From the News Center at UC Santa Cruz: “In his new book, Cosmological Koans: A Journey to the Heart of Physical Reality”, physicist Anthony Aguirre explores deep questions about the nature of reality, using an approach inspired by Zen koans to take the reader on a thought-provoking tour of the cosmos and the core ideas of modern physics.
In Zen Buddhism, koans are short parables or questions meant to confront the practitioner with the inadequacy of conventional concepts and habits of thought. Similarly, Aguirre’s “cosmological koans” confront the reader with the unexpected nature of the world as described by physics and the mind-boggling ways in which it differs from our subjective experience or intuitive understanding of things.
‘I wanted to convey that sense of mystery and wonder that comes from seeing reality in a new way,’ said Aguirre, a professor of physics and holder of the Faggin Family Presidential Chair for the Physics of Information at UC Santa Cruz.
The book covers a wide range of topics, woven together with a fictional story line that recounts a journey from Italy to Japan. Multiple universes, the nature of time, the meaning of quantum theory, and entropy and information are among the subjects explored in short chapters that manage to convey mind-bending ideas in a way that is accessible and entertaining.
The topics include some of the most challenging open questions in cosmology and physics, as well as concepts that have long been settled science yet remain disturbingly counterintuitive. With respect to the enduring mystery of time, for example, Einstein showed that there is no universal ‘now’—in other words, different observers can have different perceptions of whether two events are simultaneous.”
Let’s explore the concept of time a bit further. In Chapter 28, p. 210, Professor Aguirre writes that you don’t see the world as it is now, whether that “now” is cosmic or not. The world you see around you is the world as it was in the past. Viewing the leaf falling from a tree 50 meters away, you see the tree as it was 167 nanoseconds ago.
What does “now” mean? In other words how do we define the present as distinct from the past or the future? It’s a timeless question borne of metaphysics as much as physics. As soon as you stop to identify that now is now, the moment has already passed into the past. Perhaps the closest we can come is envisioning a pause button as the label for a given “time t” that occurs as an event in a particular space at a specific time. But as we know, within our physical framework, there is no pause button. The arrow of time is always moving forward. The instant we reflect on the present it becomes the past, and the future is the next moment in time.
So if identifying the present is nearly a fleeting impossibility, would we have the audacity to imagine a perfect moment in time? Art Garfunkel believes we can, and who am I to disagree?
In chapter 30, p. 226, Professor Aguirre turns his attention to the thorny question of Theodicy, or why a designer would create a world of beauty such as ours while allowing for unimaginable levels of pervasive suffering. This leads the good professor to contemplate the multiverse, and that the universe we inhabit is one among many – merely the one that is most inhabitable to us. That thinking is in line with Leibniz, who imagined this to be the “best” universe not just in terms of good outweighing evil, but also as the simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena.
Chapter 31, The Floating Gardens, prompted me to get even more whimsical than usual. From a biblical standpoint, and the Old Testament in particular, the most significant “uni-verse” is the first verse. (Might we consider this a Cosmological “Cohen” as opposed to a “Koan”?) It reads: בְּרֵאשִׁית בָּרָא אֱלֹהִים אֵת הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֵת הָאָרֶץ
בְּרֵאשִׁית – in the beginning. The beginning of what? Time would seem to be the essence.
בָּרָא אֱלֹהִים – God created. The apparent conflict between “God” in the plural, and “created” in the singular.
אֵת הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֵת הָאָרֶץ – The heavens and the earth. Note the singularity of the earth and the multiplicity of the heavens, not to mention “the two aces”.
So by now you may be wondering, who is Katrina? In chapter 50, p. 355, Professor Aguirre takes note of the host of dichotomies he has assailed us with: Us and Them. Self and Other. East and West. Katrina is a young woman in the service industry I encounter in her role as a barista at Starbucks in the morning and as a waitress at Martell’s Tiki Bar in the evening, a dichotomy in its own right. She took an interest in what I was reading one morning – it was Cosmological Koans – which led to a conversation about East/West and the Yoga which got shoved down to the bottom of my bucket list.
Starbucks of course asks for your first name if you order anything but regular coffee. Originally I gave my name as Len, but for some reason the baristas kept hearing “Glen”. I got tired of correcting them, and so Glen I became for the purposes of my morning routine. When Katrina waited on Miriam and me and at Martell’s, my “real” name came to the surface. “If you’re Len, be Len” she said. Sounds like a cosmological koan to me.
The following items are אָסוּר, and any amount of them renders other items with which they become mixed אָסוּר: Wine used for יֵין נֶסֶךְ; objects of עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה; hides with a tear opposite the heart [עוֹרוֹת לְבוּבִין], indicating the idolatrous practice of sacrificing hearts of live animals.
This halacha applies to:
שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל [an ox that has been condemned to be stoned (וְכִֽי־יִגַּ֨ח שׁ֥וֹר אֶת־אִ֛ישׁ א֥וֹ אֶת־אִשָּׁ֖ה וָמֵ֑ת סָק֨וֹל יִסָּקֵ֜ל הַשּׁ֗וֹר וְלֹ֤א יֵאָכֵל֙ אֶת־בְּשָׂר֔וֹ וּבַ֥עַל הַשּׁ֖וֹר נָקִֽי – Shemos 21:28)], from which it is prohibited to derive הַנָאָה even before its sentence is carried out.
עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה [a heifer whose neck is broken when a person is found killed in an area between two cities and the murderer is unknown (see Devarim 21:1–9), which is likewise forbidden from the time it is taken down to the river to be killed. In these cases, if the animal becomes mixed in a herd of similar animals, all of the animals in the herd are אָסוּר.
צִיפּוֹרֵי מְצוֹרָע [birds designated for the purification of a leper (Vayikra 14:1–6)],
שְׂעַר נָזִיר [the shorn hair of a nazir (וְגִלַּ֣ח הַנָּזִ֗יר פֶּ֛תַח אֹ֥הֶל מוֹעֵ֖ד אֶת־רֹ֣אשׁ נִזְר֑וֹ וְלָקַ֗ח אֶת־שְׂעַר֙ רֹ֣אשׁ נִזְר֔וֹ וְנָתַן֙ עַל־הָאֵ֔שׁ אֲשֶׁר־תַּ֖חַת זֶ֥בַח הַשְּׁלָמִֽים – Bamidbar 6:18)]
According to what criterion does the tanna who teaches this Mishnah classify cases? If he determines them based on any item that is דָּבָר שֶׁבְּמִנְיָן, i.e., any item that is significant enough to be considered individually, which therefore cannot be nullified in a mixture even in a very large majority of permitted items, let him also teach the case of נְבֵילָה [significant cuts of an unslaughtered animal carcass]. And if he classifies cases based on items which are אָסוּר בְּהַנָאָה, let him also teach the case of חָמֵץ בְּפֶסַח [leavened bread on Pesach]. רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא said (and some say it was רַבִּי יִצְחָק נַפָּחָא): This tanna has two criteria, based on both דָּבָר שֶׁבְּמִנְיָן and אָסוּר בְּהַנָאָה.
But let the tanna teach the cases of perech nuts, a type of nut that has a brittle shell, and Badan pomegranates, pomegranates from Badan; as these fruits are considered significant, and when they grow during the first three years after the tree was planted [עָרְלָה], they belong to the category of items that are both דָּבָר שֶׁבְּמִנְיָן and אָסוּר בְּהַנָאָה.
The Gemara responds: The Mishnah taught that case, in MasechesOrla (3:7), where perech nuts and Badan pomegranates are listed among the forbidden items that cannot be nullified in a mixture, that in regard to such items: Those items to which the אִיסוּר of עָרְלָה applies render the entire mixture אָסוּר by imparting to it the status of עָרְלָה, while those to which the אִיסוּר of כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם applies render the mixture אָסוּר by imparting to it the status of כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם. Therefore, it is unnecessary to mention those cases here. For reference, here is the Mishnah in Orla (3:7):
But let the tanna teach the case of loaves of a homeowner [כִּכָּרוֹת שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת], each of which is unique and significant, with regard to the אִיסוּר of הַנָאָה שֶׁל חָמֵץ בְּפֶסַח. The Gemara explains: Whom did you hear say that such כִּכָּרוֹת are not nullified in a mixture? This is taught by רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא in Orla (3:7): “רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מוֹסִיף אַף כִּכָּרוֹת שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת.”
At the end of the Mishnah here, the tanna reiterates the halacha stated at the beginning of the Mishnah, stating:
All of these are אָסוּר themselves, and any amount of them renders a mixture אָסוּר. The Gemara asks: What is the purpose of this reiteration? The Gemara answers that it serves to exclude any item that is דָּבָר שֶׁבְּמִנְיָן but is not אָסוּר בְּהַנָאָה, or to exclude items from which is אָסוּר בְּהַנָאָה but is not דָּבָר שֶׁבְּמִנְיָן.
Let’s bypass the next Mishnah, and to the one one atop עמוּד ב. It involves a Jew who buys a winepress from a גוֹי and need to kasher it before using it. We’re going to encounter levels of kashering, which in ascending order from most lenient (where the wine was minimally absorbed in the container) to the most stringent level (where a more intensive process to rid the container of wine due to absorption), they are:
Level 1: Hadacha [הַדָחָה] – rinsing it out with water.
Level 2: Niguv [נִיגּוּב] – a more complex cleaning agent with ashes, followed by drying.
Level 3: Kiluf [קִילוּף] – peeling/scouring away the tar with which the inside of the press is pitched.
Level 4: Miluy V’Iruy – a three day process of stages of rinsing alternating with drying (as we encountered previously on דף ל״ג).
In the case of a stone winepress that a גוֹי lined with pitch and then poured wine onto the pitch to neutralize the flavor of the pitch, one may cleanse it via Level 2 above, and it is pure, i.e., wine pressed in it is מוּתָּר. If the winepress is made of wood (Rashi notes the extra pitch needed for wood absorbs more wine as compared to the thinner coating equired for stone), רֶבִּי says that one may cleanse it (Level 2) but the חֲכָמִים say that one must peel off the pitch completely (Level 3 above).
If the winepress is of earthenware, even if one peeled off the pitch, the winepress is אָסוּר.
רָבָא says: The requirement to cleanse the winepress applies specifically if the גוֹי lined it with pitch. But if he only trod on his grapes in it without lining it with pitch, this is not required. But if he trampled [grapes] in it [i.e. the vat]: without pitching, scouring is not necessary, rather rinsing [is sufficient]. As Rashi notes:
אבל דרך בה – בשאינה זפותה לא בעיא ניגוב אלא הדחה
The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? We learned in the Mishnah that cleansing the winepress is necessary if the גוֹי lined it with pitch. The Gemara responds: Lest you say that the same is true that it requires only נִיגּוּב even if he trod on his grapes in it, and the fact that the Mishnah teaches a case where he lined it with pitch is because it’s teaching the manner in which it typically occurs, therefore it was necessary for רָבָא to teach us that this is not the case.
