong two-factor authentication.
- Expect adversarial OSINT: minor visual details can triangulate identity.
On-the-ground OPSEC: Reduce risk from chaos, confusion, and escalation
Buddy system and role clarity
- Attend with at least one trusted person and designate a communications anchor.
- If separated, go to the fallback point rather than searching.
Situational awareness without paranoia
- Identify exits, bottlenecks, and kettling risks.
- Avoid confrontations; risk spikes when you are isolated, emotionally escalated, or near flashpoints.
Documentation and rights
- Know your rights regarding protest activity and police interactions.
- Save protester-rights guidance for reference.
(Rights guidance consolidated under ACLU national resources)
PHYSICAL SECURITY: Reduce Risk of Injury, Isolation, and Opportunistic Violence
This section addresses bodily safety and crowd dynamics, not confrontation or escalation.
Personal Physical Readiness
- Dress for mobility and endurance; avoid restrictive clothing.
- Bring water, weather protection, and required medications.
- Avoid carrying unnecessary items that limit movement.
Crowd Safety and Movement
- Identify exits, open spaces, and bottlenecks early.
- Avoid compressed areas where movement is constrained.
- Monitor changes in crowd energy and enforcement posture.
De-Escalation and Exposure Control
- Do not engage counter-protesters, agitators, or law enforcement beyond what is legally required.
- Avoid flashpoints and escalation zones whenever possible.
- Leave early if conditions deteriorate; do not wait for certainty.
Medical and Emergency Awareness
- Know where volunteer medics or first-aid points are located, if present.
- If injured, overwhelmed, or disoriented, disengage and seek assistance rather than pushing forward.
If your phone is taken, lost, or you are detained: reduce blast radius
- A strong passcode plus encryption remains the core safeguard.
- Assume unlocked devices expose all on-device data.
- After any incident, rotate credentials for critical accounts and review access logs.
(Device seizure guidance consolidated under ACLU DC and EFF resources)
A Reusable quick checklist before you go
Before
- Update OS and apps.
- Back up device.
- Enable encryption, set strong passcode, disable biometrics.
- Hide lock-screen previews and remove sensitive widgets.
- Configure and test secure communications.
- Remove unnecessary sensitive apps and data.
During
- Use airplane mode when not actively communicating.
- Keep Bluetooth and Wi-Fi off unless needed.
- Stay with buddy and follow pre-planned meet points.
After
- Review and remove posts that expose others.
- Rotate passwords if anything felt off.
- Debrief and update your threat model.
Appendix A
Protest Safety, Security, and Privacy Playbooks (United States)
Scope: Lawful, non-violent protest activity
Purpose: Reference directory of vetted, publicly available guidance covering digital security (TECHSEC), personal and organizational security (OPSEC/PERSEC), physical safety, surveillance awareness, and legal rights.
A.1 Digital & Technical Security (TECHSEC)
Digital Security Guidelines for Protests
American Friends Service Committee
Use case: Consult before attending a protest to prepare your phone, reduce stored data, and understand digital risks across the full protest lifecycle.
Digital Security Guidelines for Protests | American Friends Service Committee
Surveillance Self-Defense
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Use case: Reference when you need deeper technical explanations of encryption, secure messaging, metadata, and surveillance threats beyond protest-specific summaries.
Digital Safety Practices for Protesters (PDF)
ReconcilingWorks
Use case: Use as a printable or offline guide for step-by-step phone and communication safety before, during, and after protest activity.
Activist Digital Security & Preparedness Checklist
ActivistChecklist.org
Use case: Use as a quick pre-protest and post-protest checklist when time or attention is limited.
Prepare for a Protest | Digital Security Checklists for Activists
A.2 Privacy & Surveillance Countermeasures
How to Defend Against Police Surveillance at Protests
ACLU of the District of Columbia
Use case: Consult when preparing for protests in heavily policed or camera-dense environments where device seizure or surveillance is a concern.
How to Defend Against Police Surveillance at Protests – ACLU of DC
Protest Surveillance Overview
Surveillance Technology Oversight Project
Use case: Read to understand what surveillance technologies may be deployed against protesters and how collection often extends beyond the event itself.
Protest Surveillance — S.T.O.P.
A.3 Legal Rights & Physical Safety
Protesters’ Rights
American Civil Liberties Union
Use case: Reference before attending a protest to understand your constitutional rights, police powers, and how to respond during encounters.
Protesters’ Rights | American Civil Liberties Union
Peaceful Protest & Protest Safety Resources (PDF)
The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights
Use case: Use as a consolidated legal and physical safety reference when planning or supporting larger demonstrations involving many participants.
Tips for Preparedness, Peaceful Protesting, and Safety
Human Rights Campaign
Use case: Consult for general preparedness, wellbeing, and situational awareness guidance, especially for first-time protesters.
Tips for Preparedness, Peaceful Protesting, and Safety
A.4 Journalism, Documentation, and Observer Safety
A Journalist’s Guide to Safely and Responsibly Covering Protests
Lenfest Institute for Journalism
Use case: Use when documenting protests to balance safety, ethics, legal exposure, and protection of subjects.
How to Protest Safely: Gear, Tips, and What to Do
WIRED
Use case: Read for a high-level overview of physical preparation and situational safety when you need accessible, non-technical guidance.
Protesting Tips: What to Bring, How to Act, How to Stay Safe | WIRED
A.5 Legal Environment & Policy Tracking
U.S. Protest Law Tracker
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
Use case: Consult when assessing legal risk by state or tracking changes in protest-related laws over time.
A.6 Notes on Use
- These resources are complementary, not interchangeable.
- Technical security guidance should always be paired with legal and physical safety awareness.
- Local conditions and laws vary and should be checked prior to action.
- This appendix is intended as a reference library, not tactical instruction.
BGP Activity as an Enabling or Supporting Effect in Venezuela Power-Grid Disruption
Analytic Note
Subject: BGP Activity as an Enabling or Supporting Effect in Venezuela Power-Grid Disruption
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED / OSINT
Date: January 2026
Analytic Confidence: Moderate (infrastructure telemetry is strong; intent attribution remains low confidence)
Executive Summary
Observed BGP route-leak anomalies involving Venezuela’s primary telecom provider (CANTV, AS8048) occurred in temporal proximity to major infrastructure disruptions. While BGP manipulation alone cannot directly disable electrical generation or transmission, available evidence supports the assessment that routing instability plausibly functioned as an enabling or compounding effect, degrading communications, situational awareness, or coordination during a broader crisis.
