The Problem of AI-Generated Deepfakes – and a Solution?

This video discusses the increasing prevalence of highly convincing fabricated videos featuring prominent alternative media personalities with YouTube channels. (Unfortunately, the content includes a sponsor message as part of its presentation).

Many people like me have moved away from mainstream media due to perceived partisanship, misinformation, and limited viewpoints (see The death of independent journalism). Alternative media often offers more objective analysis from experts such as Yanis Varoufakis, Jeffery Sachs, Larry Johnson, Ray McGovernGlenn Diesen, John Helmer, Vladimer BrovkinAlexander MercourisAlex Christofou, John Mearsheimer, and others. My article How is the war going? also lists alternative YouTube channels offering diverse perspectives on the Russian-Ukrainian (NATO) war.

These alternative sources attract far more viewers than traditional media. The fake videos are convincing enough to deceive most people, even those who know the originals well. For instance, Yanis Varoufakis admitted he was fooled by an imposter video, only noticing the blue shirt as a detail he had never worn in his office.

Most fake videos feature messages the real person could have said, without misrepresenting their views or authority. It appears AI has been skillfully used to make these fakes convincing, likely aiming to profit from YouTube content originally created by others.

The large viewership of fake videos suggests this funding strategy is effective.

I have noted numerous fake videos impersonating Yanis Varoufakis (the sheer number of these was a giveaway to me), John Mearsheimer (he does not have his own channel so I was suspicious from the start – again there are a large number of fakes), and Alexander Mercouris (this had me fooled for a while but I am so familiar with Alexander’s genuine videos I found the fake one too abstract for his style – and the fake one has him speaking more confidently than Alexander does himself when speaking alone).

Is this something we should be concerned about? The shift toward AI-generated content appears to be accelerating. Students have caught on to this for some time now, so perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised by this trend. In the video above, Yanis Varoufakis demonstrates just how pervasive AI has become—when he tried to report a fake video impersonation to Google/YouTube, the responses he received were generated by AI. It took him quite some time to reach an actual person.

I acknowledge that I intentionally viewed an AI-generated video to obtain technical information regarding the EU’s efforts to utilise frozen or seized Russian State Bank assets to support a loan for Ukraine. While the video provided some useful insights, it lacked certain details, which I subsequently obtained from a reliable source. It remains a concern that AI-generated content may contain inherent inaccuracies.

There is also a moral issue: creating fake videos damages the reputation of those impersonated, and risks encouraging wider misrepresentation of authoritative voices.

The solution?

Yanis Varoufakis offers a positive message, urging viewers to be more critical as fake videos become common. He suggests we should think independently rather than rely on authority or reputation, evaluate the logic presented, and verify information whenever possible.

It’s understandable that people accept narratives without checking facts, as verification can be challenging. However, using multiple reputable sources instead of just one can help avoid these pitfalls.

Two useful slogans about information sources are “Question more” and “Trust but verify.”

Yanis Varoufakis admits in this video that it’s a losing game, as most people don’t think critically and prefer narratives over facts.

But one can do little more than try.

Maybe it’s more sensible to hold summit meetings in private

Image Credit: Daniel Foubert (who says, “Next time the European leaders will have to sit on the floor”).

There have been two historic summit meetings in the last few days—the President Trump-President Putin Anchorage meeting and the President Trump-President Zelensky-assorted European leaders meeting in Washington, DC. These have generated a lot of largely irrelevant media attention and speculation.

But it is tempting to make a firmer assessment of their real successes and failures.

The Anchorage Trump-Putin summit

Obviously, this was an important step in the much-needed improvement of relations between the US and the Russian Federation. I have argued that the improvement of this relationship is so far the only real achievement initiated by President Trump (see Trump, political partisanship, and world peace). Certainly, it is the most important.

The summit was primarily a discussion to clarify each side’s position, not a true negotiation. No documents were produced to assess its success, which was disappointing given the extensive prior dialogue and high-level participants. I had hoped for progress on issues like diplomatic relations, seized diplomatic property, and talks about nuclear arms control and European security.

The abrupt ending of the summit with the abandonment of a formal meal was also a surprise. Maybe that indicates some sort of breakdown – or perhaps it is just a result of Trump’s erratic personality. Both presidents actually worked very hard after the summit ended, and I would not be surprised if Trump abruptly declared he was “getting out of here” in a move to initiate the lengthy and challenging phone negotiations he conducted with President Zelensky and some European political leaders.

Trump is a slow learner

Despite the lack of documents, we do have a clear statement from Trump that he has moved on from insisting on an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine and now stresses the importance of a rapid solution of the underlying causes of the war by negotiation.

Either Trump is a slow learner or has got into his head that an unconditional ceasefire was a necessary first step. I think he had been fooled by biased reporting claiming that the war had reached a stalemate and listened to some US politicians who wanted to convert the war into a frozen conflict, as in Korea.

President Zelensky opposed the original obligatory ceasefire idea, but Trump bullied him into a change of mind during the famous Oval Office row and the subsequent short pause on arms delivery and provision of military intelligence. Because the Russians were in fact winning on the battlefield, President Putin had no interest in the ceasefire but wanted to discuss the resolution of root causes and unilaterally reopened the Istanbul Peace Negotiation format that Ukraine had withdrawn from in early 1922. Trump welcomed that initiative, and this appeared to trap the Ukrainians into accepting renewal of negotiations, despite Zelensky’s presidential decree making such negotiations unlawful.

The Washington Trump-Zelensky-European leaders summit

This appears to have been a shambles. It might have been better to have prevented the European leaders from gate-crashing this summit.