There are those who say that רָבָא says: Cleansing the winepress is effective specifically if the גוֹי lined it with pitch. But if he trod on his grapes in it as well, נִיגּוּב it is not sufficient to purify the winepress. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? We learned in the Mishnah that cleansing the winepress is sufficient if the גוֹי lined it with pitch. The Gemara responds: Lest you say that the same is true and that cleansing is sufficient even if he trod on his grapes in it, and the fact that the Mishnah teaches a case where he lined it with pitch is because the Mishnah is teaching the manner in which the matter typically occurs, therefore רָבָא teaches us that cleansing the winepress is sufficient specifically if he lined it with pitch, but if he trod on his grapes in it, cleansing it is not sufficient.
This is similar to an incident involving a certain man who came before רַבִּי חִיָּיא and said to him: Give me a man who will purify my winepress that I purchased from a גוֹי. Giving counsel,רַבִּי חִיָּיא said to רַב (his nephew): Go with him and see to it that you conduct yourself in such a manner that will not cause people to complain against me in the Beis Medresh. רַב went with him and saw that the winepress was very smooth with pitch. רַב said: נִיגּוּב (Level 2) will certainly be sufficient for this, because it does not absorb the wine. While רַב was going and coming, he saw a crack underneath his feet and saw that it was full of wine. He then said: נִיגּוּב is not sufficient for this; rather, it requires קִילּוּף (Level 3). And this is what my uncle meant when he said to me: See to it that you do not cause people to complain against me in the Beis Medresh (a top notch job was done).
With regard to the winepress and its utensils, the ladle and the funnel, which belong to goyim, רֶבִּי permits נִיגּוּב, but the חֲכָמִים deem them אָסוּר [you would need Miluy V’iruy, Level 4]. And רֶבִּי concedes with regard to earthenware jugs belonging to goyim that they are אָסוּר. As Rashi notes:
ומודה בקנקנים – של חרס אע”פ שאין מזופפין שאסורין עד שימלאם ג’ ימים מים ומערן מעת לעת כדאמרינן באין מעמידין (לעיל עבודה זרה לג.)
What is the difference between the two cases? The case involving the jug contains the wine for storage purposes; the other case, involving a ladle and a funnel, involves utensils that touch the wine only temporarily, but not for storage purposes. And if the winepress or its utensils are fashioned of wood or stone, one must cleanse them, but if they were lined with pitch, they are forbidden, and נִיגּוּב is not sufficient to render them מוּתָּר (they require Level 4).
The Gemara raises an objection to the baraisa: Didn’t we learn in the mishna that in the case of a stone winepress that a גוֹי lined with pitch, one may cleanse it and it is pure? The Gemara answers: Our Mishnah is referring to a case where the גוֹי did not tread on his grapes in it, [for דְּלֹא דָּרַךְ בָּהּ Level 2 or נִיגּוּב is adequate] whereas the baraisa is referring to a case where he trod on his grapes in it [for דָרַךְ בָּהּ, Level 4 is required].
By the way, ArtScroll has a very nice table on 74b(4) titled “Purification Procedure For A Winepress” that sorts all of this out. Its categories are:
Stone vs. Wood vs. Earthenware
Uncoated vs. Coated
Owned by a Jew or by a Goy
רֶבִּי versus the רַבָּנָן.
It would not surprise me if Rabbi Stern imported this graphic tomorrow.
Wine used for יֵין נֶסֶךְ is אָסוּר, and any amount of it renders other wine אָסוּר if they are mixed together. Wine used for יֵין נֶסֶךְ that became mixed with ordinary wine, or water that was used for נֶסֶךְ that became mixed with ordinary water, renders the mixture אָסוּר with any amount of the forbidden wine or water; but wine used for יֵין נֶסֶךְ that became mixed with water, or water used for נֶסֶךְ that became mixed with wine renders the mixture אָסוּר only if the forbidden liquid is sufficient to impart flavor to the mixture, i.e., for the wine to flavor the water or for the water to dilute the wine to an extent that can be tasted.
This is the principle: A substance in contact with the same type of substance [מִין בְּמִינוֹ] renders the mixture אָסוּר with any amount of the forbidden substance [בְּמַשֶּׁהוּ], but a substance in contact with a different type of substance [שֶׁלֹּא בְּמִינוֹ] renders the mixture אָסוּר only in a case where it imparts flavor to it [בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם].
Rabbi Stern turned our attention to the Tosafos here:
יין ביין ומים במים במשהו – פר”ת דדוקא יין נסך ממש שנתנסך לעבודת כוכבים הוא דהוי במשהו אבל סתם יינם בששים וכן מגע עובד כוכבים במים מיירי במים שידוע שנתנסכו לעבודת כוכבים דאי בסתם מים ליכא איסור דכוותיה קתני יין שידוע שנתנסך לעבודת כוכבים אבל סתם יינם הוי בששים אפילו מין במינו כמו כל איסורין שבתורה וההיא דאגרדמים עובד כוכבים דקאמר עלה בתוספתא שטיפת יין אוסרת במשהו אע”ג דלא הוו ודאי נסך איכא למימר דאתיא כר’ יהודה דאמר מין במינו אפילו באלף לא בטיל אפי’ בשאר איסורין ועוד אומר ר”י דאפי’ אם נפשך לומר דסתם יינם במשהו אפ”ה הוי סתם יינם בזמן הזה בששים ודוקא בימי התנאים והאמוראים שהיו בקיאים העובדי כוכבים בטיב עבודת כוכבים דאז שייכא ניסוך החמירו בסתם יינם לאוסרו כמו יין נסך ממש הלכך לענין ביטול כשאר איסורין דמי ובטל בששים כמו שאר איסורין
ר”ת [the רַבֵּינוּ תַּם] points out that there is no such thing as “סְתַּם מַיִים”. You can drink water if it is owned by a גוֹי. If מַיִים is אָסוּר, it’s because it was used in the actual performance of נֶסֶךְ to עַבוֹדָה זָרָה. Likewise the יַיִן that we’re discussing is יַיִן נֶסֶךְ like מַיִים, and not סְתַּם יֵינָם. In the case of מִין בְּמִינוֹ. such as wine that fell into other wine, the guideline for the quantity that would disqualify it is greater than 1/60th [שִׁישִׁים], just as with all אִיסוּרִין in the Torah.
The ר”י adds that even if you say not like ר”ת, that you don’t require שִׁישִׁים and סְתַּם יֵינָם is אָסוּר בְּמַשֶׁהוּ in the time of the Gemara [in the middle ages], when Tosafos was written [in the 16th century] it was בְּשִׁישִׁים. That’s because an overarching theme that we’ve had since the beginning of the Mesechta is that in the time of the Tana’im and Amora’im, the Goyim were knowledgable about getchkes [real idols, not American idols]. But by the middle ages, the practice of עַבוֹדָה זָרָה was already Avodah Zarah Lite. So בִּזְמַן הַזֶה things are different and we’re not as stringent.
Rabbi Stern then turned our attention to [שולחן ערוך, יורה דעה [134:2 which states:
יין שאינו אסור אלא בשתייה אינו אוסר אלא בששים נתערב סתם יינם ביין מותר הרי זה אוסר בכל שהוא בשתייה
So clearly the מְחַבֵּר isn’t paskening like ר”ת. However, if you skip to the bottom of the Rama (who lived in the 16th century, and the halacha certainly applies in our time), you’ll find that he paskens like the ר״י:
ויש אומרים דכל סתם יינם בזמן הזה בטל בששים (תשובת הרא”ש כלל כ”ט ומרדכי פרק השוכר ובארוך כלל ט”ז דין י”ד ור”ש סוף תרומות וע”פ) וכן נוהגין להקל
This is an opportune time to pull in Rav Kornfeld’s summary chart and footnotes:
דברים האסורים דלהלן, שנתערבו במותרים, בכמה אוסרים לפי סתמות המשנה [1]
[1] אמנם נחלקו האמוראים דלהלן באיזה אופן מדברת המשנה, דלרב דימי ורב יצחק בר יוסף המשנה מדברת רק בהיתר שנפל לתוך איסור, אבל באיסור שנפל לתוך היתר – קמא קמא בטיל [אלא שנחלקו ביניהם בכמה]. ולרבין [לרש”י ותוס’] ס”ל שיין נסך שנפל לבור איסורו במשהו (אם לא שנפל שם גם קיתון של מים – כדלקמן), וא”כ הוא לומד את המשנה כפשוטה, בנפל איסור לתוך היתר.
[2] כתבו בתד”ה יין, שדוקא יין נסך ממש שנתערב ביין – במשהו, אבל סתם יינם בששים. ור”י אמר דאפי’ אם תאמר שסתם יינם גם כן דינו במשהו, מ”מ סתם יינם בזמן הזה שאין בקיאים בניסוך לכו”ע הוא בששים.
When רַב דִּימִי came from Eretz Yisrael to Bavel, he reported that רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן says: In the case of one who pours יֵין נֶסֶךְ from a barrel into a wine cistern, even if he does this all day long, the forbidden wine is nullified little by little upon contact with the wine in the cistern, and the wine is consequently מוּתָּר.
The Gemara raises an objection to the halacha reported by רַב דִּימִי from that which we learned in the Mishnah: Wine used for יֵין נֶסֶךְ is forbidden, and any amount of it renders other wine אָסוּר. What, is it not referring to a case where the forbidden substance fell into the permitted substance, as in the case of רַב דִּימִי’s statement? The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to a case where מוּתָּר fell into אָסוּר.
There’s a further objection to the halacha reported by רַב דִּימִי from the continuation of the Mishnah: Wine that became mixed with water renders the mixture forbidden if it is sufficient to impart flavor to it. What, is it not referring to a case where forbidden wine fell into permitted water, and contrary to Rav Dimi’s statement, the wine is not nullified but instead renders the mixture forbidden the moment there is a sufficient amount of it to impart flavor? The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to a case where permitted wine fell into forbidden water, and as long as the water influences the flavor of the wine, it is אָסוּר.
רַב יִצְחָק בַּר יוֹסֵף and רָבִין come along and are more מַחְמִיר, offering a different representation of what רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן said, which addresses the objections to the report by רַב דִּימִי. To overview the various opinions, time again for a Rav Kornfeld Dafayomi Advancement Forum chart and footnotes:
[3] מבואר בתד”ה כי, דדוקא באופן שאחרי שנגמר להשפך היין נסך, יש עדיין בבור יין היתר פי ששים כדי לבטלו, דאז יש את כל החילוקים דלהלן, אולם אם אין ששים בבור לבטלו – בכל אופן לכו”ע אסור. והחידוש הוא, דאף שאמרה המשנה יין נסך במשהו, הוא דוקא היתרא לגו איסורא, אבל איסורא לגוי היתרא הוא תלוי באופנים דלהלן. [אמנם יש ראשונים שחולקים בכל זה, וס”ל שקמא קמא בטיל אפי’ אם נתרבה לבסוף היין נסך על היין שבבור].