At present, no conclusive evidence proves deliberate offensive use of BGP. However, the structure, scope, and timing of the anomalies justify continued investigation into whether routing manipulation was used intentionally as part of a multi-domain effects operation, rather than being a purely accidental misconfiguration.
Confirmed Observations (High Confidence)
- Cloudflare Radar and routing telemetry identified route-leak anomalies involving AS8048 (CANTV), with atypical AS-path behavior and announcements routed through external transit providers.
- A constrained prefix set was affected, notably eight prefixes within 200.74.224.0/20, registered to Dayco Telecom (Caracas).
- During the anomaly window, telemetry showed:
- A spike in BGP announcements, and
- A reduction in announced IP address space, consistent with partial withdrawal or instability.
- The affected address space overlaps with telecom, financial, ISP, and messaging infrastructure, which are operationally critical during power-grid incidents.
These observations establish routing instability, not intent.
Analytic Judgments
Judgment 1
BGP activity did not directly cause the Venezuelan power outage.
Confidence: High
Power-grid failures require physical, OT, or control-system disruptions. Internet routing manipulation alone cannot trip generators, destroy transformers, or collapse transmission networks.
Judgment 2
BGP instability likely degraded communications during the crisis.
Confidence: Moderate–High
Telecom networks underpin grid operations, emergency coordination, outage management, and restoration logistics. Partial reachability loss or routing asymmetry affecting Caracas-based infrastructure would materially hinder response efforts.
Judgment 3
The constrained and clustered nature of affected prefixes is atypical for random global BGP noise.
Confidence: Moderate
While accidental route leaks are common, tight geographic and organizational clustering raises the probability that the impact was selective, even if the trigger was misconfiguration rather than hostile intent.
Judgment 4
Deliberate BGP manipulation as part of a layered effects operation is plausible but unproven.
Confidence: Low–Moderate
Public statements referencing “layering different effects” conceptually align with BGP being used as a communications-shaping or intelligence-support layer, but no direct evidence ties the routing event to an offensive command decision.
Hypotheses (Not Mutually Exclusive)
H1 — Accidental Route Leak Under Crisis Conditions
Assessment:
A benign policy error or misconfiguration within AS8048 or a peer caused a route leak that coincided with broader instability.
Indicators Supporting H1
- Route leaks are globally frequent.
- No sustained interception or long-duration rerouting observed.
- Rapid normalization would favor this explanation.
H2 — Communications Degradation as a Shaping Effect
Assessment:
Routing instability—intentional or not—selectively impaired key Caracas networks, slowing coordination and situational awareness during the outage.
Indicators Supporting H2
- Tight prefix clustering.
- Impact on telecom-adjacent and institutional services.
- Observable reduction in announced IP space.
H3 — BGP-Enabled Intelligence Preparation or Traffic Observation
Assessment:
Short-lived routing anomalies were used to observe or map critical communications paths during a crisis window.
Indicators Supporting H3
- Unusual AS-path prepending behavior.
- Transit through major international carriers.
- Would likely be brief to avoid detection.
Key Caveat: No public evidence of TLS interception, credential compromise, or persistent MITM currently supports this hypothesis.
H4 Deliberate Noise or Decoy Activity
Assessment:
Routing anomalies functioned primarily as analytic distraction, drawing attention away from physical sabotage, OT compromise, or telecom infrastructure failure.
Indicators Supporting H4
- High visibility, low explanatory power.
- Lack of follow-on routing exploitation.
H5 Integrated Multi-Domain Effects
Assessment:
BGP activity was one component in a broader set of cyber, informational, telecom, or physical actions designed to constrain response options.
Indicators Supporting H5
- Alignment with known “effects-layering” doctrines.
- Requires corroboration from non-BGP domains (satcom, cellular core, OT logs).
Collection Gaps
To advance confidence, the following gaps must be addressed:
- Prefix-level reachability measurements from multiple global vantage points during the incident window.
- NetFlow / path data showing whether traffic was merely dropped or actually transited alternate AS paths.
- TLS / certificate telemetry indicating possible interception.
- Utility and telecom incident logs correlating comms loss with operational decision points.
- Historical baseline behavior for AS8048, including normal prepending patterns and peer relationships.
Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)
- Did any utility, telecom, or government operator credentials show anomalous access during or immediately after the routing event?
- Were outage restoration timelines measurably delayed due to loss of IP-based communications?
- Did the affected prefixes host operator-facing services (VPNs, NOCs, dispatch systems) rather than public-facing content?
- Are similar BGP anomalies observable before or during other infrastructure crises in the region?
Bottom Line
The most defensible analytic position is that BGP instability acted as a stress/force multiplier, not a root cause. Whether that instability was accidental, opportunistic, or deliberately induced remains unresolved. However, the event demonstrates that internet routing is a viable enabling layer in modern infrastructure disruption scenarios, particularly when telecom resilience is weak and crisis coordination depends heavily on IP networks.
THE KRAMPUS LIST 2025: AI APOCALYPSE EDITION
By Krypt3ia, Patron Saint of Bitter CTI Commentary
There is a particular stink that rolls in every December. It is part stale eggnog, part scorched plastic from LED decorations nobody with a functioning brain ever wanted, and part ozone crackle from yet another AI model promising to revolutionize everything while quietly siphoning the emotional scraps of eight billion hairless primates. You smell it before you admit it. The season is dying. The architecture of the year collapses like an unpatched Exchange server. And when the last trace of forced cheer rots off the bone, that is when I hear it.
Chains.
Bells.
Hooves.
Not metaphorical. Not poetic. Real. Heavy. Slow. The deliberate footfall of an alpine debt collector who works one month a year and still accomplishes more moral bookkeeping than every ethics committee in Silicon Valley combined.
Krampus is awake, and he is very, very pissed.
I do not summon him. I do not need to. I simply stand in the frozen dark and wait for the horned bastard to stomp out of whatever cursed dimension he winters in. He drags that enormous sack behind him. This year it is not filled with children. It is filled with the bloated silhouettes of 2025’s worst offenders, all tied up like overdue accounts in some infernal ledger that balances suffering instead of currency.
He does not look at me. I am not the point. I am only the miserable chronicler who gets front row seats while Krampus repossesses the souls of CEOs, AI prophets, surveillance peddlers, and the tech warlords who think a well phrased apology on LinkedIn counts as repentance.