Most of the summit was held in an open format, which may have been good for Trump’s ego (it must have been satisfying to appear as the world leader and reveal the open fawning of the Europeans). But the Europeans are very divided, seem to be unaware of and not prepared to discuss the real issues underlying the war, and are still at the stage of promoting propagandist declarations instead of considering the substantive issues.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wanted to divert attention with the false claim that Russia had abducted thousands of children, seemingly completely unaware that the issue had already been dealt with by the Ukraine-Russia negotiations. The Ukrainians produced a list of 330 children they claimed were separated from their families in the war, and the Russians are in the process of verifying and considering the list. There have already been several exchanges of children separated from their families because of the war.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz wanted to promote the unconditional ceasefire approach, seemingly unaware that the world has moved on, and even President Zelensky accepts this.

Finland’s President Alexander Stubb expressed cautious optimism about the peace process but seemed unaware of the irony in his story about the successful Finnish experience of ceding land to Russia and undertaking a path of neutrality in Finnish-Russian negotiations at the end of the war. The fact that Finland was a German ally in that war and had been involved in the siege of Leningrad will not be lost on Russian observers, who may draw parallels with the influence of neo-Nazis in Ukraine today. That Finland has now given up its neutrality and joined NATO is also ironic.

A Finnish battalion of the Waffen-SS in 1943. Image Source: New York Times. “Finnish Volunteers ‘Very Likely’ Participated in Killing of Jews in WWII

There was plenty of discussion of security guarantees for Ukraine. Ideas were very vague, and many seem fixated on Ukraine’s membership of NATO and NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine again showing that these leaders do not understand what the war is about.

This summit did include a closed session, and we have no clear information on any decisions made. However, it appears to have concentrated on land concessions and security guarantees, and no doubt any decisions will have been conveyed to the Russian side.

The immediate future

In a typically impulsive way, Trump is talking about an immediate Zelensky-Putin summit, etc. But, with acceptance of the need to negotiate for a proper peace treaty and removal of the “ceasefire” obstacle, there is a chance that the Ukrainian-Russian Istanbul negotiations can now proceed more realistically. It seems far too early to have a high-level summit, but this possibility can be discussed in Istanbul and promoted at the appropriate time.

So one step forward with the removal of the “ceasefire” which various players were hiding behind. We can look forward to a new proposal from the Ukrainian negotiators.

I think the misunderstanding of security guarantee concepts will be a hurdle. There is a lot of confusion about the concept, and Trump has not helped by promoting misleading concepts. He clearly does not yet understand the real causes of the war and why security must not be approached in an arbitrary, one-sided way but in the way that Europe made some progress on in the past with the concept of indivisible or collective security. Security for all – not security for one country at the expense of another.

Given his current central role, it is a pity that Trump is so impulsive and does not take the time to listen and understand.

The Science and Mātauranga Māori debate

Professor Kendall Clements of the University of Auckland argues that attempts to conflate traditional Māori knowledge with science debases both.

This is a video of a great discussion between Professor Kendall Clements of the University of Auckland and Dr Iona Italia, managing editor and a podcast host at the online magazine Quillette

Kendall Clements co-authored a brief letter in defence of science in the Listener magazine in 2021. The resulting public scandal has been described as convoluted and absurd. For me, the original letter raised issues about the nature of science and the role of modern and traditional empirical knowledge as important components of science, but not complete science in itself. The discussion also raised the importance of respecting both science and Mātauranga Māori. I think Professor Clements makes an important point when he points out that trying to equate the different areas of knowledge disrespects and degrades both systems of knowledge.

Although the discussion is mostly about epistemology and the philosophy of science, the political aspects of the public scandal are also discussed. I think that is important as it opens up issues like the importance of neutrality of educational institutions and of free speech in these academic institutions, which have recently been discussed in our parliament.

The discussion also covers identity politics and the resulting self- and institutional-censorship, which I think are harmful. There is also the danger of the sort of backlash against academia that has recently occurred in the USA.

The podcast notes referred to the presence, somewhere, of some background reading on the issue. I thought this might provide links to the range of articles published in 2021/2022 during the public debate, and would have presented these links here if I could have found them. Professor Clements believes, now, that the public discussion at the time was quite boring and often irrational. However, I think this interview does cover the issues well – and rather uniquely, Clements is one of the initial persons involved in the debate.

Finally, two aspects that are new to me:

  • Some of the authors of the original Listener Letter to the Editor had previously attempted to publish an academic paper on this issue in the New Zealand Journal of the Royal Society and one other journal. The paper was rejected in both cases as being in conflict with the policies of the institutions involved.
  • The vice chancellor of the University of Auckland, after condemning the Listener letter as not reflecting the views of the university and then reversing her stance by saying the university doesn’t have a particular view on the issue, said the university would host a symposium in 2022 to discuss the relationship between Mātauranga Māori and science. I remember that promise and looked forward to hearing how it went. But Professor Clement confirms it never happened. I feel cheated.

A new paper challenges the consensus on the cost-benefit analysis of community water fluoridation

Bill Osmunson, senior advisor to the Fluoride Action Network, is one of the authors of the paper critiqued in this article. Image Credit: Fluoride Action Network Team.

Most studies of the costs and benefits of community water fluoridation (CWF) show it is beneficial and profitable for communities above a few thousand (see New study finds community water fluoridation still cost effective, New review shows clear economic benefits from community water fluoridation, Fluoridation: New research confirms it is cost effective – yet again). However, a new study offers a different perspective, stating that “fluoridation is not cost-effective if the cost of harm is included.” The citation is:

Osmunson, B., & Cole, G. (2024). Community Water Fluoridation: A Cost-Benefit-Risk Consideration. Public Health Challenges, 3(4), e70009.