[4] עי’ בתד”ה ודוקא, שכתבו, דרב דימי דאמר בחבית, התיר דוקא בחבית אבל גיגית שנפיש עמודיה יותר מחבית גם הוא מודה דלא אמרינן קמא קמא בטיל. וכן כתב גם רש”י בד”ה ראשון ראשון, שאם נפלה חבית לבור ונשברה – נאסר הכל כיון שנפל כולו כאחד.
[5] עי’ רש”י ד”ה רואין את ההיתר, שכתב שפליג רבין אדרב דימי, ואשמועינן דמיא הוא דמבטל חמרא, אבל חמרא לא מבטל חמרא כלל – וכפשטות המשנה. ועי’ בתד”ה רואין.
Well we made it past our minimum goal of the halfway point, so I’ll leave you with the balance of Rabbi Stern’s video.
There was an incident involving a certain man who said to another: If I sell this land, I will sell it to you, and they performed a formal act of קִנְין to ratify the agreement. [In the spirit of right-of-first refusal, though non-binding.] He then went and sold it to another person. רַב יוֹסֵף said: The first one has acquired it.
אַבַּיֵי said to him: “But he did not fix a price with him for it.” And from where do you say that wherever the people involved in the transaction didn’t set a price, the buyer has not acquired the item, even if they performed a formal act of קִנְין? We derive it from what we learned in the Mishnah: In the case of a Jew who sells his wine to a גוֹי, if he set a price before he measured the wine into the גוֹי’s vessel, deriving הַנָאָה from the money paid for the wine is מוּתָּר. But if the Jew first measured the wine into the גוֹי’s vessel, thereby rendering it אָסוּר, before he set a price, the money paid for the wine is אָסוּר.
What halachic conclusion was reached about this matter? It’s as we stated, that it’s evident from the Mishnah that the קִנְין goes into effect only after the price is set. The Gemara explains its question: Perhaps due to the חוּמְרָא of יֵין נֶסֶךְ, the case of the Mishnah is different and is not characteristic of the halacha in דִינֵי מָמוֹנוּת.
Let’s try a different proof on for size, that a קִנְין goes into effect only after the price is set:
רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין said: There was an incident that came before the school of רַב חִסְדָּא, and רַב חִסְדָּא brought it before the school of רַב הוּנָא, and רַב הוּנָא resolved it from this case we learned in a baraisa: One purchased פֵּירוֹת from another that was loaded on the seller’s donkeys or carried by his laborers. If the purchaser did מְשִׁיכָה, whether the seller set a price before or after he measured the פֵּירוֹת, the קִנְין is not binding and either party can retract [it’s more like a “memorandum of understanding” than a contract]. As Rashi notes:
משך הימנו חמריו ופועליו – הרי שהיה מביא חמריו טעונין פירות ופועליו נושאים בכתף ומשכה חבירו ממנו והכניסן לתוך ביתו לאו משיכה שאין משיכה קונה בבני אדם ופירות כל זמן שהן עלייהו לא קנה
But if the purchaser unloaded the פֵּירוֹת and brought it into his house, this constitutes a קִנְין. If he set a price before he measured the פֵּירוֹת, neither of them can retract. However, if he measured the פֵּירוֹת before he set a price, either party can retract. This illustrates that even if a קִנְין took place, they can retract the transaction until the price has been set, in accordance with the statement of אַבַּיֵי.
There was a related incident involving a certain man who said to another: If I will desire to sell this land, I will sell it to you for one hundred dinars, and they performed a קִנְין to ratify the agreement. He went and sold it to another person for one hundred and twenty dinars. רַב כָּהֲנָא said that the first one has acquired it. רַב יַעֲקֹב מִנְּהַר פְּקוֹד objects to this: Those twenty additional dinars compelled him to sell it to the second purchaser. The Gemara concludes that the halacha is in accordance with the opinion of רַב יַעֲקֹב מִנְּהַר פְּקוֹד. [You can read more about the נְּהַר פְּקוֹד region here.]
If the seller said to the purchaser: “I will sell you this merchandise as it is assesssed by three people”, even if two out of the three agreed to a certain appraisal, the seller must accept this price. If he said: “I will sell you this merchandise in accordance with the price that is stated by three people”, he is not held to their assessment unless it is stated by all three. If he said: As it is assessed by four people, he is not held to their assessment unless it is stated by all four; and all the more so in a case where he said to him: In accordance with the price that is stated by four people. An act of בֵּית דִין requires an odd number of judges, as one can serve as a tie-breaker. But an even number implies that the ruling has to be unanimous, Onwardas Rashi notes:
כדשיימי בארבעה – כיון דנחת לדעות להרבות דעות יותר מכדי ב”ד ודאי לאו לתורת דיינין נחית ולא אזלינן בתר רובא עד דאמרין כולהו דאי חולקין מאי אהנו ליה דעות
If the seller said to the buyer: I will sell you this merchandise as it is assessed by three people, and three people came and assessed it, and the purchaser, said: Let three other people, who are more proficient in their assessment, come and assess the merchandise, רַב פָּפָּא said: The halacha is that he can prevent the price from being set until more proficient people assess the merchandise. רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ objects to this: From where can he know that those other three are more proficient in their assessment? Perhaps the first three, are more proficient. The Gemara concludes that the halacha is in accordance with the opinion of רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ.
In a case where a Jew took a funnel and measured wine into a גוֹי’s jug, and then measured wine with the same funnel into a Jew’s jug, if there is a remnant of wine left in the funnel, the wine measured into the Jew’s jug is forbidden, as some of the wine that was measured into the gentile’s jug is mixed in it. In the case of one who pours wine from one vessel into another vessel, the wine left in the vessel from which he poured is permitted, but the wine in the vessel into which he poured is forbidden.
We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Teharos 8:9): A stream of water, and water descending an incline, and liquid that rendered an item moist do not constitute a connection between liquids, neither with regard to טוּמְאָה nor טהֳרָה. These liquids do not constitute a connection that transmits טוּמְאָה, e.g., if impure water is in one place and becomes attached to water above it, the water above is not considered attached to the impure water and is not rendered טָמֵא. As Rashi comments:
אינו חיבור לא לטומאה – אם משקין תלושין הן ונגע טמא בתחתון העליון טהור וכן לענין משקה טופח אפילו במקום חלק משקה מכאן ומכאן ומשקה טופח באמצע ונגע טמא במשקה משקין שמכאן ומכאן טהורין ואע”פ שמחוברין לו
They also do not constitute a connection for purification, e.g., if two collections of water are attached via the pouring of a stream, they do not join together to form the amount of water necessary to form a valid מִקְוָה, through which people and items can become טהוֹר. Rashi notes:
ולא לטהרה – גממית שאין בה ארבעים סאה ונצוק או קטפרס או משקה טופח מחבר לגממית זו מקוה שלם אינה חיבור והטובל בגממית לא עלתה לו טבילה
A pond constitutes a connection between liquids with regard to impurity and with regard to טהֳרָה, with Rashi adding: ביקוע ארץ מליחה שנתבקעה ונקוו שם מים חיבור לטומאה ולטהרה.
רַב הוּנָא says: A stream of water, and water descending an incline, and liquid that rendered an item moist constitute a connection with regard to יֵין נֶסֶךְ.
רַב נַחְמָן said to רַב הוּנָא: From where do you derive this? If we say it is as learned in the mishna: A stream, and water descending an incline, and liquid that rendered an item moist do not constitute a connection between liquids, neither with regard to טוּמְאָה nor טהֳרָה, and it is inferred that it is with regard to טוּמְאָה and טהֳרָה that it does not constitute a connection, but with regard to יֵין נֶסֶךְ it does constitute a connection, consider the סֵיפָא: A pond constitutes a connection between liquids with regard to טוּמְאָה and טהֳרָה. It can be inferred from here that with regard to טוּמְאָה and טהֳרָה it is a connection, but with regard to יֵין נֶסֶךְ it is not a connection, contrary to the halacha inferred from the former clause. The bottom line? No inference is to be learned from this mishna.
Okay, so that mishna didn’t work. But can we bring proof from our Mishnah?
In a case where a Jew took a funnel and measured wine into a גוֹי’s jug, and then measured wine with the same funnel into a Jew’s jug, if there is a remnant of wine left in the funnel, it is rendered אָסוּר. In what manner is this remnant of wine rendered אָסוּר? Is it not by the stream of wine going down from the funnel into the גוֹי’s vessel, thereby connecting the גוֹי’s vessel and the funnel and rendering the wine in the funnel אָסוּר? Conclude from it that a stream constitutes a connection.
רַבִּי חִיָּיא teaches that the mishna is referring to a situation where the wine in the גוֹי’s jug rose and reached the funnel. The Gemara infers: But in a case where the wine in the jug did not rise and reach the funnel, what is the halacha? It is not אָסוּר. Therefore, resolve the dilemma and conclude that a stream is not a connection. The Gemara rejects this: No, רַבִּי חִיָּיא means to say that in a case where the wine in the jug rose and reached the funnel you can resolve the dilemma and conclude that it is אָסוּר, but with regard to a stream [נִצּוֹק] the dilemma remains unresolved.
In the case of a military unit that entered a city: If it entered during peacetime, then after the soldiers leave the open barrels of wine are אָסוּר, but the sealed barrels are מוּתָּר. If the unit entered in wartime, both these barrels and those barrels are מוּתָּר, because in wartime there is no time to pour wine for libations, and one can be certain that the soldiers did not do so.
The Gemara raises a contradiction to the assumption that soldiers during wartime do not have time to commit transgressions from that which is taught in another mishna (Kesubos 27a): With regard to a city that was conquered by an army laying siege, all the women married to כֹּהַנִים located in the city are פָּסוּל to their husbands, due to the concern that they were raped. As Rashi notes:
כל כהנות – הנמצאות בתוכה פסולות לבעליהן דאשת כהן אסורה אף באונס אבל אשת ישראל לא. הא הכא דשעת מלחמה היא וקתני אסורות דיש פנאי לבעול
רַב מָרִי resolved the contradiction and said: The soldiers don’t have time to pour יַיִן נֶסֶךְ, as their passion for עַבוֹדָה זָרָה is not pressing at that time, but they have time for בִּיאָה, because their lust is great even during wartime. [And added to the lust factor is the dominance factor, as reviewed here.]
With regard to Jewish craftsmen to whom a גוֹי sent a barrel of wine used for יֵין נֶסֶךְ in lieu of wages, it is מוּתָּר for them to ask for monetary value instead. But once it has entered into their possession, it is אָסוּר for them to make this request, as that would be tantamount to selling the wine to the גוֹי and deriving הַנָאָה from it. As Rashi notes:
מותר לומר לו תן לנו את דמיה – דהא לא קנו לה והוא אינו חייב להן אלא מעות ותניא לעיל (עבודה זרה דף סד.) ישראל שנושה בעובד כוכבים מנה מכר עבודת כוכבים והביא לו יין נסך והביא לו מותר
רַב יְהוּדָה says in the name of רַב: It is permitted for a person to say to a גוֹי: “Have the collectors of the governmental tax on wine cut me a break, and I will reimburse you”, even if he pays the tax with wine used for נֶסֶךְ.