When the sack finally hits the ground, the snow trembles. The forest holds its breath. The shapes inside begin to twitch. And one by one they climb out to face the judgment they have been earning all year.
THE PARADE OF TECHNICAL SINNERS
The first to rise is Sam Altman. He glows faintly like a fluorescent tube flickering at the end of its warranty. He talks about safety again. He talks about alignment again. Krampus rolls his eyes so hard the temperature drops two degrees. Sam promises to save humanity while quietly bolting the lab door behind him. Krampus stares at him the way a parent stares at a child who has drawn on the wall again. A long, disappointed silence hangs between them.
Next is Dario Amodei, calm enough to be suspicious. He talks about constitutions for machines. Krampus studies him like someone examining a mold sample on bread that is somehow also sentient. The man speaks of ethical guardrails while refusing to publish the diagram. Krampus sighs long and deep. It is the sigh of someone who knows he will see this man again next year.
Emad Mostaque rolls out like a bankruptcy notice in human form. A walking metaphor for overpromise and underdeliver. Stability AI imploded so hard it left a dent in the open source community. Krampus looks at him with the pity reserved for circus accidents.
Mustafa Suleyman appears next. Smooth. Efficient. Corporate to the bone. He talks about personal AI and the transformative power of assistants. Krampus looks at him with the expression of someone who has witnessed many transformations and most of them involved screaming.
Elon Musk lands like a meteor. Loud. Disruptive. Talking before he touches ground. Krampus presses one hoof on his chest to shut him up. Elon tries to explain why deepfake laws violate freedom of expression. Krampus growls one word in reply. The word is unacceptable. The forest agrees.
Jensen Huang emerges wearing leather, radiating the confidence of a man who sells GPUs for the price of a medium sized nation. Krampus remains unimpressed. He has met warlords with less appetite for resource control.
Satya Nadella steps forward with corporate serenity leaking from every pore. He speaks softly about innovation. Krampus waves him away. Anyone responsible for forcing AI into Microsoft Word cannot be trusted unsupervised.
Sundar Pichai lingers near the treeline as if trying to avoid an antitrust lawsuit by hiding behind a branch. Krampus gives him a look of profound skepticism.
Tim Cook arrives smelling like polished aluminum. He whispers the word privacy as if it is a sacred chant. Krampus leans in close. Siri whispers back. Krampus writes his name down twice.
Mark Zuckerberg materializes like a glitch in a software demo. He claims the metaverse is thriving. Krampus stares at him as if handed a pamphlet written by cultists. Zuckerberg never blinks. Krampus worries for him.
Andy Jassy appears with the demeanor of a man who would fire his reflection if it saved a nickel. Krampus glares. Jassy mutters about efficiency. Krampus mutters about basic humanity. The two ideas never meet.
Shou Zi Chew smiles politely. Krampus sighs. Not personal. Just structural.
Peter Thiel arrives looking like a vampire who interned at a defense startup. His presence darkens the area and even the trees lean away as if offended by his carbon footprint. He steps forward with the calm confidence of a man who believes God, Satan, and the Federal Reserve should all be privatized.
He adjusts his coat as if preparing for another keynote about the Devil and artificial intelligence, a topic he milks across endless speaking engagements where he warns that AI is either Lucifer’s cleverest trick or God’s new business model. Sometimes both. He talks like a TED Talk possessed by an Old Testament ghost cum sideshow performer.
Krampus listens for a moment, expression flat, patience collapsing. Thiel launches into a speech about angels, silicon, and Series A salvation. Krampus looks at him the way a hungry goat looks at an unguarded garden, already plotting the optimal damage path.
When Thiel smiles with the serenity of someone untouched by the consequences of his own ideas, Krampus finally puts one hoof down hard enough to shake the ground. The message is clear. Thiel shuts up.
Krampus nudges him to the front of the naughty queue with silent inevitability. No ceremony. No anger. Just judgment. Thiel walks with the smug confidence of someone who thinks he has outsmarted God.
Krampus watches him go with a disgusted stare that suggests even the Devil would reject his resume on cultural fit alone.
Larry Ellison wears sunglasses even though it is night. He carries the aura of a man who would centralize the world’s medical data in an unsecured Azure instance and call it a feature. Krampus grips his horns in frustration.
THE SPYWARE SYNDICATE
Shalev Hulio from NSO hits the snow like a corrupted attachment.
Idan Nurick from Paragon insists his spyware is ethical. Krampus laughs. It is not a pleasant laugh.
Tal Dilian slinks out like malware that will not uninstall.
Hoan Ton That of Clearview starts scanning faces immediately. Krampus swats him.
Alex Karp begins talking about data fusion with the glazed intensity of a man who has not spoken to a non government entity in ten years. Krampus signals for silence, and when Karp does not notice, the demon considers sending him to a place where even Palantir cannot track the pieces.
Thomas Hogan from Cellebrite looks guilty just by existing.
Fog Data Science appears as a pile of location data that reforms into a person only when threatened.
Geolitica claims it predicted this entire scene. Krampus looks skeptical.
THE OVERCONFIDENT UPSTARTS
Arthur Mensch of Mistral arrives acting as if he deserves a parade.
Noam Shazeer arrives flanked by chatbots with questionable emotional boundaries.
Alexandr Wang of Scale AI arrives carrying the grievances of every underpaid annotator on the planet.
Krampus narrows his eyes.
THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL GOLDEN CHILD
Palmer Luckey bursts out of the sack like a drone strike given human shape. He lands in the snow with the same kinetic enthusiasm his machines use when visiting hostile airspace. He grins with the joy of a child who has just discovered a loophole in international law and figured out how to monetize it. His whole posture radiates the smug confidence of someone who truly believes Geneva Conventions are more of a suggestion than a treaty.
Krampus watches this in silence. Not fear. Not caution. Just the stunned appreciation a seasoned torturer gives to an apprentice who somehow invented a new form of cruelty by accident. Palmer adjusts his jacket, which looks suspiciously like it was sewn from the torn upholstery of a Pentagon black project. Then he strikes a pose that suggests he is waiting for a camera drone to swoop in and capture his hero angle for a magazine cover that should really be filed under dystopian satire.