According to their paper, the authors are associated with the International Academy of Medical and Dental Toxicology, the American Environmental Health Studies Project, and the Fluoride Action Network, which contributed financially to the publication costs.

The following critique addresses their arguments about the alleged harm of dental fluorosis and developmental neurotoxicity.

Costs due to dental fluorosis

Professional reporting of dental fluorosis will always categorise the different severities (questionable, very mild, mild, moderate, severe) (see Facts about fluorosis – not a worry in New Zealand) rather than cite undefined data (“Professional diagnosis of dental fluorosis is commonly reported at 14.5%–17.5% [11, 12]”  as Osmunson and Cole do. The figures of “14.5%–17.5%” don’t appear in the cited references.

Osmunson and Cole use the words “severe,” “moderate,” and “mild” (and the categorisation term “Dean’s Fluorosis Index of 4”), but only in reference to one of their images, not in relation to the data used for their analysis.

More seriously, they claim:

“52% of patients perceived their dental fluorosis, at 0.7mg/L fluoride in CWF, to be objectionable, and 95% of those wanted the damage repaired [12],”

but these figures simply don’t occur in the paper they cite (Moimaz et al. 2015: Dental fluorosis and its influence on children’s lifeBrazilian Oral Research29(1), 1–7).

The Moimaz et al (2015) study was not limited to “0.7mg/L fluoride in CWF.” To quote Moimaz et al (2015):

“The city has two different areas: one where the fluoride concentration is maintained at optimal levels (approximately 0.7 mgF/l) and another where the fluoride level is higher than the recommended limits. The study participants were divided into two groups: those who had always lived in an area with excessive fluoride (1.2 mgF/l) and those who had always lived in an area with ideal fluoride levels (0.7 mgF/l) in the water supply.”

Nowhere do Moimaz et al (2015) refer to 52% or 95% of patients. In their abstract, they reported:

“Among the 292 children that showed fluorosis, 40% perceived the presence of spots in their teeth. The prevalence of fluorosis was slightly high, and the mildest levels were the most frequently observed. Although most of the children showed fluorosis to various degrees, the majority did not perceive these spots, suggesting that this alteration did not affect their quality of life.”

In their results section they provide more details:

“Fluorosis was observed in 58.9% of the examined children, and the “very mild” level was the most prevalent (44.4%). . . . . . Less than half of the children who presented with dental fluorosis (40.1%) perceived the clinical signals in their teeth and, among these, the majority (94.9%) expressed a wish to remove the fluorosis spots . . .”

A little bit of arithmetic indicates that about 38% (40.1% x 94.9%) of those with dental fluorosis wished to remove the fluorosis spots and that this was an issue for  only 22.4% (58.9% x 40.1% x 94.9%) of the total 292 children.

So Osmunson and Cole have cherry-picked the Moimaz et al (2015 study which suggests that for an area which includes drinking water sources with fluoride concentrations higher than for CWF perhaps 22% of children might wish to remove the spots from their teeth. Yet they then go on to use what they describe as a “conservative”  “30% of those on fluoridation will have perceived dental fluorosis they would wish to have removed or for which they would request compensation” in their “Cost–Benefit–Risk” analysis.

Costs due to developmental neurotoxicity

In recent years, anti-fluoride activists have promoted studies they argue show developmental neurotoxicity of fluoride. Most studies are of poor quality, based on populations in areas of endemic fluorosis, where fluoride intake is high, and are subject to several statistical inadequacies common in epidemiological studies. Such studies are prone to data mining, or worse, data dredging, p-hacking, and similar tricks, and we are wisely warned that correlation does not mean causation. However, that doesn’t stop active confirmation bias from influencing the promotion of such studies.

While some more recent studies have attempted to include populations in areas using community water fluoridation, many of the inadequacies persist. I have written before about the problem of inadequate consideration of possible confounding influences (see my paper Perrott 2017: Fluoridation and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder – a critique of Malin and Till (2015)) and overhyping correlations that explain minuscule amounts of the observation variations (see The promotion of weak statistical relationships in scienceCan we trust science?Biostatistical problems with the Canadian fluoride/IQ study).

Reviewers have attempted to make sense of the fluoride-IQ studies using statistical metanalyses. The most authoritative of these have concluded that while there is a negative association between IQ deficits and drinking water where the fluoride concentrations are great than 1.5 mg/L there is not statistically significant relationship for drinking water concentration below 1.5 mg/L (see NASEM. 2021:Review of the Revised NTP Monograph on the Systematic Review of Fluoride Exposure and Neurodevelopmental and Cognitive Health Effectshttps://doi.org/10.17226/26030Kumar et al. 2023: Association between low fluoride exposure and children’s intelligence: a meta-analysis relevant to community water fluoridation. Community Water Fluoridation (CWF) uses drinking water concentrations around 0.7 – 1 mg/L

Osmunson and Cole reject the now commonly accepted conclusion of these recent reviews that there is no evidence of developmental neurotoxicity with CWF and instead attempt their own mini-meta-analyses. Their bias is illustrated by their critical attempt to discredit one study showing a positive relationship between water fluoride concentration and child IQ (with no critiques of the limitations in any study showing a negative effect).

They conclude:

“There is reasonable agreement and consistency that fluoride is a developmental neurotoxin. . . . . the majority of published research using a conservative 3 IQ loss for those on fluoridated water.”

The analysis they rely for this is Neurath. 2020: Dose-Response Assessment of Fluoride Neurotoxicity Studies. This report by the Science Research Director of the Fluoride Action Network separates the fluoride-IQ studies into two groups – those with a mean water fluoride concentration greater than 1.5 mg/L and ones with a mean concentration less than 1.5 mg/L. This is clear from its Figure 2: Forest plot showing results of subgroup meta-analysis for exposures above 1.5 mg/L compared to those with exposures below 1.5 mg/L.