Rashi comments:
צא והפס עלי מנת המלך – ארנונא שהיו נותנין מתבואותיהן ומבהמותיהן עישור וישראל זה שחייב לתת למלך יין מותר לומר לעובד כוכבים הפס עלי אע”ג דקא יהיב האי עובד כוכבים יין נסך והאי ישראל הוא פרעיה דמיה כיון דהוה מצי לסלוקי לשליחא דמלכא בזוזי כי יהיב ליה עובד כוכבים יין נסך לאו שלוחיה דישראל הוא
The point here is that the Jew didn’t specify to the גוֹי to pay off the tax collector with יַיִן נֶסֶךְ, in which case that would be forbidden. The גוֹי elected to do that on his won.
An objection was raised from a baraisa: A person may not say to a גוֹי: “Go in my stead to the commissary pay the wine tax for me,” if he pays it in יַיִן נֶסֶךְ. Rav said to him: You say that the case I am referring to is similar to one who says to a גוֹי: “Go in my stead to the commissary”? In that case, since he says: “In my stead”, whatever the gives the commissary is considered as though the Jew gave it himself. This case that I am referring to is comparable only to that which is taught in the baraisa: But the Jew may say to a גוֹי: “Save me from my tax obligation.”
In the case of a Jew who sells his wine to a גוֹי, if he fixed a price before he measured the wine into the גוֹי’s vessel, deriving הַנָאָה from the money paid for the wine is מוּתָּר. It is not tantamount to selling wine used for a libation, as the גוֹי purchased the wine before it became אָסוּר, and the money already belonged to the Jew. But if the Jew measured the wine into the גוֹי’s vessel, thereby rendering it אָסוּר, before he fixed a price, the money paid for the wine is אָסוּר.
אַמֵּימָר says: The legal act of acquiring an object by מְשִׁיכָה applies to a גוֹי. Know that it is so, as those Persians [פָּרְסָאֵי] send gifts to one another and do not retract them, which shows that they acquire one from another by מְשִׁיכָה alone, even without paying for it. רַב אַשֵׁי says: Actually, מְשִׁיכָה does not acquire an object in a transaction involving a גוֹי, and the fact that they do not retract their gifts is not due to הִלְכוֹת קִנְיָן, but because they are taken over by haughtiness, and they consider it shameful to retract a gift. As Rashi notes:
ולא הדרי בהו – השולחין אלמא במשיכה קנינהו המקבלין. ל”א מתשובת הגאונים פרדשני מי שיש לו כור חיטין למכור פוסק דמים ללוקח והולך לביתו ומשגר לו קב חיטין לראות כמה הן יפות ואם מעכב הלוקח אותו קב אצלו מתקיים המקח ואם אינו חפץ בהן מחזירו
Tosafos here states:
פרדשני דורונות ולא הדרי בהו – אלמא קננהו במשיכה ל”א מתשובת הגאונים מי שיש לו כור חטים כו’ פי’ בקונט’ זה עיקר דלישנא קמא קני במתנה הוא והוא בא לומר דמשיכה קונה במקח וממכר ואור”י דאפי’ למ”ד אינה קונה כרב אשי בסמוך ה”מ כגון דאיכא כספא אבל במציאה ומתנה דליכא כספא כ”ע מודו דקני במשיכה או בהגבהה
רַב אַשֵׁי said: From where do I say that קִנְיָן through מְשִׁיכָה does not apply to גוֹיִים? It is from that which רַב said to certain wine shopkeepers: When you measure wine for גוֹיִים, take the dinars from them and then measure the wine for them. And if they do not have dinars with them readily available, lend them dinars and then take those dinars back from them, so that it will be a loan provided to them that they are repaying. As if you do not do so, when it becomes wine used for יֵין נֶסֶךְ it becomes so in your רְשׁוּת, and when you take the money it will be payment for יֵין נֶסֶךְ that you are taking. רַב אַשֵׁי concludes his proof for his opinion: And if it enters your mind that pulling an object acquires it in a transaction involving a גוֹי, from the moment that he did מְשִׁיכָה, the גּוֹי acquired it, whereas it did not become יֵין נֶסֶךְ until he touched it. Therefore, the seller can receive payment for the wine he sold, because at the time of the acquisition the wine was מוּתָּר.
Summary time from Rav Kornfeld’s Dafyomi Advancement Forum’s chart:
באיזה קנין קונה ישראל מן התורה, ובאיזה קונה עכו”ם [תד”ה רב]
[4] וכן פסק רש”י להלכה, ועי’ בתד”ה שקילו, בתי’ השני, שהוכיחו התוס’ דאיכא מאן דס”ל שעכו”ם קונה או במשיכה או במעות ובתד”ה דאי, הביאו שיטה שעכו”ם צריך גם משיכה וגם כסף כדי לקנות.
There’s considerably more to today’s shiur, but I’ll have to leave you to go through Rabbi Stern’s video.
We begin on דף ע עמוּד א, with eight cases attributed to רָבָא, the first of which involves cracks and barrels mindful of the controversy over the Cracker Barrel logo (my excuse to begin with a graphic):
There was an incident involving a certain house where Jews’ wine was stored. A גוֹי entered the house, and he locked the door before the Jew, but there was a crack in the door, and the גוֹי was found standing between the barrels. רָבָא said: All the barrels that were opposite the crack through which the גוֹי could be seen are מוּתָּר, because he would have been wary about being seen tampering with them [remember מִרְתַת, the fear factor the גוֹי has of being accused of wine tampering]. Barrels out of view through the crack, where the גוֹי could not be seen, are אָסוּר, as the גוֹי used them for יַיִן נֶסֶךְ since מִרְתַת wasn’t in play.
There was an incident involving a certain Jew’s wine that was stored in the lower story of a house, in which the Jew was living in the upper story and a גוֹי in the lower story, and the wine could be supervised from the upper story. One day the residents heard a sound of quarreling and went outside. The גוֹי came back in first and locked the door before the Jew. Rava said: The wine is permitted, because the גוֹי presumably said to himself: Just as I came back in early, perhaps my neighbor the Jew came back in early and is sitting in the upper story and watching me.
There was an incident involving a certain inn where a Jew’s wine was stored, and a גוֹי was found sitting among the barrels. רָבָא said: If he was caught as a thief, i.e., if the גוֹי seemed startled and did not have a good explanation for being there, the wine is מוּתָּר, as the גוֹי was presumably afraid about being caught and would not have used it for נֶסֶךְ. But if not, the wine is אָסוּר.
There was an incident involving a certain house where wine was stored. A גוֹי was found standing among the barrels. רָבָא said: If he has a way to excuse his entrance to where the wine was stored, the wine is אָסוּר, but if not, the wine is מוּתָּר. The Gemara raises an objection to this ruling from a baraisa: If an inn was locked and a גוֹי was inside, or if the Jew said to the גוֹי: Safeguard my wine, the wine is אָסוּר. Hold on – is it not אָסוּר even if the גוֹי does not have a way to excuse his entrance? The Gemara answers: No, the baraisa is referring to a situation where he does have a way to excuse his entrance; otherwise the wine is מוּתָּר.
There was an incident involving a certain Jew and a certain גוֹי who were sitting and drinking wine. The Jew heard the sound of davening at the synagogue. He got up and went to daven. רָבָא said that the wine is מוּתָּר, because the גוֹי presumably said to himself: Any moment now he will remember his wine and come back.
There was an incident involving a certain Jew and a certain גוֹי who were sitting on a ship. The Jew heard the sound of the shofar of twilight indicating the beginning of שַׁבָּת. He disembarked and went into town to spend שַׁבָּת there. רָבָא said: The wine is מוּתָּר, because the גוֹי presumably said to himself: Any moment now he will remember his wine and come back.
And if one might object that the גוֹי is presumably not concerned because he knows that the Jew will not return until the end of שַׁבָּת, didn’t רָבָא say: אִיסּוּר the גֵר told me: When we were still גוֹייִם, before converting, we used to say: Jews do not actually observe שַׁבָּת, as, if they observe שַׁבָּת, how many wallets would be found in the marketplace that the Jews could not take on שַׁבָּת? And I did not know that we maintain that the halacha is in accordance with the opinion of רַבִּי יִצְחָק who says: One who finds a wallet on שַׁבָּת may carry it in increments of less than אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת. Evidently, גוֹייִם assume that a Jew would violate שַׁבָּת for monetary gain. (Some things never change – see this article about Jews, money, and antisemitism.)
Detail from The Way Of The Red Sea Is A Way Of Blood, a 1944 Italian poster, which depicts grinning Jewish bankers carrying money bags past dead soldiers (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum)
There was an incident involving a certain lion who roared in a winepress. A גוֹי heard the roar and was frightened, and he hid among the barrels of wine. רָבָא said: The wine is מוּתָּר, because the גוֹי presumably said to himself: Just as I am hiding, a Jew might also be hiding behind me and see me.
There was an incident involving certain thieves who came to פּוּמְבְּדִיתָא and opened many barrels of wine. רָבָא said: The wine is מוּתָּר. What is the reason? Most of the thieves in פּוּמְבְּדִיתָא are Jews, and the halacha follows the majority, and therefore the wine is not rendered אָסוּר. There was a similar incident in נְהַרְדְּעָא, and שְׁמוּאֵל said: The wine is מוּתָּר.
The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this? Perhaps it is in accordance with the opinion of רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, who says with regard to cases of סָפֵק concerning טַהַרָה that if the סָפֵק is with regard to a person’s entry into a certain place, he is deemed טָהוֹר.
With regard to a גוֹי who was transporting barrels of wine from one place to another place together with a Jew, if the wine was under the presumption of being supervised, it is מוּתָּר. As Rashi notes:
אם היה בחזקת המשתמר – מפרש בגמרא שאע”פ שהפליג ישראל מן העובד כוכבים מיל אם לא הודיעו שהוא מפליג מותר דמירתת עובד כוכבים כל שעתא השתא אתי
But if the Jew notified him that he was going far away, the wine is אָסוּר if the Jew left for a sufficient amount of time for the גוֹי to bore a hole in the barrel, seal it again with plaster, and for the plaster to dry. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל says: The wine is אָסוּר only if it was sufficient time for the גוֹי to open the barrel by removing the stopper altogether, then stop it again by making a new stopper, and for the new stopper to dry.
With regard to one who placed his wine in a wagon or on a ship with a גוֹי, and went on his way by a shortcut, such that the גוֹי doesn’t know when the Jew will encounter him, even if the Jew entered the city and bathed, the wine is מוּתָּר, because the גוֹי would not use the wine for יַיִן נֶסֶךְ, for fear the owner might catch him at it. As Rashi comments: במרחץ מותר כיון דעובד כוכבים לא ידע דשהי מרתת ולא נגע (as we encountered previously, “מִרְתַת” is the fear factor the גוֹי has of the Jew discovering that he has touched the wine).