He starts talking. Of course he does. He talks about autonomous battle platforms and next generation deterrence. He talks about innovation at the edge of legality. He talks about turning war into a fast moving consumer product. His voice carries the cheerful tone of someone explaining a new video game mechanic while ignoring the fact that real people will be exploded by it.
Krampus squints at him as if trying to determine whether this creature is actually human or some strange Silicon Valley homunculus assembled in a garage by libertarians with a soldering iron. The demon leans closer and inhales. He smells burning circuitry, venture capital, and the faint ammonia sting of military procurement paperwork. He smells the future, and he does not like it.
Palmer keeps grinning. He cannot stop. It is the smile of a kid who won the science fair by accidentally creating a weapon system. It is unblinking. It is unnerving. It is the smile of someone who believes disruption should apply equally to industries, ethics, and the physical safety of entire regions.
Krampus finally lifts his giant quill and writes Palmer’s name in very large letters. So large the ink freezes into the snow. So large that even the reindeer look concerned. It is not a name on the naughty list. It is a warning label.
Krampus stares at him for one long moment. A moment so cold that even Luckey’s eternal optimism falters. Then the demon nods once in the way a seasoned executioner nods at a condemned prince. A gesture that means you are important, but not in the way you think.
Palmer Luckey stands there smiling, looking pleased with himself in the dim glow of the northern lights, unaware that Krampus has just marked him as one of the most dangerous people of the year.
It is not personal.
It is simply accurate.
THE FINAL RECKONING
Krampus looks at the assembled mass of offenders. The CEOs. The innovators. The disruptors. The surveillance profiteers. The synthetic sugar prophets of artificial intelligence. The war tech wunderkind. The startups that should have been left in private beta. He shakes the snow from his fur and makes a single guttural noise.
Enough.
The forest goes quiet.
The snow settles.
The year ends.
RISK ASSESSMENT: POTENTIAL BLOCKS TO THE RELEASE OF THE EPSTEIN FILES
Now, before you all get excited about those Epstein files….
Just know that not only are the things below probable, but, remember who has had control of the data (e.g. Bondi, Kash, etc) and that it’s been manhandled a lot already. I would trust little of what comes out because this administration is one of the most corrupt in history.
1. Executive-Level Reversal or Reinterpretation
Risk Level: High
Description: Public announcements or signing events are often symbolic. Later, the administration may cite new intelligence briefings, legal advice, or “unintended scope” to reinterpret what was actually authorized.
Impact: Substantial—could halt or indefinitely suspend release.
Drivers:
• Advisors warning of political fallout
• Reassessment of exposure to allies, donors, or staff
• Claim of misunderstanding of the order’s effect
2. Inter-Agency Redaction Disputes
Risk Level: High
Description: Agencies such as DOJ, FBI, DHS, or CIA may disagree on what can be safely released. These disputes are a common reason disclosures stall.
Impact: Delay ranging from months to years.
Drivers:
• Conflicting equities between intelligence and law enforcement
• Disagreement over classified HUMINT/SIGINT sources
• Protection of foreign partner intelligence
3. Invocation of National Security Exemptions
Risk Level: Medium–High
Description: Portions of the files may be deemed sensitive due to foreign intelligence relationships, ongoing operations, or covert programs indirectly brushed by the case.
Impact: Could justify withholding the majority of pages, or releasing heavily redacted versions.
Drivers:
• International cooperation notes
• Sensitive surveillance programs tied to related investigations
• Covert asset names or methods
4. Privacy Act and Victim Protection Issues
Risk Level: Medium
Description: Agencies may assert that identifying details of living individuals—victims, witnesses, or even uncharged third parties, require further legal review or court orders.
Impact: Delay; release may be partial or phased.
Drivers:
• Risk of doxxing, harassment, defamation
• Conflicts with sealed civil filings
• Conflict with protective orders
5. Ongoing or Newly Initiated Investigations
Risk Level: Medium
Description: Authorities may claim the files intersect with active investigations into human trafficking, financial crimes, or related co-conspirators.
Impact: Could suspend release indefinitely.
Drivers:
• New investigative leads
• Coordination with state-level cases
• Federal grand jury restrictions
6. Foreign Government Intervention
Risk Level: Medium
Description: If documents include references to foreign nationals, passports, intelligence liaisons, or VIPs, foreign governments may request delay or redaction.
Impact: Moderate but politically sensitive; could justify narrowing the release.
Drivers:
• Diplomatic fallout
• Protection of foreign dignitaries or intelligence partners
• Embarrassing political connections
7. Executive Privilege or Legal Counsel Review
Risk Level: Medium
Description: White House Counsel may argue that files intersect with privileged communications or require additional executive-branch review.
Impact: Moderate; could reshape or slow down release.
Drivers:
• Risk of exposing internal decision-making processes
• Protection of aides or former administration officials
• Reinterpretation of what “release” entails
8. Mechanical / Administrative Delay Tactics
Risk Level: Medium
Description: Agencies can slow-roll through procedural obstacles without explicitly refusing release.
Impact: High in practice; delays can stretch beyond the administration’s term.
Examples of Mechanisms:
• Claiming “unexpected volume” or “digitization delay”
• FOIA-style queues
• Redaction workflow bottlenecks
• Records integrity checks
9. Strategic Political Timing
Risk Level: Medium
Description: Release may be delayed for political calculus—avoiding proximity to elections, major news cycles, or sensitive diplomatic events.
Impact: Could push release to a symbolic or negligible window.
Drivers:
• Avoiding negative press cycles
• Protecting political allies
• Using timing to maximize political leverage
10. Controlled Release or Partial Disclosure
Risk Level: Medium
Description: Administration may technically “release” documents but withhold the core sensitive material via heavy redaction or selective document sets.
Impact: High—public release appears completed but yields little substantive information.
Drivers:
• Managing optics
• Satisfying legal obligations without full transparency
• Limiting political damage
Overall Likelihood of Full, Unredacted Release
Assessment:
A fully unredacted, immediately available release is low likelihood.
A partially redacted or strategically delayed release is high likelihood.
GEOPOLITICAL THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORT: Strategic Cyber Operations and Geopolitical Positioning by the PRC: SALT TYPHOON, U.S. Infrastructure, and Taiwan Contingency Planning
Date: October 15, 2025
Classification: TLP WHITE / STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Prepared by: Krypt3ia
EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW
This report provides an integrated geopolitical threat intelligence analysis of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) cyber operations against the United States, with a specific focus on SALT TYPHOON and affiliated state aligned cyber actors. Drawing from current and historical cyber activity, including the October 2025 exploitation of F5 Networks infrastructure and U.S. domestic cybersecurity policy shifts, this assessment evaluates China’s strategic objectives within a broader geopolitical framework, particularly its intent and capabilities regarding Taiwan, and maps these activities to foundational Chinese strategic doctrine.