Chris Neurath is the FAN and AEHSP (American Environmental Health Studies Project) Research Director. Image Credit: Fluoride Action Network Team.

Neurath found that the effect of fluoride concentration on IQ decrease was larger in those with mean exposures below 1.5 mg/L compared to the subgroup of studies with exposures above 1.5 mg/L (-4.04 compared to -2.40 IQ points per 1 mg/L increase in fluoride exposure).

The problem is that citing only the mean water F concentration hides the fact that each study includes a range of concentrations, with probably many of them greater than 1.5 mg/L.

For example, Neurath (202) cites a mean concentration of 1.3 mg/L for the Cui 2018 study. But this study included an endemic fluorosis area, and the drinking water concentrations actually ranged from 0.2 to 2.49 mg/L. I showed in my article Analysis of FAN’s 65 brain-fluoride studies that when the data for concentrations less than 1.5 mg/L in this and other similar studies are considered separately, there is no statistically significant effect of water F concentration on child IQ.

We can see a similar situation for studies using urinary F concentrations (see figure), although, because of different methods used, it is difficult to know what the cutoff point is between normal and excessive urinary F concentrations.

 

Data from Xiang et al (2003). Red data points for urinary F concentrations < 2mg/L. From Perrott 2020: Analysis of FAN’s 65 brain-fluoride studies

So, in the cost-benefit analysis, Osmunson & Cole should have the scientifically valid conclusion of zero IQ effect instead of “using a conservative 3 IQ loss for those on fluoridated water.”

Conclusion

Osmunson & Cole assert that fluoridation leads to detrimental dental fluorosis and decreased IQ in children. However, these assertions do not hold up under rigorous scientific examination of the literature referenced.

The authors’ argument may differ from the prevailing consensus due to their affiliations with certain organisations. Regardless of these affiliations, their data and arguments should be subjected to reasonable critique. This has been attempted here.

I should perhaps submit an article to the journal they used (Public Health Challenges) critiquing their paper, but I don’t have the financial backing to pay the publication costs involved. Also, my previous experience with this approach has taught me that journal editors are not always driven by scientific honesty (see Fluoridation not associated with ADHD – a myth put to rest).

I have informed Bill Osmunson of my critique and invited his response here to address or counter my points.

Ukraine war enters new stage – an anti-terrorist operation?

 

The post-coup Ukrainian government was the first to declare an anti-terrorist war – although their forces were the ones carrying ut terrorist acts against civilians in Eastern Ukraine.

Russian politicians are starting to discuss the necessity of escalating the Russia-Ukraine war from a limited military operation into an anti-terrorist war.

Interestingly, it was the Ukrainians who first referred to their action as an anti-terrorist operation. In 2014, the government that came to power after the February coup designated their opponents in the civil war in the east as terrorists. They labelled the area of the civil war as a terrorist zone and referred to their military actions as an anti-terrorist operation.

This terminology shift may stem from the constitutional ban on Ukrainian governments using their military against citizens. Nonetheless, they fought Ukrainian citizens in the east, often engaging in terrorist actions targeting civilians, including women and children.

Ukrainian President Poroshenko in 214 said this about Ukrainian Citizens in the east (see video above):

‘Because we will have jobs, but they won’t!

We will have pensions, but they won’t!

We will have child and elderly care, but they won’t!

Our children will go to schools and kindergartens, but their children will sit in the basements!

Because they are not capable of doing anything!

In this and only this way we will win this war.’

In 2024, Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko commented on this speech:

“Then it sounded disgusting. Now it sounds dreadful.”

Is the description of Ukrainian military as terrorists justified?

I think yes – at least partially.

Most rational observers believe that Russians are winning this war. On the other hand, the more extreme Ukrainian nationalists and their supporters are promoting the myth that the Russians are losing. It is a myth that the Ukrainian leadership is forced into accepting as a result of pressure from the ultranationalists.

Readers who still doubt the nature of the ultranationalists in Ukraine and their current role, particularly in controlling the government, should watch the recent video “Volhynia Massacre: Ukraine’s EU aspirations Hits a Wall | David Marples.” See below:

Ukrainian actions such as the drone attack on the nuclear airfields, the train attacks in Bryansk and Kursk, and the recent attack on the Crimean bridge are claimed by the ultranationalists and their supporters as military victories proving their inevitable victory. Yet they will have a negligible effect on the progress of the war. However, they represent the sort of sabotage acts that the Ukrainian military and security agencies, as well as the SBU, have become very skilled at.

These agencies have a long record (going back to 2014) of assassinating of Russian and Ukrainian political and military leaders, bloggers, and journalists. Assassinations aimed at removing Zelensky’s political opponents, even those who have fled the country, as well as those taking part in or reporting the war. The drone attack on the airfield is merely an extension of the equally clever assassinations of journalists and military leaders in Moscow and Saint Petersburg

Recently Russian President Putin accused Ukraine and its Western backers of having sought a strategic defeat of Russia on the battlefield. Now, he said, Kiev is shifting tactics amid mounting losses and setbacks along the front line.

“Today, amid heavy losses and retreating along the entire line of contact, the Kiev leadership has turned to organizing terrorist acts in an attempt to intimidate Russia,” Putin said.

While Ukraine is losing on the battlefield, where the actual fate of the war will be determined, it presents its supporters with a myth that it is winning. After all, the sabotage and terrorist acts are impressive. Well planned and carried out. They are humiliating to the Russian side. All aspects emphasised by the Ukrainian-backed news and media and welcomed by adoring fans of Ukraine, who are starved of any real military victories but love the opportunity of seeing Putin, whom they hate so much, humiliated.