If the Jew informed the גוֹי that he was going away for a long period of time, the wine is אָסוּר if it was sufficient time for the גוֹיto bore a hole in the barrel, seal it again with plaster, and for the plaster to dry. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל says it’s אָסוּר only if it was sufficient time for him to open the barrel by removing the stopper altogether, stop it again, and for the new stopper to dry.
With regard to one who left a גוֹי in his shop, even if the Jew went out and came in and was not there all the time, the wine is permitted. But if the Jew informed the גוֹי that he was going away for a long period of time, the wine is forbidden if it was sufficient time for the גוֹי to bore a hole in the barrel, seal it again with plaster, and for the plaster to dry. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל says: The wine is אָסוּר only if it was sufficient time for him to open the whole top of the barrel and re-seal it (apparently a longer amount of time, as Rashi notes: אינו נאסר אלא עד שישהא כדי שיפתח את כל מגופת החבית וא”א לנוטלה שלא תשבר כולה).
If a Jew was eating with a גוֹי at the table, and left jugs of wine on the table and a jug on the side table, and he left it and went out, what is on the table is אָסוּר, as it is likely that the גוֹי handled it, whereas what is on the side table is מוּתָּר. But if the Jew said to the גוֹי: “Mix water with the wine and drink,” even the jug that is on the side table is אָסוּר. Similarly, open barrels are אָסוּר, but sealed barrels are מוּתָּר unless the Jew was out of the room for sufficient time for the גוֹי to open the barrel by removing the stopper, and stop it again by making a new stopper, and for the new stopper to dry.
What are the circumstances described by the phrase: ״בְּחֶזְקַת הַמִּשְׁתַּמֵּר״? Insight comes from the following baraisa. Here’s the scenario: One’s donkey drivers and laborers were unreliable with regard to טוּמְאָה, and they were loaded up with wine or produce that was טָמֵא. He instructed them not to tamper with his goods, but he doesn’t know for sure whether or not they listened t him. Even if he went away from them to a distance of more than a mil, his items that were טָהוֹר are still considered טָהוֹר because we can presume they heeded his instructions. However, if he said to them: “Go, and I’ll come later”, so that they knew he wouldn’t be going with them (hence מִרְתַת, or the fear factor doesn’t apply), then once they are out of his sight his items that were טָהוֹר are now held to be טָמֵא.
What’s the difference above between the רֵישָׁא and the סֵיפָא? According to רַב יִצְחָק, the ruling of the רֵישָׁא involves a case where he was מְטַהֵר his donkey drivers and laborers for this assignment by having them be טוֹבֵל so they would not transfer טוּמְאָה to the פֵּירוֹת.
Hold on! If that is so, the same reasoning should also apply to the סֵיפָא (the Gemara always seeks symmetry). The Gemara answers: An עַם הָאָרֶץ is not מַקְפִּיד about contact with another person. Although they themselves were מְטַהֵר, they may have met another עַם הָאָרֶץ on the way, and the פֵּירוֹת would be rendered טָמֵא by that person. Fair enough, but using that argument, we should say that the פֵּירוֹת should be טָמֵא in the case of the רֵישָׁא as well! רָבָא proposes the following answer:
It is a case where he came to them in a roundabout way, such that they would not know from where he might appear, and they would be afraid to tamper with the goods because he might catch them in the act. All well and good but again, if that is so, this reasoning can apply to the סֵיפָא as well. The Gemara answers: In the case of the סֵיפָא, since he said to them: “Go and I will come later”, their minds are at ease that he will not surprise them.
It seems that the cases in the Mishnah, including the case of one who left a גוֹי in his shop, and the case of one who placed his wine in a wagon or on a ship, are very similar. Why was it necessary to state them all? Because had the Mishnah taught only the case of the גוֹי transporting a Jew’s barrels, one might assume that the reason there is no concern that the גוֹי used the wine in that case is because he thinks that perhaps the owner will keep an eye on him. But in a wagon or on a ship, one might say that he thinks he can escape detection.
And had the Mishnah taught only the case where the Jew placed his wine in a wagon or on a ship, one might assume that the concern there is because the גוֹי thinks: Perhaps he will come on a different road or stand on the bank of the river and see me. But in the case of a גוֹי in his shop, one might say that he can hold the door closed and do whatever he desires with no concern of being seen. Therefore, the Mishnah teaches us that in all of these cases the same ruling applies, and there is no concern unless the Jew informed the גוֹי that he is going a great distance away.
There is a מַחְלוֹקֶת in the Mishnah with regard to the length of time that causes the wine to be אָסוּר if the owner notified the גוֹי that he is going off some distance. רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה says in the name of רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: The dispute is only with regard to the case of a stopper made of lime plaster, in which a hole can be sealed without being detected.
But with regard to the case of a stopper made of clay, in which a patch would be detected, everyone agrees that the wine is forbidden only if there was enough time for the gentile to open the barrel by removing the stopper entirely, stop it again with a new stopper, and for the new stopper to dry.
The Gemara raises an objection to this explanation of the מַחְלוֹקֶת from a baraisa: רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל said to the חֲכָמִים: But isn’t the sealing of the hole noticeable both from above and from below, and therefore the gentile will be wary of doing so?
The Gemara explains: Granted, if you say that the מַחְלוֹקֶת is also with regard to a stopper made of clay, this explanation is consistent with that which the baraisa teaches as to the response of רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: Its sealing is noticeable both from above and from below. But if you say that the dispute is with regard to a stopper made of lime plaster, granted, the location of the sealing is noticeable from below, as it is impossible to fill the entire hole with lime plaster, and an empty space remains below it; but the resealing is not noticeable from above.
The Gemara answers: It was רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל who did not know what the חֲכָמִים were saying, and this is what he is saying to them: If you are speaking of a stopper made of clay, its sealing is noticeable both from above and from below. And if you are speaking of a stopper made of lime plaster, granted, it is not noticeable from above, but it is noticeable, in any event, from below. And how would the חֲכָמִים respond to this claim? They maintain that since it is not noticeable from above that there is a patch, it does not occur to the gentile that the owner will turn the stopper over and see the patch. Alternatively, the חֲכָמִים could answer that sometimes it seals firmly and is not detectable.
רָבָא says that the halacha is in accordance with the opinion of רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, since we learned a סְתַּם mishna in accordance with his opinion.
This is as we learned in the סֵיפָא: If a Jew was eating with a גוֹי at the table, and left jugs of wine on the table and a jug on the side table, and he left it and went out, what is on the table is אָסוּר, as it is likely that the גוֹי handled it, whereas what is on the side table is permitted. But if the Jew said to the גוֹי: “Mix water with the wine and drink,” even the jug that is on the side table is אָסוּר. Similarly, open barrels are אָסוּר, but sealed barrels are מוּתָּר unless the Jew was out of the room for sufficient time for the גוֹי to open the barrel by removing the stopper, stop it again by making a new stopper, and for the new stopper to dry.
We leave the subject of plastering holes (though perhaps not entirely) to conclude with the following:
רָבָא says: In the case of a gentile prostitute, where Jews are dining at her table, the wine at the table is מוּתָּר. Granted, their passion for the sin of harlotry overwhelms their judgment, but the passion for wine used for יַיִן נֶסֶךְ does not overwhelm their judgment, and they will not allow her to use it for נֶסֶךְ. In the case of a Jewish prostitute and gentiles dining with her, the wine is forbidden. What is the reason? It is that since she is contemptible in their eyes, she is subjugated to them, and they use the wine for יַיִן נֶסֶךְ without consideration for her.
I previously introduced a scholarly nine-volume text by Rabbi Noam Sachs Zion that centers on sexual matters in the Gemara. The title of chapter five in the volume above seems apropos to our Gemara: “Talmudic Prostitute and Postmodern ‘Liquid Love'”. Of course our perek is no stranger to the discussion about prostitution, as you may recall from an earlier blog. But the statement in our Gemara here is a rather fascinating one:
נְהִי דְּתָקֵיף לְהוּ יִצְרָא דַעֲבֵירָה יִצְרָא דְּיֵין נֶסֶךְ לָא תָּקֵיף לְהוּ. The ArtScroll translation is: “For granted they are overpowered by the urge of forbidden relations (but) by the urge for the sin of nesech wine they are not overpowered. The ArtScroll notes add: “We do not say since they are sinners insofar as one transgression, they are assumed to be sinners in regard to all other prohibitions as well.”
So the first scenario that רָבָא presents involves multiple Jewish men hanging out at the table of one goyische prostitute [זוֹנָה גּוֹיָה, וְיִשְׂרָאֵל מְסוּבִּין אֶצְלָהּ] with her wine. Apparently although they’d give in to the temptation of illicit sex, they would have no problem resisting the temptation of illicit wine. But in the second scenario of goyim hanging out at the table of a Jewish prostitute [זוֹנָה יִשְׂרְאֵלִית וְגוֹיִם מְסוּבִּין] with her wine, ArtScroll notes: “Having cheapened herself by submitting to their lusts, she is too meek to assert herself when they take her wine and use it for יַיִן נֶסֶךְ.”
Lest you think this is far fetched, it apparently occurred often enough back in the day that the שולחן ערוך, יורה דעה [Siman 129:13-14]] saw fit to include two entries about it:
ונה עובדת כוכבי’ במסיבת ישראל היין מותר שאינם מניחים אותה לנסך אבל זונה ישראלית במסיבת עובדי כוכבים יינה של הזונה גם כן אסור
הניח יין בביתו בחלון פתוח ובא עובד כוכבים והכניס שם זונה וסגר הדלת אחריו ואחר כך בא הישראל ומצא יינו כמו שהניחו מותר
Steinsaltz relates that the Taz rules that in contemporary times, “whoever is suspect with regard to harlotry is certainly suspect with regard to the prohibition concerning nondescript wine of gentiles [סְתַּם יֵינָן], and is assumed to not take care that the gentile prostitute not tamper with the wine.
עוּלָּא says that the מַחְלוֹקֶת between רַבִּי מֵאִיר and רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן is with regard to a forbidden food that enhanced the flavor of a dish when it first fell into it and subsequently detracted from its flavor. In this case רַבִּי מֵאִיר holds it’s אָסוּר, since the forbidden food enhanced its flavor at the outset. But in a case of forbidden food that detracted from the flavor of the dish [נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם] at the outset, everyone agrees that it’s מוּתָּר.
רַב חַגָּא raised an objection to the opinion of עוּלָּא from a baraisa: Forbidden wine that fell into lentils, or forbidden vinegar that fell into split beans, renders the food אָסוּר. And רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן deems them מוּתָּר. But here it is a case where the forbidden food was נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם at the outset, and yet the tanna’im disagree.
עוּלָּא said: חַגָּא does not know what the חַכָמִים say, yet he raises an objection? [Zing!] Here we are dealing with a case where the vinegar fell into the cold split beans and one subsequently heated them, in which case it becomes like a forbidden food that enhanced the flavor of the mixture and subsequently detracted from it, as vinegar enhances the flavor of cold split beans, and it is consequently אָסוּר according to רַבִּי מֵאִיר.
רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן says that the מַחְלוֹקֶת between רַבִּי מֵאִיר and רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן is with regard to a case where the forbidden food was נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם of the permitted food from the outset.
Does רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן mean that the מַחְלוֹקֶת is with regard to a case where the forbidden food is נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם from the outset, but if it enhanced it at first and subsequently detracted from it, everyone agrees that it’s אָסוּר? Or, perhaps he means that the מַחְלוֹקֶת involves both cases. תֵּיקוּ [The dilemma shall stand unresolved]. ArtScroll weighs in here, citing two Tosafos:
או דלמא בין בזו ובין בזו מחלוקת – וא”ת היכי מספקא ליה בהא א”כ ר’ יוחנן דאמר לעיל פגם מעיקרא מותר השביח ולבסוף פגם אסור דאמר כמאן לא כר”מ ולא כר”ש דר”מ אסר כל פגם ור”ש מתיר כל פגם וי”ל דסבר לה כר”ש בחדא בפגם מעיקרו וכר”מ בחדא בהשביח ולבסוף פגם
תיקו – ואע”ג דלקמן פשטינן לה מברייתא דבפגם מעיקרא פליגי השביח ולבסוף פגם דברי הכל אסור מ”מ עלתה להם בבית המדרש בתיקו ושוב פשטוה וכי האי גוונא אשכחנא בנדה בפרק המפלת (נדה דף כה.) גבי מחלוקת בעכור אבל בצלול כו’ [וע”ע תוס’ לעיל (עבודה זרה נג.) סוף ד”ה או דלמא]
The first set of comments from Tosafos [או דלמא בין בזו ובין בזו מחלוקת] asks how the Gemara could entertain the possibility that this is how רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן interprets the מַחְלוֹקֶת. If it involves both cases, then his statement above (on דף ס״ז עמוּד א) limiting the Mishnah’s ruling permitting vinegar that fell into split beans only to when the vinegar ruined the taste of the beans from the beginning, but not when it first enhanced the beans and then ruined them, doesn’t agree with anyone (neither רַבִּי מֵאִיר nor רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן!). Tosafos answer that the Gemara entertains the possibility that although רַבִּי מֵאִיר and רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן dispute both cases, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן (on דף ס״ז עמוּד א) rules in accordance with רַבִּי מֵאִיר with respect to a detrimental flavor that first enhanced the mixture and then ruined it, and in accordance with רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן regarding a flavor that ruined the the mixture from the outset.
The second set of comments from Tosafos [תיקו] notes that a resolution to this inquiry does in fact occur below. Here however the Gemara quotes the original discussion in which the matter was left unresolved.
This is a good spot to insert the summary chart that Rabbi Stern shared, from Rav Kornfeld’s Dafyomi Advancement Forum:
[1] הנה הסתפקה הגמ’ בדברי ר’ יוחנן שאמר שבפוגם מעיקרא מחלוקת, מה סברתו בהשביח ולבסוף פוגם, האם לכו”ע אסור, או שגם בזה נחלקו ר’ מאיר ור’ שמעון. אולם למסקנא פשטו שלכו”ע אסור בהשביח ולבסוף פגם, ועי’ בתד”ה תיקו.
The Gemara will then present three cases, but rather than going through them one by one, we’ll simply present the summary chart of them:
שאור של תרומה ושל חולין שיש בכל אחד כדי להחמיץ שנפלו לעיסה, מה הדין
כשנפלו בבת אחת
כשנפל תרומה תחילה
כשנפל חולין תחילה
לר’ שמעון
מותר
אסור
מותר
לרבנן
אסור
אסור
אסור
Moving on, you’ve heard of skunked beer. But what about moused beer?
There was a certain mouse that fell into a barrel of beer. רַב said the beer is verboten. The רַבָּנַן said in front of רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: Shall we say that רַב holds that even in a case where the forbidden substance is נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם, it is אָסוּר? Presumably, the mouse imparted flavor to the detriment of the beer.
ArtScroll notes that the mouse was not removed from the beer until after 24 hours had elapsed. In keeping with the principle that כָּבוּשׁ הַרֵי הוּא כִּמְבוּשָׁל [that which is soaked is like that which has been cooked], it is assumed that the mouse was נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם as if it had been cooked in it. This is in line with Tosafos who comment:
ההוא עכברא דנפל בגו חביתא דשיכרא אסריה רב לההוא שיכרא – תימה דהא צונן בצונן הוא ולשתרי וי”ל דמיירי ששהה שם יום או יומים והיה כבוש בתוך השכר וכבוש הרי הוא כמבושל
רַב שֵׁשֶׁת said to them: רַב generally maintains that in a case where the forbidden substance is נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם, it is מוּתָּר. But here, in the case of a mouse, it is a novelty that the Torah prohibits the flavor from a mouse at all, as it is repulsive and people distance themselves from consuming it, and even so הקבּ״ה prohibits it. Therefore, although it imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture, it is still אָסוּר.
The רַבָּנַן said to רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: If that is so, that the halacha with regard to a mouse is considered a novelty and is therefore understood to be more חָמוּר than the norm, then a dead mouse should impart טוּמְאָה whether it is moist or dried out. Why did we learn in a mishna (Nidda 54b) that carcasses of creeping animals impart impurity when they are moist but do not impart impurity when they are dried out?
רַב שֵׁשֶׁת responded: And according to your reasoning, in which you compare the halachos of טוּמְאָה to forbidden foods, then with regard to semen, which is also repulsive, it should impart טוּמְאָה whether moist or dried out. Why did we learn in a mishna (Nidda 54b) that semen imparts impurity when it is moist but it does not impart impurity when it is dried out?
With regard to the טוּמְאָה of שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע, the Torah states: “The flow of seed” (וְאִ֕ישׁ כִּֽי־תֵצֵ֥א מִמֶּ֖נּוּ שִׁכְבַת־זָ֑רַע וְרָחַ֥ץ בַּמַּ֛יִם אֶת־כל־בְּשָׂר֖וֹ וְטָמֵ֥א עַד־הָעָֽרֶב – Vayikra 15:16), meaning that the reference is to semen that can potentially procreate. Here too, with regard to the טוּמְאָה of a mouse, the pasuk states: “When they have died” (וְכֹ֣ל אֲשֶׁר־יִפֹּל־עָלָיו֩ מֵהֶ֨ם ׀ בְּמֹתָ֜ם יִטְמָ֗א מִכל־כְּלִי־עֵץ֙ א֣וֹ בֶ֤גֶד אוֹ־עוֹר֙ א֣וֹ שָׂ֔ק כל־כְּלִ֕י אֲשֶׁר־יֵעָשֶׂ֥ה מְלָאכָ֖ה בָּהֶ֑ם בַּמַּ֧יִם יוּבָ֛א וְטָמֵ֥א עַד־הָעֶ֖רֶב וְטָהֵֽר – Vayikra 11:32). The Torah states that the carcasses of creeping animals impart טוּמְאָה only when they are similar to their state at time of their death, i.e., when they are still moist. Therefore, there is no contradiction to the claim that the אִיסוּר against eating a mouse is a novelty and consequently applies even when it detracted from the flavor of the food into which it fell.
רַב שִׁימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא objects to the assumption that a mouse is repulsive. After all, isn’t it served at the table of kings and considered a delicacy? רַב שִׁימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא said in clarification that the statement about a mouse being served as a delicacy is with regard to a field mouse, and statement that a mouse is repulsive is with regard to a city mouse. [This is almost mindful of Aesop’s Fable about the Town Mouse & the Country Mouse.]
רָבָא said: The halacha is that if the forbidden substance is נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם, it is מוּתָּר. But with regard to a mouse that fell into a barrel of beer, I do not know what the reason was that רַב deemed it forbidden. I do not know whether it was because he maintains that if the forbidden substance is נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם it is אָסוּר, and if so, the halacha is not in accordance with his opinion, or whether it was because although he maintains that if the forbidden substance is נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם it is מוּתָּר, a mouse that falls into beer enhances its flavor.
If a mouse fell into vinegar, what is the halacha? Does it enhance its flavor? רַב הִילֵּל said to רַב אַשֵׁי: There was such an incident in the study hall of רַב כָּהֲנָא, and he deemed the vinegar אָסוּר. This indicates that it enhances the flavor. רַב אַשֵׁי said to him that this doesn’t constitute a proof. That mouse was dismembered, and רַב כָּהֲנָא deemed the vinegar forbidden due to concern that one might consume a substantive piece of the mouse in the vinegar, which is אָסוּר regardless of the taste.
רָבִינָא thought that the quantity of vinegar necessary for nullifying the flavor of the mouse should be calculated at 101 times the volume of the mouse. He said: It should not be rendered more stringent, than teruma, which is nullified by 101 times its volume in a mixture. This is as we learned in a mishna (Terumot 4:7): Teruma is nullified in a mixture by 101 times its volume of permitted food. רַב תַּחְלִיפָא בַּר גִּיזָּא said to רָבִינָא: Perhaps this case is similar to spice of teruma in a pot, whose flavor is not nullified even by 101 times its volume of permitted food, as the flavor imparted by spice is exceptionally strong.
רַב אַחַאי calculated the amount of vinegar necessary to nullify the flavor of the mouse at fifty times its volume. Although forbidden food in a mixture usually requires the presence of sixty times its volume of permitted food to be nullified, vinegar has a sharp enough flavor that it nullifies the mouse with less. רַב שְׁמוּאֵל the son of רַב אִיקָא calculated the amount of beer necessary for nullifying the mouse at sixty times the volume of the mouse.
וְהִלְכְתָא: אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בְּשִׁיתִּין, וְכֵן כל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה
The Gemara concludes: And the halaha is that both vinegar and beer nullify the mouse with sixty times its volume, and so is the ruling for all אִיסוּרִין in the Torah. As Rashi notes:
ה”ג וכן כל איסור שבתורה – בששים. וכן הלכה רווחת בישראל דמין בשאינו מינו בששים חוץ מחמץ אבל מין במינו מוקמינן בפסחים (דף ל.) הלכתא במשהו כרב וטעמא משום דכל איסורין שבתורה מין במינו במשהו כרב ובחמץ גזירה שאינו מינו אטו מינו
In the most recent Talmudic Blog I referenced the current month as one of introspection, and the ongoing battle between internal and external forces. This morning I got the facebook feed from bookplug, who recommended an oldie but goodie, Pyscho-Cybernetics by Dr. Maxwell Maltz, originally published in 1960.
The entire book is available free through this link online. The basic premise of the book is that it doesn’t suffice to make cosmetic changes if one continues to struggle with self-image. The internal make-over is as (if not more) important than the external as Dr. Maltz, a plastic surgeon, noticed with many of his patients. The overview by bookplug is nicely done, and I’m pasting it in here in its entirety:
“I first approached Psycho-Cybernetics with the mild suspicion I have for any book whose title sounds like it belongs in a 1960s science lab. But within the first chapters, it became clear that Dr. Maxwell Maltz was onto something timeless: the idea that our self-image shapes everything we do, and that by consciously reprogramming it, we can transform our lives from the inside out.