The evidence confirms a long-term, methodical effort by the PRC to establish asymmetric pre-conflict leverage through persistent access to U.S. critical infrastructure and exploitation of internal vulnerabilities in U.S. cyber defense capacity. These activities align with Chinese national objectives to deter or delay U.S. intervention in a potential Taiwan conflict and to precondition the geopolitical battlespace in ways consistent with classical Chinese military strategy, including the doctrines of Sun Tzu and modern PLA information warfare principles.
CHINA’S STRATEGIC CONTEXT
National Objectives and Taiwan
Taiwan remains the most geopolitically sensitive flashpoint in U.S.-China relations. The PRC has repeatedly declared reunification with Taiwan a “historical mission” and “core national interest.” The PRC’s strategic calculus assumes that U.S. military intervention is probable in the event of a Taiwan conflict.
Since 2021, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has accelerated its political, economic, and military preparations for a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait. In parallel, Chinese cyber operations, such as those conducted by SALT TYPHOON, indicate a strategic plan to offset conventional disadvantages by targeting the U.S. homeland’s digital and physical infrastructure to deter response or delay mobilization.
PLA and Cyber Domain Integration
China’s military doctrine incorporates “informatized warfare” and increasingly emphasizes “intelligentized operations,” where cyber, electronic, and information warfare capabilities are decisive tools for shaping adversary behavior. The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) plays a central role in this strategy, responsible for cyber operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations. These capabilities are integrated into national strategic competition objectives and are operationalized through state-aligned threat actors such as SALT TYPHOON.
STRATEGIC CYBER OPERATIONS: SALT TYPHOON AND RELATED ACTORS
SALT TYPHOON Profile
- Affiliation: Assessed to operate under the direction of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) or PLA Strategic Support Force.
- Objectives: Strategic cyber espionage, long-term infrastructure prepositioning, and shaping operations.
- Tactics: Use of “living off the land” (LOTL) techniques, credential theft, lateral movement, and custom exploits with low attribution signatures.
- Targets: Telecommunications, energy, water, transportation, defense contractors, and government entities across U.S. infrastructure.
Operational Timeline and Geopolitical Relevance (2023–2025)
| Date | Event | Sector Targeted | Geopolitical Context |
| May 2023 | Guam telecom infrastructure accessed | Military communications | Indo-Pacific command & control surveillance |
| Apr 2024 | Water utilities in U.S. Midwest compromised | Civil infrastructure | Prepositioning for civilian disruption in homeland during conflict |
| Jul 2025 | Energy grid access via SCADA vulnerabilities | Energy infrastructure | Establishing latent disruption capacity ahead of a Taiwan contingency |
| Oct 2025 | F5 BIG-IP zero-days exploited | Cross-sector enterprise | Coincides with Taiwan National Day; direct escalation signaling |
GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OCTOBER 2025 F5 INCIDENT
Event Summary
On October 15, 2025, F5 Networks disclosed five actively exploited zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-39301 to CVE-2025-39305) affecting its BIG-IP and BIG-IQ products. These vulnerabilities were exploited by a nation-state-aligned threat actor with tradecraft consistent with SALT TYPHOON. Affected systems span U.S. defense, government, energy, and telecommunications sectors. Exploitation included credential harvesting, stealth lateral movement, and backdoor persistence without traditional malware.
Timing and Geopolitical Framing
The incident occurred days after Taiwan’s National Day (October 10), an event marked by independence rhetoric and met with sharp PRC condemnation. The coordinated timing suggests the exploitation was strategic in nature, intended to demonstrate latent capabilities and erode U.S. confidence in infrastructure resilience and crisis readiness.
This type of signaling aligns with PLA doctrine favoring covert shaping and psychological disruption, serving both as a deterrence mechanism and a preparatory move should a Taiwan conflict emerge.
DOMESTIC CYBERSECURITY FRAGILITY AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER
CISA Workforce Reduction and Institutional Weakening
In Q3 2025, the Trump administration initiated a budgetary and organizational restructuring of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). This included proposed cuts to staffing (estimated 35–40%), suspension of certain regional coordination programs, and reduced grants for state-level cybersecurity readiness.
The rationale was political, citing overreach, bureaucratic redundancy, and emphasis on private sector-led security. However, this decision introduced significant gaps in federal cyber coordination and incident response capability at a time when China was expanding its offensive cyber posture.
Strategic Consequences and Chinese Exploitation
From a geopolitical threat perspective, China is highly likely to interpret U.S. reductions in cyber defense infrastructure as strategic opportunity. Based on PLA writings on “opportunity warfare” (机遇战), adversary political disarray and bureaucratic paralysis are ideal conditions for:
- Increasing cyber infiltration campaigns (e.g., SALT TYPHOON expanding access across under-monitored sectors).
- Launching parallel information operations targeting public trust and allied confidence in U.S. resilience.
- Widening asymmetric gaps through exploitation of edge systems (e.g., F5, Fortinet, and Citrix appliances) often neglected during institutional transitions.
This internal degradation in U.S. cyber capacity, when paired with Chinese strategic intent, increases both the probability and potential success of coordinated infrastructure disruptions during geopolitical escalation involving Taiwan.
Strategic Amplification – Risk Matrix
| Risk Category | Impact from CISA Reduction | Chinese Exploitation Vector |
| Federal-private coordination | Reduced speed and coherence of incident response | Exploit time gap to escalate undetected access |
| Attribution and deterrence | Weakened capability to identify and respond to nation-state activity | Operate below attribution threshold |
| Sectoral readiness (water, energy) | Increased gaps in regional defenses | Focus on decentralized/under-resourced critical infrastructure |
| International perception | U.S. viewed as unreliable cybersecurity partner | Undermine allied alignment and Taiwan defense cooperation |
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK: APPLICATION OF SUN TZU
China’s cyber strategy reflects classical military principles derived from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, which remain central to PLA strategic education. The PLA explicitly emphasizes the use of cyber to achieve victory through preparation, deception, and disruption, not necessarily combat.
| Sun Tzu Tenet | Application in PRC Cyber Strategy |
| “All warfare is based on deception.” | Use of LOTL, false flag TTPs, obfuscation of attribution |
| “Know the enemy and know yourself.” | Long-term presence inside U.S. infrastructure |
| “Supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” | Infrastructure control as coercive leverage |
| “Attack where he is unprepared.” | Focus on edge infrastructure and underfunded sectors |
| “In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity.” | Exploiting U.S. internal cyber governance instability (CISA cuts) |
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS: TAIWAN CONTINGENCY
Pre-Conflict Shaping Operations
PRC cyber operations, especially those attributed to SALT TYPHOON, are best understood as part of Phase 0 shaping campaigns, preparing the digital battlespace prior to kinetic conflict. These campaigns are designed to:
- Disrupt U.S. power projection through critical infrastructure compromise (logistics, communications).