On the other hand, the Russians, while not seeing the sabotage and terrorist actions by Ukraine as threatening Russian victory in the long term, must be tempted to eliminate the sources of these actions. Certainly, there is strong pressure on the government to do so.

That elimination will become possible if the Russians remove the restrictions they currently have on attacking or killing political leaders and destroying state institutions. Moving to an anti-terrorist operation will enable them to directly target the SBU and military intelligence, and to target their leadership of these organisations.

Why Now?

The Russian leadership, while condemning these sabotage and terrorist attacks in the strongest terms, has not seen them as having a marked effect on the war. Even the attack on strategic bombers had a negligible effect on Russian capabilities.

But the Russian leadership appears to be concluding that serious negotiations with the Ukrainian regime are no longer possible. President Putin has expressed that view, although Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Chief Negotiator Vladimir Medinsky still believe that some benefits can be obtained from the Istanbul negotiations. A moot point, as Ukrainian President Zelensky appears to be declaring that his side will withdraw from the Istanbul format.

So, the Russians believe that the war will only be won on the battlefield and that they should now pursue that military victory in earnest. Also, they judge that the Ukrainian leadership has so discredited itself with Zelensky’s behaviour that Russia’s friends in the global south will no longer oppose the escalation of Russian military actions.

Currently, the Russians have stepped up their offensive, and I will not be surprised if they soon declare their military action to be an anti-terrorist one so that they can eliminate the sources of the sabotage and terrorist actions.

Ukrainian drone attack on Russian strategic bombers – why the concern?

The recent drone attacks on Russian strategic bombers were welcomed by many Western politicians but condemned by some US politicians. Why the controversy? After all, it is widely accepted that the Ukrainian military has a right to attempt to disable or destroy those Russian long-range bombers that are involved in missile attacks on Ukrainian targets.

The concern of some US politicians arises from the fact that the US has nuclear arms treaties with the Russian Federation. These treaties require both countries to maintain some of their nuclear assets in the open so that they can be monitored by the other side. I saw this myself in a visit to a US nuclear missile silo in Arizona, where the hatch had to be maintained permanently open to allow Russian satellites to monitor the condition of the missile in the silo. Similarly, the Russian strategic bombers must be maintained in the open on the airfield to enable US satellite monitoring.

The possibility that such nuclear assets could be threatened, or even damaged or destroyed, in a proxy war must have been overlooked by the treaty negotiators when these conditions were agreed upon.

But this has now happened, and it raises two issues in my mind:

1: These drone attacks have crossed a line – making nuclear war between the Russian Federation and the USA more likely. This fact may not have even been considered by the Ukrainian military tacticians or their supporters in Europe, who were very gung-ho about the incident, but it is obvious to politicians in the Russian Federation and (some) politicians in the USA. Several US politicians (for example, Generals Flynn and Keith Kellogg [see above video]) have openly expressed their concern, as the attacks represent a violation of the treaty to which they are signatories. They warned that the attack seriously raised the possibility of a nuclear exchange

2: The opening up of state-to-state contacts between the Russian Federation and the USA under the current US Trump administration will reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, which could result from these attacks. This incident confirmed I was correct in welcoming the recent opening up of diplomatic exchanges between the Russian Federation and the USA (see my article Trump, political partisanship, and world peace.”

Russian Military Doctrine

The updated Russian nuclear doctrine is directly relevant to this drone attack. The document FUNDAMENTALS of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence

“Aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state is considered as their joint attack.”

And it lists one of the conditions that would lead to nuclear weapons employment by the Russian Federation as:

“c) actions by an adversary affecting elements of critically important state or military infrastructure of the Russian Federation, the disablement of which would disrupt response actions by nuclear forces;”

It is widely acknowledged (and directly understood by the Russian Federation) that the war in Ukraine is a proxy war. It is a war between Russia and NATO in which the Ukrainians act as proxies for NATO. So, while only conventional weapons have so far been used, the Russian Federation recognises that it is in conflict with the nuclear powers – the USA, UK, and France.

Not for the first time, of course. But responsible diplomats and world leaders recognise the absolute need to manage proxy wars in a manner that prevents their escalation into the use of nuclear weapons.

In this case, considering Russian nuclear doctrine, the NATO powers have a responsibility to prevent the use of even conventional, non-nuclear, weapons being used to threaten or disable those aspects of the Russian military superstructure that are vital to the ability of the Russian Federation to use their nuclear forces.

In principle, this is what happened with the Ukrainian drone attack. This threatened an arm of the Russian nuclear forces – their long-distance bombers.

There has been a lot of disinformation about the effectiveness of this attack. Fortunately, the outstanding success claim of the Ukrainian propagandists is fake. Some bombers were damaged, a few even destroyed, but in no way was the attack serious enough to completely disable this arm of the Russian nuclear forces.

Nevertheless, such a serious attack on the nuclear bombers needed to be handled responsibly by the Russian Federation and the USA to prevent them from escalating into a full-scale nuclear exchange. Again, fortunately, the recent opening up of contact between the USA and Russia made such responsible diplomatic contact and explanation of motives possible.

That is why I said in my article “Trump, political partisanship, and world peace” that whatever we think of Trump the man or his policies, he has done at least one thing right:

“Initiation of these discussions [with the Russian Federation] may be the only positive thing Trump achieves in his presidency. But we should be thankful for this single action, and the whole world should be behind him on this, whatever they think of him as a person.”

And:

“Attack Trump by all means – politicians expect this. But please don’t attack him for the one thing he is doing right.”