Maltz, a plastic surgeon turned self-help pioneer, began noticing that physical changes in his patients often did nothing to change how they saw themselves. A person could get the “perfect” nose, but if they still believed they were unattractive, nothing in their life truly changed. From this, he concluded that lasting transformation doesn’t start with the mirror, it starts in the mind.
The “cybernetics” part comes from his analogy of the mind as a goal-seeking mechanism, like a guided missile. Feed it the wrong data, negative self-talk, limiting beliefs and it will faithfully steer you toward failure or mediocrity. Feed it the right data—clear goals, empowering images, positive self-affirmations and it will lock onto success as naturally as breathing.
The updated and expanded version blends his original insights with modern research in psychology and neuroscience, making it feel both classic and relevant. By the end, you can’t help but realize that “changing your life” isn’t about hustle or luck as much as it is about recalibrating your inner blueprint.
Key Lessons from the Book:
1. Your self-image is your life’s control center.
You cannot consistently outperform or underperform, your self-perception. If you believe you’re unworthy, you’ll unconsciously sabotage success. If you believe you’re capable, your actions will align to prove it true.
2. The mind works best with clear pictures.
The subconscious thrives on imagery, not vague intentions. Visualizing yourself already succeeding, down to sights, sounds, and feelings programs your “mental GPS” to move toward that reality.
3. Failure is feedback, not identity.
Maltz insists that mistakes are simply data points telling you to adjust your approach. Separating your self-worth from your results frees you to try again without fear.
4. Relaxation improves performance.
Success often comes not from tense over-effort but from calm, focused action. Practicing “mental relaxation” allows your subconscious to process solutions more creatively and effectively.
5. Repetition rewires the mind.
Just as negative self-talk can cement insecurity, repeating constructive thoughts and mental images can reprogram your self-image over time. Change is less about sudden breakthroughs and more about daily mental conditioning.
Psycho-Cybernetics is one of those rare personal development books that doesn’t feel like a passing trend, it’s a foundational work. It teaches you that life doesn’t change by accident; it changes when you deliberately change how you see yourself.”
The following principle is stated in the mishna: Anything that benefits from a forbidden item contributing a positive taste to it is אָסוּר, and anything that does not benefit from a forbidden item imparting flavor to it is מוּתָּר. For example, forbidden vinegar that fell onto split beans, as the flavor imparted by the vinegar does not enhance the taste of the beans. רַב יְהוּדָה says in the name of שְׁמוּאֵל that this in fact is the halacha, that (as Rashi says) נותן טעם לפגם מותר.
רַב יְהוּדָה says in the name of שְׁמוּאֵל: The חַכָמִים taught this only with regard to a case where the vinegar fell into hot split beans, imparting flavor to their detriment. But if the vinegar fell into cold split beans, the vinegar enhances the flavor, and if one subsequently heated them, it becomes like a dish that some added ingredient first enhanced its flavor and ultimately detracted from it, and it is rendered אָסוּר, as the initial flavor that was imparted was beneficial.
And similarly, when רָבִין came from אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל to בָּבֶל he reported that רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה says in the name of רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: The חַכָמִים taught this only with regard to the case where the vinegar fell into hot split beans. But if the vinegar fell into cold split beans and one subsequently heated the mixture, it becomes like a dish that some added ingredient first enhanced its flavor and ultimately detracted from it, and it is rendered forbidden. And similarly, when רַב דִּימִי came, he also reported this in the name of רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן and added: And they would prepare this dish of split beans and vinegar on עֶרֶב שַׁבָּת in צִיפּוֹרִי, and they would call it cress dish.
רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ says: With regard to the principle that the חַכָמִים said, that if a forbidden food imparts flavor to a permitted food to the detriment of the mixture it remains מוּתָּר, the criterion is not that people would say: This dish is lacking in salt or is overabundant in salt, is lacking in spices or is overabundant in spices, and that is why its flavor was detracted by the forbidden food. Rather, it is referring to any dish that is not lacking in anything, but will not be eaten only because of this forbidden substance that fell into it.
And there are those who say that רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ states a קוּלָה of נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם: With regard to that which חַכָמִים said that if a forbidden food imparts flavor to a permitted food to the detriment of the mixture, it remains מוּתָּר, one does not say that a certain food is אָסוּר because its flavor was not actually detracted by the forbidden substance, as this dish is lacking in salt or is overabundant in salt, is lacking in spices or is overabundant in spices, and it is for that reason that the forbidden substance detracted from its flavor. Rather, since now, in any event, the forbidden substance detracted from its flavor, it is מוּתָּר. As Rashi notes:
נותן טעם לפגם שאמרו אין אומר כו‘ – כלומר אין תולין הפגם בדבר אחר לומר חסירה היא מלח ואילו היתה כתיקונה לא היה זה האיסור פוגמה שהמלח היה מבטל את פגימת טעם האיסור ומתקנו אלא כיון דטעם האיסור פוגמה עכשיו כמות שהיא הוי פגם ומותר
Furthermore, with regard to a forbidden food that became mixed with a permitted food, רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ says in the name of רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: In any case where the flavor and substance of the forbidden food are perceptible in the mixture, the mixture is אָסוּר, and one gets מַלְקוֹת for consuming it. And it is a tradition that this is the measure for such a case: One who eats a כְּזַיִת of the forbidden element in the mixture in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread [בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס] is חַייָב for eating the forbidden food. There’s a huge Rashi here, and Rabbi Stern interjected a portion of it:
כל שטעמו וממשו לוקין עליו וזהו כזית בכדי אכילת פרס – ועל כגון זה נאמר שיעור כזית בכדי אכילת פרס הלכה למשה מסיני שאם יש בכשיעור פרס של תבשיל כזית מן האיסור לוקין עליו אע”פ שאין כזית של איסור נאכל בבת אחת כיון דאינו שוהה באכילתו משהתחיל לאוכלו עד שגמרו אלא כדי אכילת פרס מצטרפת אכילתו ולוקה אבל אם אין בכדי אכילת פרס של תבשיל איסור הואיל ושוהה באכילתו כזית יותר מכדי אכילת פרס הוו להו כשתי אכילות של שני ימים ואין לוקין דקים להו לרבנן דאכילת פרס הוי שיעור שהיית אכילה
But if only the flavor of the forbidden food is recognizable in the mixture, but not its substance, as it was completely dissolved into the permitted food, the mixture is אָסוּר, but one does not get מַלְקוֹת for consuming it. And if the forbidden food amplified the flavor of the permitted food to its detriment, it is מוּתָּר. Rashi ostensibly gives the example of milkd falling into meat: טעמו ולא ממשו – כגון חלב שנפל לקדרה או חלב שנפל נימוח שאין ממשו בעין
Rabbi Stern pointed out the long Tosafos here that finds Rashi problematic. Tosfaos begins:
א”ר יוחנן כל שטעמו וממשו אסור ולוקין עליו טעמו ולא ממשו אסור ואין לוקין עליו – פי’ רש”י בפרק גיד הנשה (חולין דף צח:) מכאן דטעם כעיקר לאו דאורייתא ופי’ כגון חלב שנפל לתוך בשר או חלב שנפל נימוח שאין ממשו בעין ואין נראה מה שפי’ רש”י חלב שנפל לתוך בשר דאפילו לפירוש רש”י דטעם כעיקר לאו דאורייתא מודה בבשר בחלב דהוי דאורייתא דדרך בישול אסרה תורה
Have a look at ArtScroll, which elaborates as follows:
“Tosafos find difficulty with Rashi’s use of milk falling into a pot [of meat] as an example of ‘flavor without substance’ which is forbidden only rabbinically … For even if we grant that a liquid absorbed into the meat is considered only a flavor and not a substance, all would agree that in the case of milk-and-meat, the meat becomes Biblically prohibited as a result of the milk “flavor” it has absorbed, since the Torah forbids a mixture of meat and milk cooked together even if the two components are then separated … [In defense of Rashi, Chasam Sofer suggests that Rashi in his example does not mean that milk fell into a pot of meat, but rather than non-kosher milk (e.g. from a camel) fell into a pot of vegetables.]”
The following two charts from Rav Kornfeld’s Dafyomi Advancement Forum summarizes what follows nicely:
[2] כגון נבילה סרוחה, ופירש”י לקמן [דף ס”ח רע”א], דהואיל ואיפגמא מקודם שבאה לידי נבילה לא חל עליה שם נבילה, אבל דבר שנאסר קודם, שוב לא פוקע איסורו (לר’ מאיר) משום הפגם.