- Generate domestic pressure through controlled disruptions (energy, water, emergency response systems).
- Undermine public trust and federal credibility during crisis escalation.
- Deter allied engagement by demonstrating U.S. cyber vulnerability.
Strategic Calculus
If the PRC believes the United States lacks the internal resilience, due to cyber readiness degradation (e.g., CISA cuts), to respond effectively to a Taiwan contingency, it may assess the risk of military escalation as acceptable or manageable. Conversely, the ability to silently degrade U.S. capacity serves as a non-kinetic deterrent to delay or avoid U.S. intervention.
FORECAST SCENARIOS
| Scenario | Chinese Cyber Activity | Strategic Objective |
| Taiwan invasion with U.S. response | Activate latent access to disrupt U.S. infrastructure | Delay or deny force deployment; induce internal pressure |
| Taiwan blockade | Deploy cyber pressure on Taiwan and regional allies | Achieve political concessions without direct conflict |
| U.S. internal cyber instability | Exploit institutional gaps (e.g., weakened CISA) | Expand infiltration, test red lines, degrade deterrence credibility |
POLICY AND STRATEGIC RESPONSE OPTIONS
- Reinforce National Cyber Readiness
- Restore full funding and workforce capacity at CISA.
- Create a national cyber reserve force for surge support.
- Rebuild Deterrence Messaging
- Issue formal declaratory policies tying cyber prepositioning to strategic red lines.
- Conduct joint U.S.-allied infrastructure defense exercises.
- Secure Edge Infrastructure
- Mandate rapid patching and third-party security validation for appliances (e.g., F5, Fortinet).
- Enforce zero-trust and segmentation standards across federal and critical sectors.
- Global Cybersecurity Diplomacy
- Strengthen bilateral and multilateral cyber threat sharing with Indo-Pacific allies.
- Promote collective attribution mechanisms for state-sponsored campaigns.
CONCLUSION
Chinese state-sponsored cyber operations against U.S. infrastructure, exemplified by SALT TYPHOON’s long-term infiltration campaigns and the exploitation of F5 vulnerabilities in October 2025, reflect a deliberate strategy of pre-conflict shaping and geopolitical coercion. When paired with the reduction of U.S. federal cyber defense capability, particularly the weakening of CISA, this strategy becomes increasingly potent.
These actions are not isolated technical threats. They constitute a broader effort by the PRC to establish asymmetric control over critical infrastructure, reduce U.S. will to intervene in defense of Taiwan, and reshape strategic decision-making during crisis escalation. U.S. policymakers must treat domestic cyber readiness not only as a technical imperative but as a pillar of national security with direct implications for deterrence, alliance credibility, and great power competition.
Linked Primary Sources
F5 8K report:
https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000154696
Microsoft Threat Intelligence Report – Volt Typhoon (SALT TYPHOON)
Volt Typhoon: State-sponsored actor from China targeting critical infrastructure
CISA Alerts Related to SALT TYPHOON and Infrastructure Threats
CISA Alert AA23-144A: PRC State-Sponsored Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection
CISA Alert AA24-102A: PRC State-Sponsored Cyber Activity Targeting Infrastructure
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Annual Reports on PRC Military Capabilities
2023 Report: Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC (PDF)
The 2024 report is pending release. Check DoD’s China Military Power site: https://www.defense.gov/CMPR/
PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) – Public Analysis
RAND Report: China’s Strategic Support Force and the Future of PLA Information Operations
Commercial Threat Intelligence Reporting (Mandiant, CrowdStrike, Recorded Future)
Mandiant – Blog on China Cyber Operations
(For APT41, APT40, and MSS-aligned threat groups.)
CrowdStrike Global Threat Report 2024
(2025 version expected in Q1 2026.)
Recorded Future – China Cyber Threat Intelligence
PLA Interpretations of Sun Tzu / Strategic Military Theory
Direct PLA interpretations are not publicly distributed. However, PLA strategic thinking is reflected in U.S. and Western military academic analysis:
The Science of Military Strategy – PLA National Defense University (NDU Press summary)
(Unofficial English-language assessments of PLA doctrine.)
China Military Power Report (DoD analysis of PLA strategy)
End of Report
Prepared for strategic-level consumers across defense, intelligence, and allied national security organizations.
Threat Intelligence Report: Daejeon NIRS Data Center Fire Potential DPRK APT Nexus
Date: 2025-10-07
Analyst: Krypt3ia
Executive Summary
Between 26–27 September 2025, a lithium-ion battery explosion at the National Information Resources Service (NIRS) data center in Daejeon crippled hundreds of South Korean government systems, forcing weeks of recovery and prompting police to charge four individuals for alleged negligence. The fire began while aging LG Energy Solution battery modules were being relocated and serviced, highlighting serious vulnerabilities in the maintenance of critical backup power infrastructure. The cascading failure underscored how intertwined technical, procedural, and vendor-level risks can bring down essential national services despite existing redundancy protocols.
Recent developments have intensified speculation that the NIRS fire may represent a continuation of North Korea’s escalating cyber campaign against South Korea. In the months preceding the incident, DPRK-linked advanced persistent threat (APT) groups such as Kimsuky, Andariel, and Lazarus dramatically increased both the frequency and technical sophistication of their intrusions into South Korean telecommunications, defense contractors, and research networks. These operations have been characterized by a growing willingness to blur the line between espionage and disruption, targeting not only data but also operational continuity. Against that backdrop, the possibility that the Daejeon data-center fire could be part of a hybrid offensive—combining physical sabotage with digital infiltration—has drawn scrutiny from intelligence analysts and policymakers alike. Although investigators have not publicly confirmed any link, the timing, strategic value, and symbolic impact of disabling core government systems align with Pyongyang’s broader doctrine of asymmetric pressure, prompting renewed debate over whether this event marks a turning point from covert collection toward overt destabilization of South Korea’s digital infrastructure.