Did the US and other Western nuclear powers know about, or even approve of, the planned drone attack?

This was a central issue in the phone call between President Trump and President Putin after the attacks. Of course, Putin was interested in whether the US would acknowledge a role in the attacks – and Trump was equally interested in denying any pre-attack knowledge. Putin probably did not believe him, and it is quite possible that Trump was ignorant or unaware. But the exchange enabled them to defuse the situation somewhat.

I don’t believe for one minute that the US intelligence agencies were in the dark. After all, immediately after the 2014 coup in Kiev, the CIA moved in and refashioned the Ukrainian security agencies – the SBU and Military intelligence – and worked hard to remove any Russian influence.

The CIA is likely to be well informed of Ukrainian military planning, even participating in or initiating such planning. This drone attack was in planning for 18 months, so it is perhaps understandable that there was no current information at the presidential level. Another point is the operation may have been approved by the USA 18 months ago, but it continued in planning despite electoral changes. The CIA operates a policy of keeping politicians in the dark and not abandoning plans unless specifically told to.

Conclusion

Proxy wars like that between North and South Vietnam or Ukraine and the Russian Federation may be useful ways of superpowers to maintain or improve their influence throughout the world without resorting to a direct superpower armed conflict, which would inevitably lead to a nuclear exchange and destruction of all life on the planet.

But there is always a danger that such proxy wars could escalate to involve a direct conflict between the nuclear superpowers. This is particularly so where the proxy for one superpower is in direct conflict with the other superpowers – as is the case in the Ukraine-Russian war.

That is why it is so necessary that superpowers maintain good contact with each other. Contact is essential to enable the risks inherent in the proxy wars to be managed rationally to prevent all-out war.

Fortunately, in this case the Russian Federation and USA had to some extent been able to renew contacts and hence handle the situation. Unfortunately, this is not the same for Europe, which refuses to renew contacts and even works to make contact less likely. The fact that European politicians actually welcomed the drone attack and worked hard to justify it – even to glamourous it, is, unfortunately, not a good sign.

Why is there no progress in Ukrainian war peace talks?

President Trump’s hopes of ending the war in Ukraine seemed more driven by ego than realistic analysis. Professor Vladimir Brovkin’s latest video above highlights the internal conflicts within the USA, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine, which are currently hindering peace talks and clarity. Brovkin pointed out major contradictions within each camp that many observers overlook.

In the USA

President Trump seems to want a military ceasefire, possibly aiming for a Nobel Peace Prize. However, he faces opposition from those who wish to continue the war against Russia. His advisors are presenting two peace scenarios: Steve Witkoff suggests accepting Russia’s claims to four eastern oblasts and denying NATO membership to Ukraine, while Keith Kellog proposes an immediate ceasefire followed by dividing Ukraine into three regions – one occupied by Russia, one by European troops and the third a remnant Ukraine.

In Europe

There is a small but growing number of countries who oppose arming Ukraine and want normal relations with Russia restored. But a “coalition of the willing” has been formed which turned out to really be a coalition of the unwilling. Five of these states want to send troops to Ukraine (which aligns to a large extent with the Kellog plan, but most of the European countries will refuse to send their own troops.

In the Russian Federation

President Putin has demanded the annexation of four eastern Ukrainian oblasts. A year ago, he proposed a ceasefire if Ukraine withdrew its forces from these regions and agreed to neutrality and no NATO membership. However, influential sections of Russian society now argue that neutrality, rejection of NATO membership, demilitarization, de-Nazification, and minority ethnic human rights guarantees, which were initially given as the aims of the war, require continued warfare for the full occupation of Ukraine. Some people believe cities like Odessa and Kharkov are predominantly Russian and should be occupied before ending the war.

In Ukraine

Ukraine is currently facing numerous internal conflicts. Brovkin focuses on the primary disagreement regarding Trump’s economic minerals deal. One group views this deal as essential for financing the US arms needed to achieve Ukrainian objectives in the war. Another group considers the deal exploitative, potentially leading to Ukraine being colonised by the US. This group believes that accepting the current Russian offer, which would maintain an independent Ukraine within the remaining oblasts, might be preferable to losing independence as well as the four eastern oblasts.

Some other issues

An interesting analysis, as far as it goes. I think while individual observers may be aware of the different camps within one or other of the participants in the war, most do not understand the full picture.

On the face of it, we might expect to only see two sides in a war. But this is a proxy war between the Russian Federation and NATO in which Ukraine really doesn’t have any control and has the task of providing the cannon fodder. But every country, or groups of countries, pursue their own interests. We could therefore expect contradiction between Ukraine and NATO but the added interest is the contradictions within NATO between the USA and the European countries.

The contradictions between the Russian Federation and most of the rest of the world (excluding NATO and countries aligned with it) are noteworthy. One of the aims of the USA and NATO was to use the conflict to isolate Russia using economic, trade, and political means. However, the economic measures did not achieve their intended effect. Instead, they resulted in strengthening Russia. This strength is partially due to Russia maintaining good relations with other countries (excluding NATO and its allies), which were crucial for trade.

Efforts by the USA and NATO to influence global opinion against Russia have been largely ineffective. While many countries have raised criticisms or concerns about Russia’s actions, these have had minimal impact. These concerns have contributed to Russia conducting the conflict as a limited military action rather than an all-out war. Targets are selected to minimize civilian casualties, engaging in a war of attrition focused on degrading NATO and Ukrainian assets, without major offensives that could alarm countries in the global south

This situation highlights another potential strategic conflict within the Russian camp: whether to maintain the current approach of slow attrition and ongoing diplomatic efforts for peace, or to escalate to full-scale military action to achieve complete control over Ukraine.