Regarding a pot [קְדֵירָה] that was used for cooking two different foods in quick succession, thereby imparting the flavor of the first into the second:
Rabbi Stern finished at the 25:25 with a ten minute mussar schmooze in honor of Chodesh Elul, following yesterday’s schmooze on the inception of blowing of the shofar, today’s piece based on addressing לדוד ה׳ אוֹרי וישעי according to Rav Yitzchak Isaac Sher. The premise for this חִיזוּק is based on the fact that because time fritters away in our minds, הקבּ״ה gives us physical manifestations of time as a reminder. Rav Sher writes:
ועוד תקנו להקדמונים לומר בחודש זה בכל יום את המזמור בתהלים לדוד ה׳ אורי וְישעי ממי אירא ולענין אומר פרק זה הוא הבטחון המוחלט בד׳ שיעזור לו בכל עניניו הין הגשמעים והין הרוחנים ואז כאשר אדם בוטח כראוי בד׳, הרי אין לו לירא משום דבר, ואין לו לפחד משום דבר
Normally when we think of “אין לו לפחד משום דבר”, overcoming the fear that comes with doing battle in military combat based on the power and protection supplied by הקבּ״ה comes to mind [והעיקר לא לפחד כלל]:
Certainly the story of David vs. Goliath is well known. דָוִד has only the stone as a weapon, and גָלְיַת הַפְּלִישְׁתִּי is in full armor, with a shield, and wielding a tree as a weapon. But that was the overt war that was bering waged, the מִלְחֶמֶת הַחִיצוֹנִי. The greater battle that דָוִד waged was מִלְחֶמֶת הַפְּנִימִי, the internal war against one’s יֵצֶר הָרַע. The challenge is to conquer one’s inner demons, and הקבּ״ה will take care of the external forces. That is the יהֹוָ֚ה | אוֹרִ֣י וְ֖יִשְׁעִי מִמִּ֣י אִירָ֑א יְהֹוָ֖ה מָע֥וֹז חַ֜יַּ֗י מִמִּ֥י אֶפְחָֽד to which דָוִד is referring. As Rav Sher continues:
ולא עוד אלא, שאף מן היצר הרע אין לא לאדם לפחד כלל, כאשר הוא סמוך ובטוח בד׳ כי יעזרנו להמלט ממנו. וזהו שאומר שם הפסוק: ״אם תחנה עלי מחנה לא ירא לבי אם תקום עלי מלחמה בזאת אני בוטח״, ובאיזו מלחמה מדבר הכתוב? – הרי אומר אף במלחמה היותר גדולה שיש לו לאדם, וזוהי מלחמת היצר וחיילותיו, שהאדם צריך ללחום עם עצמו, כמו שמבואר ב״חובות הלבבות״ (פרק ה משער ״יחוד המעשה״) באותו מעשה בחסיד אחד שפגע באנשים השבים ממלחמת אויבים וכו׳, ״אמר להם: שבתם מן המלחמה הקטנה שוללים שלל, התעתדו למלחמה הגדולה. מרו לו, ומה היא המלחמה הגדולה? – אמר להם מלחמת היצר וחייליו״. וזהו שאומר דהע״ה, שאף מן היצה״ר אינו ירא כלל, כי בהיותו סמוך ובטוח בד׳, הרי הוא חש באמת שכל הכוחות האחרים אינם קיימים כלל, והם כאין וכאפס, וכלא נחשבו. כמו שאתה מוצא בו בדוד המלך, שהרג את הארי ואת הדוב, וגם יצא ללא חת לקראת גלית הפלישתי, הלבוש שריון מכף רגלו ועד קדקדו, וכלי מלחמה בידו ומגינים מלפניו, והוא, דוד, יצא לעומתו והרגו באבן, תוך ביטול מוחלט לכל גבורתו. והטעים דוד את מעשהו, באמרו שכיון שהפלשתי הזה מחרף מערכות א־לקים, הרי הוא כלא נחשב – ״כי מי הפלשתי הערל הזה כי חרף מערכות א־לקים חיים״ (שמואל א, י״ז, כו). ולא רק מכוחות חיצוניים לא היה ירא, אלא גם כן מן הכחות הרעים החבויים בפנימיותו – מכוחות היצה״ר
And Rav Sher concludes:
אמנם, באיזה אופן בטוח הוא דוד המלך המלך מן היצה״ר? – אך ורק ״בזאת אני בוטח״, ואין זאת אלא תורה, שנאמר (דברים ד, מד) ״וזאת התורה״ (מדרש שוח״ט תהלים כ״ז). וזהו שממשיך שם דהע״ה ואומר: ״אחת שאלתי מאת די אותה אבקש שבתי בבית ד׳ כל ימי חיי וגו׳ (פס׳ ד׳). רק על ידי ״שבתי בבית ד׳ כל ימי חיי, הרי הוא בטוח בממלחמתו התמידית של היצר הרע.
Rabbi Stern exhorted us to internalize the message behind לדוד ה׳ אוֹרי וישעי in Elul.
יד קַוֵּ֗ה אֶל־יְהֹ֫וָ֥ה חֲ֖זַק וְיַֽאֲמֵ֣ץ לִבֶּ֑ךָ וְ֜קַוֵּ֗ה אֶל־יְהֹוָֽה:
1 Of David. The Lord is my light and my salvation; whom shall I fear? The Lord is the stronghold of my life; from whom shall I be frightened?
2 When evildoers draw near to me to devour my flesh, my adversaries and my enemies against me-they stumbled and fell.
3 If a camp encamps against me, my heart shall not fear; if a war should rise up against me, in this I trust.
4 One [thing] I ask of the Lord, that I seek-that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to see the pleasantness of the Lord and to visit His Temple every morning.
5 That He will hide me in His tabernacle on the day of calamity; He will conceal me in the secrecy of His tent; He will lift me up on a rock.
6 And now, my head will be raised over my enemies around me, and I will sacrifice in His tent sacrifices with joyous song; I will sing and chant praise to the Lord.
7 Hearken, O Lord, to my voice [which] I call out, and be gracious to me and answer me.
8 On Your behalf, my heart says, “Seek My presence.” Your presence, O Lord, I will seek.
9 Do not hide Your presence from me; do not turn Your servant away with anger. You were my help; do not forsake me and do not abandon me, O God of my salvation.
10 For my father and my mother have forsaken me, but the Lord gathers me in.
11 Instruct me, O Lord, in Your way, and lead me in the straight path because of those who lie in wait for me.
12 Do not deliver me to the desires of my adversaries, for false witnesses and speakers of evil have risen against me.
13 Had I not believed in seeing the good of the Lord in the land of the living!
14 Hope for the Lord, be strong and He will give your heart courage, and hope for the Lord.
We learned in the Mishna: In the case of יֵין נֶסֶךְ that fell on grapes, one rinses them and they are מוּתָּר. But if the grapes were cracked, they are אָסוּר. The Gemara infers: If the grapes are cracked, they are אָסוּר, but grapes that are not cracked are מוּתָּר. If so, what is the cause for concern in the case where wine spilled on the wheat? It should be sufficient to rinse the wheat. רַב פָּפָּא said: Wheat is different, since, because of its slits, its status is similar to that of grapes that are cracked.
With regard to old wine used as יֵין נֶסֶךְ that fell onto grapes, all agree that the grapes are אָסוּר only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to them. With regard to new wine used for יֵין נֶסֶךְ, i.e., wine that had just been squeezed and has not yet fermented, that fell onto grapes, אַבַּיֵי says that any amount renders the grapes אָסוּר, and רָבָא says that they are אָסוּר only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to them. As Rashi notes:
חמרא חדתא – בנותן טעם. וכל היכא דאיתמר נותן טעם ואין טעמו ניכר הוה שיעורא בששים
[For more on the topic of שיעורא בששים, see here.]
אַבַּיֵי says that any amount renders them אָסוּר because he maintains that when categorizing substances in the context of the halachos of mixtures we follow the flavor [בָּתַר טַעְמָא אָזְלִינַן], and this wine and those grapes are of the same flavor, which renders it a case of a substance in contact with the same type of substance [מִין בְּמִינוֹ]. And the principle is that in a case of מִין בְּמִינוֹ, any amount of the forbidden substance renders the mixture אָסוּר.
רָבָא says that they are אָסוּר only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to them because he maintains that when categorizing substances in the context of the halachos of mixtures we follow the name [בָּתַר שְׁמָא אָזְלִינַן], and this wine has a discrete name, and those grapes have their own discrete name. Accordingly, this is a case of a substance in contact with a different type of substance [מִין בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ]. And the principle is that in a case of מִין בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ, the mixture is אָסוּר only in a case where the forbidden item imparts flavor to it [בְּנוֹתֵן טַעַם].
Rabbi Stern pointed out the ריטב״א here, who notes:
דבתר טעמא אזלינן. ואם תאמר והא איפכא שמעינן להו לעיל דאביי אזיל בתר טעמא ורבא לא אזיל בתר טעמא ולא קשיא דהנהו דלעיל מיירי בדברים ששמם ידוע לדברי הכל ואפילו קודם שנפלו זה לזה היו חלוקים בטעמם או בשמם ואלו הכא קא מפלגי בעיקר שמו היאך ראוי לקרותו דאביי סבר דכיון דריחיה חלא חלא הוא לכל דבר בין לתרומה בין לברכת הנהנין וקדוש והרי הוא נדון כאלו נשתנה טעמו גם כן וכיון דכן הכא נמי בחלא דיינינן ליה דהא חד מינא וכחד טעמא חשיבי לכל דבר ורבא סבר דריחיה חלא וטעמיה חמרא חמרא הוא לכל דבר וכיון דכן הכא נמי חמרא שמיה והוה ליה בהדי חלא שני מינין בין בטעמא ובין בשמה מ״ר. וכן פירש הראבד ז״ל והלכתא כרבא וכן פסק רבינו אלפסי ז״ל בפ׳ ערבי פסחים בפלוגתא דרבי יוחנן ורבי יהושע בן לוי והא כתיבנא לה התם ובפרק המוכר פירות בבבא בתרא בסיעתא דשמיא
With regard to this bung hole [בַּת תִּיהָא], the hole in a barrel through which one can smell the wine (plugged with a removable stopper), if a גוֹי smells a Jew’s wine through it, the wine is permitted, but for a Jew to smell a גוֹי’s wine through it, אַבַּיֵי says that it is אָסוּר. This is because he holds that a smell is a substantial matter, a significant form of pleasure, and it is not permitted to derive הַנָאָה from a גוֹי’s wine. רָבָא says it is מוּתָּר because he holds that a smell is insubstantial.
רָבָא holds that smell is insubstantial because we learned the following in a mishna (Terumot 10:4): With regard to an oven that one lit with cumin stalks of teruma and baked bread in it, the bread is מוּתָּר because it has not absorbed the flavor of the cumin stalks but only the smell of the cumin stalks. This indicates that smell alone does not render a food אָסוּר.
And how does אַבַּיֵי explain this? He answers that it is different there, as the forbidden substance was burned. The smell of the forbidden cumin stalks entered the bread after the cumin stalks themselves were consumed by the fire, and a smell that is not from an extant substance is מוּתָּר. By contrast, in a case where the smell is from an extant source, it is אָסוּר.
רַב מָרִי said that the מַחְלוֹקֶת between אַבַּיֵי and רָבָא is parallel to a מַחְלוֹקֶת between tanna’im, as it is taught in a mishna (Terumot 10:3): With regard to one who detached a hot loaf of bread from the oven and placed it on the opening of a barrel of wine of teruma, רַבִּי מֵאִיר deems the bread אָסוּר to non-כֹּהַנִים, as in his opinion the smell of the wine renders the bread אָסוּר to them, and רַבִּי יְהוּדָה holds it’s מוּתָּר.
רַבִּי יוֹסֵי holds it’s מוּתָּר in a case of wheat bread but אָסוּר in a case of barley bread, because the barley draws out the fumes of the wine. רַב מָרִי explains: What, is it not with regard to this matter that the חַכָמִים in the Mishnah disagree: רַבִּי מֵאִיר holds that a smell is a substantial matter, and רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, holds that it’s insubstantial?
The Gemara remarks: According to the opinion of רָבָא, the מַחְלוֹקֶת between him and אַבַּיֵי is certainly parallel to a מַחְלוֹקֶת between tanna’im, as he must concede that רַבִּי מֵאִיר holds that a smell is a substantial matter. But according to the opinion of אַבַּיֵי, shall we say that it is parallel to a מַחְלוֹקֶת between tanna’im?
אַבַּיֵי could say to you that רַבִּי יְהוּדָה also holds that a smell is a substantial matter. Wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה says in the name of רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: In the case of a hot loaf of bread and an open barrel, everyone agrees that it is אָסוּר, as the bread certainly absorbed of the smell of the wine? Furthermore, in the case of a cool loaf of bread and a stoppered barrel, everyone agrees that it is מוּתָּר. They disagree only with regard to the case of a hot loaf of bread and a stoppered barrel, or in the case of a cool loaf of bread and an open barrel. And this case of mine, i.e., the case of the bunghole, is also comparable to the case of a hot loaf of bread and an open barrel, in which everyone agrees that the bread is אָסוּר.
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