In the aftermath, South Korea elevated its national cyber threat level to “caution,” amid fears that hostile actors might exploit the outage’s chaos for intrusion or data theft. This caution was not unfounded, LG Group and telecom networks had suffered prior compromises linked by public reporting to state-sponsored threat actors, including suspected DPRK (North Korean) APTs. While no direct evidence yet ties Pyongyang to the fire, the shared corporate ecosystem and recent cyber-espionage activity establish plausible, though unproven, grounds to treat the incident as a potential cyber-physical compromise, warranting deep forensic analysis of battery management systems (BMS), firmware, and industrial control interfaces for signs of manipulation or implanted malware.
Purpose & Methodology
This report synthesizes open reporting, industry incident patterns, and known DPRK APT TTPs to reconstruct plausible attack chains that could turn a battery maintenance event into thermal runaway via cyber means, and to hypothesize specific malware and firmware techniques that might induce overcharge or disable safety interlocks. It then translates those hypotheses into prioritized detection, forensic, and mitigation actions for government and vendor stakeholders, focusing on artifact preservation, firmware analysis, vendor device forensics, OT/IT telemetry correlation, and rapid containment measures.
The assessment draws on mainstream and industry sources, Reuters, The Guardian, DataCenterDynamics, The Korea Times, alongside technical threat reporting (Mandiant / M-Trends 2025), ICS malware analyses, and coverage of LG Group and telecom compromises; load-bearing statements are cited to those sources. The product is intended as an operational playbook: to guide immediate hunts for BMS/ESS compromise indicators, to inform medium-term OT hardening, and to support decisions about cross-sector intelligence sharing and supply-chain remediation.
Background / Context
On 26 September 2025, a lithium-ion battery fire broke out at the National Information Resources Service (NIRS) data center in Daejeon, spreading rapidly through adjacent battery racks and servers and forcing the shutdown of hundreds of critical South Korean government systems. The complex fire, driven by the volatile chemistry of lithium cells and compounded by restricted access in the server environment, took hours to extinguish and left essential digital infrastructure crippled for weeks. Police have since charged four individuals involved in maintenance work at the facility, as investigators examine whether procedural errors or equipment faults triggered the ignition.
The batteries were manufactured by LG Energy Solution, part of the broader LG Group, and several reports have pointed to outdated module vintages and a lack of modern fire-suppression systems within the rack-based UPS/ESS configuration. The event unfolded in a wider atmosphere of escalating cyber risk — major telecom operators such as LG Uplus and KT had faced compromises earlier in 2025, attributed to capable, state-linked adversaries. In response to the outage, South Korea’s government elevated its national cyber-threat level to “caution”, acknowledging that such a disruption could be exploited by hostile actors for data theft or further intrusion, underscoring the intersection of physical safety failures and cyber-espionage exposure in national infrastructure.
Timeline
In the months leading up to the September 2025 incident, South Korea’s threat landscape was already deteriorating. A series of telecom breaches and vendor exposures had revealed the extent to which regional infrastructure was being surveilled by advanced threat actors, many with suspected state affiliations, according to public reporting. These compromises weakened trust in the resilience of core service providers and exposed overlapping dependencies between government networks, critical utilities, and private-sector vendors such as those under the LG Group umbrella.
On the evening of 26 September 2025, at approximately 20:15 local time, a battery module explosion occurred during scheduled maintenance at the NIRS data center in Daejeon, igniting a fire that rapidly spread through adjacent racks and servers. By 27–30 September, extensive forensic and police investigations were underway, and four individualsassociated with on-site maintenance were booked on negligence charges. Meanwhile, the outage crippled hundreds of essential government systems and forced the elevation of South Korea’s national cyber alert level, reflecting fears that the downtime might provide a window for hostile cyber exploitation or follow-on attacks.
Threat Hypotheses
Current official reporting points to an accidental or negligence-based cause as the most likely explanation for the Daejeon data-center fire. Investigators have focused on aging battery modules, improper maintenance procedures, and insufficient safety controls as primary contributing factors. The decision to charge on-site personnel for negligence reinforces this baseline assessment, suggesting a failure of operational discipline rather than a coordinated external attack. Confidence in this hypothesis remains moderate to high, as physical evidence and witness statements appear consistent with an unintentional ignition event resulting from human and technical error.
However, alternative hypotheses remain under review. One scenario posits that a pre-existing IT compromise, potentially linked to earlier intrusions into LGU plus or affiliated vendor networks—may have enabled opportunistic exploitation during the ensuing chaos, with adversaries using the downtime to pivot, exfiltrate, or reconnoiter government systems. A more speculative but technically plausible hypothesis considers deliberate cyber-physical sabotage, possibly involving DPRK-linked APT actors modifying battery management or UPS control firmware to trigger a controlled thermal runaway. While North Korea’s proven interest in industrial control systems lends credibility to this possibility, no public forensic evidence yet substantiates such an intrusion, keeping confidence in this scenario at low to moderate.
Technical plausibility: how malware could cause a lithium-ion fire
Thermal runaway in lithium-ion cells is a cascading thermal and chemical failure that can be initiated by a handful of root causes: sustained overcharging, internal cell shorting, excessively high discharge currents, severe cell imbalance, or mechanical damage that breaches separators. Once a single cell enters thermal runaway it can rapidly heat neighboring cells, producing venting, fire, or explosion, which is why battery modules are designed with layered protections and conservative operating thresholds.
Modern Battery Management Systems (BMS) and Energy Storage System (ESS) architectures implement those protections, cell balancing, thermal monitoring, over-/under-voltage cutouts, current limiting, and emergency relay disconnects, specifically to prevent conditions that lead to runaway. To defeat those safeguards remotely would require either modification of the BMS/ESS supervisory logic (for example via firmware tampering), spoofing or corrupting telemetry so controllers never see critical sensor values, bypassing interlock signals to prevent automatic disconnects, or direct physical tampering with protective hardware; any of these paths substantially raises the technical bar compared with a simple IT intrusion.