Can we now find out who the real Vladimir Putin is?

Regardless of our opinions about the politicians involved, I believe that every rational person should welcome the reestablishment of contacts between the USA and the Russian Federation. While this is only the beginning and there are no guarantees of success, it does create the opportunity to address issues such as the Ukraine crisis and to return to effective arms control measures. I discussed the importance of these contacts in my recent article Trump, political partisanship, and world peace.

It is understandable to follow news of these negotiations to judge their progress. But an interesting aside is public comments made by the US negotiators revealing an understanding of the Ukraine crisis and the positions of Ukrainian and Russian politicians. These show a refreshing understanding of things that we have not heard from US politicians for many years. Comments based on facts rather than ideology.

An example is the comments made by lead US negotiator Steve Witkoff after his recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Putin seems to be someone who you either love or hate – and in the west it appears obligatory to hate. It is difficult to find any objective writing about the man, his history, or his policies. The denomisation of Putin is so invasive that most of the published biographies come across as comic caricatures, devoid of credible facts but full of emotion and slander.

So it was refreshing to find the video above where Vladimir Brovkin uses Steve Witkoff’s impression of President Putin to give a brief background to Putin’s promotion to president and his policies and actions to bring his country out of the mess of the 1990s, rebuild its power, and provide for the needs of the population. This helps explain the popularity Putin has within his own country.

For Putin, this represents a positive history. Naturally, some Russians will have their own critical views, which is common in any comprehensive analysis of a political figure and their support. However, this video by Dr Brovkin might provide a balanced perspective on one of the significant politicians of this era.

Vladimir Brovkin is a retired American historian who was a professor of Soviet History at Harvard University. He has authored many books and articles on Russian history and politics. His most recent book From Vladimir Lenin to Vladimir Putin, includes a more detailed history of Vladimir Putin.

I recently acquired the book, and I look forward to reading it as I do find Dr Brovkin’s videos most informative.

 

 

 

 

Nuclear Ukraine: Budapest Memorandum – what it says and is it relevant?

Russian President Boris Yeltsin, U.S. President Bill Clinton, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, and British Prime Minister John Major signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Budapest, Hungary, on December 5, 1994. Known as the Budapest Memorandum, the agreement led to the dismantling of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal. Source: Radio Free Europe

A prevalent narrative suggests that Ukraine once possessed the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal and relinquished it in exchange for Russia’s promise not to invade, as outlined in the Budapest Memorandum. With Russia allegedly violating this agreement, some argue that Ukraine should develop or acquire new nuclear weapons. However, this narrative is not supported by factual evidence.

Before 1991, the nuclear weapons located in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan were under the control of the USSR and managed by Moscow. In 1991, the former republics of the Soviet Union within the Commonwealth of Independent States agreed to transfer all these nuclear armaments to Russian control.

Ukraine’s declaration of state sovereignty upon independence stated that the country would adopt a stance of permanent neutrality, abstain from participating in military alliances, and remain free of nuclear weapons.

The Budapest Memoranda of 1994 formalized the agreement on the repatriation of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to Russia, with assistance from Russia, the USA, and the UK. These memoranda included commitments from the USA, Russia, and the UK:

  • Weapons should only be used against these countries under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
  • Refrain from economic coercion to subordinate the rights of these countries to secure advantages of any kind
  • Seek UN Security Council intervention if aggression involving nuclear weapons occurs against these countries.
  • And refrain from using nuclear weapons against these three countries.

So who violated this memorandum?

Many believe the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine violated the memorandum. However, the Russian President justified the actions using the UN Charter. No case was taken to the UN Security Council, which could theoretically make a legal judgement but is hindered by the political positions of permanent members.

The narrative does not mention that the US (and potentially the UK) may have influenced the situation through economic measures such as sanctions and political activities, including funding NGOs and similar groups. Notable events in Ukraine include the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the US-backed coup in February 2014. In December 2013, Victoria Nuland, then US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, stated that the U.S. had invested over $5 billion in “democratic skills and institutions, civic participation, and good governance” in Ukraine since 1991.

Belarus complained to the United States regarding its economic and political violation of the Belarus Memorandum. In response, the US Embassy stated that these memoranda are “not legally binding” and asserted that their actions are exempt due to involvement in “human rights” issues.

Conclusions

Ukraine did not control the Soviet nuclear weapons on their territory; these were managed by Moscow. At independence, Ukraine aimed to be nuclear-free, neutral, and not part of any military alliance.

The Memorandum for Ukraine was breached by both Russia (violating Article 2 but justified under the UN Charter) and the US (violating Article 3, but the US did not consider the Memorandum legally binding).

Repatriating nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan was crucial due to instability in the former USSR’s constitutional republics. Given the political instability and occasional terrorist activities of Ukrainian leadership, it is fortunate that Ukraine does not have access to such weapons.

Sources

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States signed the Minsk Agreement on December 30, 1991, agreeing that the Russian government would be given charge of all nuclear armaments (see 1991 Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces). However, as long as the weapons remained in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the governments of those countries would have the right to veto their use. The target date for dismantling the weapons was set for the end of 1994. (Ukraine, Nuclear Weapons, and Security Assurances at a Glance)

Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine

This declaration includes the text:

“The Ukrainian SSR solemnly declares its intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear-free principles: to accept, to produce and to purchase no nuclear weapons” (see Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine).

Budapest Memoranda for Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan

The texts for the three memoranda are essentially the same and include the following articles:

1: To “respect the sovereignty and the existing borders of these three independent countries.”

2: Refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence” of these countries. None of their weapons “will never be used against” these three countries “except in self defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”

3: In accordance with the CSCE final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interests the exercise by” these countries “of the rights inherent in “their” sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.”