Plausible cyber-paths:
- Remote firmware patching of BMS microcontrollers (e.g., via vendor update tools, USB updates, or remote maintenance interfaces) to change charge thresholds, disable balancing, or suppress over-temp alarms. (Mechanism: malicious firmware image with timebomb.)
- Telemetry spoofing / sensor manipulation injecting false temperature/voltage telemetry to supervisory systems so that automatic shutdowns are not triggered. (Mechanism: man-in-the-middle on Modbus/CAN/Proprietary channels or malware on the BMS.)
- Command injection to charge controllers / inverters sending commands to UPS/charger to continue charging or to increase current beyond safe limits. (Mechanism: compromised SCADA/PLC or vendor management console.)
- Disabling relay/fuse control signals override protective relay actuators to keep circuits closed during a fault.
- Coordinated physical + digital action adversary triggers actions in the middle of maintenance (e.g., during power down/up) so that operator procedures mask anomalous digital commands.
Malware families such as TRITON (which targeted safety instrumented systems), INDUSTROYER (capable of manipulating industrial protocols), and a range of state-actor toolkits that employ wiper logic or direct firmware patching provide concrete precedents for how attackers can bypass safety layers and drive ICS equipment into hazardous states. These tools demonstrate several technical techniques relevant to battery systems: direct manipulation of control protocols, suppression or falsification of safety alarms, and replacement or tampering of firmware to alter device behavior, all routes that can convert a protected control loop into a failure mode.
North Korean actors, while better known for espionage and financially motivated operations, have in open reporting shown use of loaders, backdoors, and experimentation against OT/ICS components, which makes the broad class of cyber-physical sabotage technically plausible in principle. That plausibility, however, is not proof: applying those ICS techniques to induce a lithium-ion thermal runaway would require targeted knowledge of vendor firmware, maintenance workflows, or physical access vectors. In this incident, therefore, such malware-driven scenarios remain credible hypotheses to be investigated, but they require firmware artifacts, command logs, or definitive telemetry anomalies to move from plausible to proven.
DPRK Attribution Assessment
DPRK involvement warrants consideration because North Korean cyber units are among the most capable and aggressive in the world, with a well-documented history of targeting South Korean government, defense, and industrial systems. Multiple sanctions and intelligence advisories through 2025 have described an ongoing offensive posture, combining espionage, disruptive campaigns, and financial theft—demonstrating that Pyongyang maintains both the motivation and technical skill to strike at critical infrastructure. Their past intrusions into telecommunications and logistics networks illustrate a sustained interest in operational technologies that could intersect with energy or datacenter environments.
That said, attribution in this specific case remains weak. Current public findings emphasize maintenance activity, aging lithium-ion batteries, and human negligence, with police actions centered on on-site workers rather than external operatives. To date, there is no publicly disclosed forensic evidence of battery-management firmware tampering, command-and-cIndicators of Compromise (IOCs)
The operational impact of the NIRS data-center fire was severe, crippling critical South Korean government functions such as identity issuance, certificate validation, and access to public records. The outage affected hundreds of systems and reportedly jeopardized hundreds of terabytes of government data, with recovery timelines stretching into weeks. The disruption exposed deep dependencies on centralized digital infrastructure and revealed the fragility of national continuity mechanisms in the face of compounded physical and technical failures. Even if the root cause was accidental, the scale of the outage demonstrates how a single point failure in a high-density data environment can cascade into a multi-agency service collapse.
Strategically, the incident has intensified public concern and political debate around digital resilience and centralization. The government faces mounting scrutiny over whether redundancy, geographic diversification, and disaster recovery measures were adequate. At the same time, security analysts have warned that the chaos may have offered a window for adversarial exploitation, allowing threat actors to move laterally through connected systems or exfiltrate sensitive data during restoration efforts. If such opportunistic activity occurred, it would extend the event’s impact from operational disruption to long-term national security risk, underscoring the urgent need for coordinated cross-sector forensic huntsand a comprehensive review of how cyber and physical contingencies are integrated within South Korea’s critical infrastructure planning.
Open Questions (intelligence gaps to close)
Several intelligence gaps remain that will determine whether the NIRS fire was purely accidental or had a cyber-physical dimension. Chief among them is the need to verify whether any vendor maintenance laptops, jump hosts, or diagnostic devices contained malware or command-and-control (C2) artifacts consistent with known DPRK toolkits. Forensic imaging of these systems is essential to confirm or rule out compromise of the maintenance environment, as such systems could have provided a covert path into the Battery Management System (BMS) or Energy Storage System (ESS). Equally important is a binary-level comparison of recovered firmware against vendor baselines to detect unauthorized modifications—such as altered voltage thresholds, bypassed thermal interlocks, or hidden persistence modules—that might indicate deliberate manipulation of safety controls.
Parallel to technical forensics, broader intelligence collection must focus on network correlation and signals intelligence. Analysts should determine whether lateral movement occurred in government or contractor networks during or immediately after the fire, activity that could reveal opportunistic exploitation by an embedded actor. Finally, the intelligence community should assess whether any intercepted communications or coordination indicators tie North Korean assets to the event’s timing or planning. Closing these gaps will transform the current hypothesis-driven narrative into an evidence-based attribution model, distinguishing between coincidence, exploitation, or deliberate sabotage within South Korea’s critical infrastructure ecosystem.
Assessment & Likelihood of APT Activity Causality
Based on all available open source reporting and technical indicators, the most probable explanation for the Daejeon NIRS datacenter fire remains an accidental thermal event triggered during the relocation or maintenance of aging lithium-ion battery modules. Equipment degradation, insufficient safety interlocks, and procedural lapses appear to have converged to produce a catastrophic failure with cascading national consequences. Yet the incident did not occur in a vacuum: the preceding series of telecom and LG-group network compromises, along with DPRK’s well documented interest in industrial control and operational technology systems, introduces a layer of strategic ambiguity that cannot be dismissed without comprehensive forensic validation.
Accordingly, the hypothesis of cyber-physical interference or sabotage should be treated not as an assumption, but as a high impact line of inquiry to be rigorously pursued. Investigators should prioritize firmware extraction and differential analysis, vendor credential and access tracing, and cross-correlation of physical events with network telemetry to confirm or rule out adversary involvement. Only through disciplined, data driven analysis can South Korea separate coincidence from intent, and, in doing so, strengthen both the resilience and credibility of its national cyber-incident response posture moving forward.
Krypt3ia 