4: “Reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to” these three countries “as a non-nuclear weapon State Party(s) to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if” and of these countries “should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”

5: “Reaffirm, in the case of “ these three countries,” their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.

The documents can be found in pages 7 – 9 of Security Assurances

The Memoranda are not Legally Binding

Comment by Glenn Diesen in his book “The Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order”:

“When the U.S. imposed sanctions on Belarus in 2013, Washington explicitly stated that the Budapest Memorandum was not legally binding and that U.S. actions were exempted as they aimed to protect human rights:

Although the Memorandum is not legally binding, we take these political commitments seriously and do not believe any U.S. sanctions, whether imposed because of human rights or non-proliferation concerns, are inconsistent with our commitments to Belarus under the Memorandum or undermine them. Rather, sanctions are aimed at securing the human rights of Belarusians and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other illicit activities, not at gaining any advantage for the United States. US Embassy in Belarus, “Belarus: Budapest Memorandum,” U.S. Embassy in Minsk, 12 April 2013.

The Western-backed coup in 2014 had been an even more blatant violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. The West interfered in the domestic affairs of Ukraine, imposed economic sanctions, and finally toppled the Ukrainian president. The Budapest Memorandum was put aside as the West claimed to have supported a “democratic revolution.” International law imposes rules and mutual constraints in which the various sides have their foreign policy flexibility limited but in return gain reciprocity and thus predictability. Once the West relieved itself from mutual constraints in the Budapest Memorandum, then Russia also abandoned it.”

(See also Statement of the Foreign Ministry of Belarus regarding the US introduction of restrictions towards the Republic of Belarus for the complaint).

 

Trump, political partisanship, and world peace

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty prohibited all U.S. and Soviet missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The official figures above show missiles deployed November 1, 1987, shortly before the INF Treaty was signed. The treaty also required destruction of 430 U.S. missiles and 979 Soviet missiles which were in storage or otherwise not deployed. The treaty prevented the planned deployment of an additional 208 GLCMs in the Netherlands, Britain, Belgium, Germany, and Italy. The Pershing IAs, under joint U.S.-German control, were not formally covered by the INF Treaty but were also to be eliminated by U.S. and West German agreement.

 

Trump is not a nice person. If I were a US citizen I couldn’t have voted for him – but I couldn’t have voted for the other side either. (No, that’s imprecise – there were several “other sides” in the minor candidates, but I am referring to Harris). US “democracy” has been very undemocratic over the last 10 years and has been unable to deliver credible, likeable candidates with good policies. (For a long time I have thought the US is very hypocritical to lecture the rest of the world about “democracy’ when they are in such bad shape themselves.)

Danger of partisanship

OK, that self-explanation is out of the way. It shouldn’t have been necessary, but hopefully it will divert those attacks from people who say I am “pro-Trump” in an attempt to obscure my main message.

This is the problem with political partisanship, which has been so extreme lately. I understand how people get emotional over politics and why rational debate is difficult for most of us. But the extreme political partisanship and the overriding preoccupation with certain demonised personalities stops us from solving important issues. (The “Trump derangement syndrome” concept has itself been demonised but I think it does have some value in describing this sort of undermining of rational discussion. The term should be “Trump diversion syndrome.”)

The Peace Issue

This is the key thing to me. The only good news over the last few months has been Trump’s initiation of discussions between the leadership teams of the US and the Russian Federation. The Biden administration refused to do this, and Harris was clearly opposed to it.

These days there is a strong tendency to see peace only in the context of the war in Ukraine. But there are far more important issues and threats to the world than that war.

The danger of nuclear war and the subsequent death of humanity has never been greater. This is because communication between the leading nuclear powers, the US and the Russian Federation, has broken down. Disarmament and weapon control treaties have been abandoned or are soon to expire. And this tt a time when world leaders are talking about the realistic use of nuclear weapons. Nothing is being done to restore these treaties, and instead new weapons are being developed, and we are now back to the situation in the 1980s where deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles with first strike capabilities in Europe brought the world close to a danger of nuclear war starting accidentally. (Incidentally, at the time the peace movement actively campaigned against these weapons, but where is that movement now when we need it so badly?).

This needs to change. Yet, the US and Russian Federation don’t have functioning embassies in each other’s country The “tit for tat” expulsion of diplomats, seizure of diplomatic properties, removal of financial and monetary services for embassies, economic and personal sanctions, weaponisation of financial transaction systems like Swift, seizure of financial assets, etc., have made important discussions and negotiations impossible. This is at a time when these negotiations have become essential. Things never got this bad during the Cold War.

Trump’s initiation of communication and the start of negotiations between teams from both countries have been so necessary. Not only for the two countries involved but for the safety of the whole world.

It’s a small start. The negotiations are going to be difficult and may not succeed. But at least a start has been made, and without progress there is no hope of bringing peace to countries like Ukraine. (Naming of ambassadors and consideration of financial aspects for embassies indicates progress.).

Initiation of these discussions may be the only positive thing Trump achieves in his presidency. But we should be thankful for this single action, and the whole world should be behind him on this, whatever they think of him as a person.

Let’s be adult and deal with the real world

Yes, it would be nice if this peace initiative had been taken by a politician who was not a blowhard bully and was more physically attractive . But no other politician has been prepared or able to take this step. Ukraine has a law preventing such negotiations, and the Europeans rebuked Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán for the attempt he made in visits to Kiev, Beijing, Moscow, and the US.

Let’s deal with reality and use the cards we have in our hands. Attack Trump by all means – politicians expect this. But please don’t attack him for the one thing he is doing right.