Iran’s Counter-revolutionary Influence
Check out “Iran’s Counter-revolutionary Influence” by this author at GW’s International Affairs Review. Here’s a snippet:
The bloodless phase of today’s Arab revolts is all but over. Monarchs and dictators are now equipped with two very different examples. One example, offered by Iran, suggests violence and urgency can handicap a revolution even when hundreds of thousands take to the streets. The other example, relentlessly broadcast by al Jazeera these past several weeks, proves concession can be suicidal.
Where’s the Democracy?
Recent events in Tunisia and Egypt have sent the punditocracy into a dizzying haze of catchphrases of late. Terms like “democracy,” “Arab Spring,” and “freedom” have been thrown about with regard to the Arab revolts. However, the main part of the media seems to disregard history in their assessments of what is happening. While it may be true that at some point the authoritarian regimes of Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen might be replaced with some form of democracy, it is too early to tell. In fact, there are a slew of seemingly insurmountable hurdles ossified into the governing structures of these countries that might prevent any sort of real democracy of freedom possible in the short run.
Taking a look at Tunisian history, Massimo Calabresi at Time writes of a new dawn in Tunis with the ouster of a corrupt dictator in favor of a sweeping democratic reforms. However, Calabresi is quoting a 1987 New York Times article which was describing the rise of President Ben Ali, who recently fled the country for safer sands. Although it is too early to tell, the revolt in Tunis could simply replace one corrupt dictatorship with another. While democracy remains the fantasy ideal of many in the Arab world, can it really take root succeeding the type of regimes that the region has constructed? There is nothing guaranteeing that democracy, or even free market democracy, would be a logical successor to the system that governed Tunisia. There is massive unemployment and the private sector is completely run by former Ben Ali cronies. Where are the jobs going to come from? Without government patronage, how will a majority of the people live?
The same argument can be applied to Egypt. Analysts have so far preferred to critique the differences between the uprising in Egypt and Tunisia. The former Tunisian government was established by popular revolt while the Egyptian regime rests on the legacy of Nasser’s Free Officer’s coup. The military in Egypt might be more loyal to Mubarak then the Tunisian military was to Ben Ali. Differences like these, while important in perhaps gauging the efficacy of popular revolt, do not assess, in any meaningful way, whether democracy can take foot in these countries. To do so, analysts should focus on the socioeconomic systems that these governments have put into place to perpetuate their rule. For any sort of transition to democracy to take place, these conditions have to change – and that is more difficult than forcing a dictator to flee the capital.
As the Financial Times pointed out a few days ago, Mubarak’s regime has successfully co-opted big business into the system. Army officers sit on the boards of successful corporations and prominent businessmen are rubber stamp members of parliament. But more importantly the huge bureaucracy is the largest employer in the country and the route to many jobs lay in loyalty to the ruling party. Won’t this all change if Mubarak is ousted? Yes, most likely. But what system will take its place. The transition to a market oriented economy is never pretty and always painful. One of the reasons the regime probably avoided stark market reforms (other than because they will weaken its control) is that the population will bear the brunt and possibly revolt. Opening the government controlled economy to the free market will increase efficiency and cut waste.
This usually means that people employed by the government or state owned businesses will lose their jobs. Government subsidies for staple food items will end if state revenue streams can’t be met. Of course, the United States could shoulder this burden by continuing its billions of dollars in aid to Cairo, but will that last if an unfavorable government steps in? Egypt does have a skilled labor force, but what type of industries does the country harbor and what multinational corporations would do business in a nation fresh off a popular coup? Global markets have already taken a hit from the situation in Cairo, and there is no guarantee that international business would risk taking a stake in a newly elected government.
So free market reforms would lead to higher joblessness, higher food prices, and an educated populace that still can’t find work. What does this all mean? It means that any patronage system that Mubarak has set up will probably continue in the near future. Whoever comes to power will have to maintain that system to keep the people in check while trying to liberalize the economy slowly to soften the transition. However, as was the case in Latin America, the Washington Consensus framework is susceptible to global markets and one shock to the system could send any reforms reeling, the result being a government that needs to tighten its grip on the nation to maintain order and power. It was the justification given by Mubarak years ago and it will most likely be the justification given by the new regime. So while free and fair elections may be held if Mubarak is ousted, there is no guarantee that their would be a second such election.
Finally, the army has to enter any discussion when considering the future. As stated above, the army has vested interests in the economic status quo in Egypt. They need to retain their power in order to maintain the gold in their pockets. And so far, the army is playing a very cunning hand – declaring a refusal to use force on the protesters while marginally following deployment orders. Whether these orders came form Mubarak or his generals is unknown, but their unwillingness to use force against the demonstrators leads to two conclusions – Mubarak is not in their favor and the army wants to keep its image untarnished in the people’s eyes. The military clearly has eyes to the post-Mubarak order here. Whatever government comes to form after Mubarak leaves, the army will have a say and it is unlikely they will give up their sources of personal revenue, keeping the patronage network intact.
I’m a not suggesting that the Egyptian experience is doomed to a one party autocracy. There is a huge spectrum of democracy that can be established in any state. While Egypt’s experience might not lead to a western style democracy, it may yet bring in a more pluralistic society that offers real choice in terms of political actors. However, the patronage system and socioeconomic factors on the ground also make a reversion to authoritarianism just as likely if the people decide that stability and food on the table is more important than certain freedoms. Remember, the Arab regimes have had nearly 50 years to create systems of power that maintain the status quo. That status quo has surely been rocked of late, and it will never be the same. But there are too many factors, economic and political, that may keep that status quo from shifting dramatically.
“The Longest War” by Peter Bergen
Earlier today, George Washington University’s International Affairs Review published a review of Peter L. Bergen’s new book, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and al Qaeda, by this contributor.
The Longest War is both a useful history and a call to action for American policymakers. Bergen methodically documents the errors of the past decade while implicitly suggesting the United States can and should do better in the future. Al Qaeda is weak today, certainly, and never was an existential threat, but it remains grave enough to demand our very best effort.The Longest War offers much-needed perspective as Americans prepare to observe the ten-year anniversary of the day that started an epoch.
The complete review can be found here.
Tick Tock Tehran
Urgency defines the Iran debate but may be dangerous. The end result might be another disastrous war in the Middle East or an undeserved peace with Tehran. Arguments issued by “hawks” and “doves” (two imperfect labels) deserve criticism when considering how the US can maintain its dominance in the Persian Gulf, an arrangement which only Iran challenges, and the US still benefits from.
Some suggest military action can resolve outstanding issues. According to this logic, Iran’s leaders cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons because they support terrorism and suffer from a theocratic handicap that makes them unpredictable. The remedy is simple: the US or Israel must physically interrupt the enrichment and weaponization process. Doing so would underscore America’s resolve in the Middle East, prove the US is serious about non-proliferation, and presumably roll back a nuclear threat or ratchet up the costs until they become prohibitive for the regime. Recall the guiding logic of the Iraq War (WMD; support for terrorism; chronic unpredictability; anti-American bent; etc.) and arguments for attacking Iran sound familiar. The scope of proposed intervention varies widely if raised at all–with some arguing for regime change and others for airstrikes like those employed against Saddam in the 1990s.
Hawks fall into three traps. First, they are convinced Iran is irrational or would become so upon mastering the atom. In the case of Iran this makes little sense. The Islamic Republic lost much of its missionary zeal more than two decades ago, after the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) soured any expectations that it would lead the Muslim world. The regime entrenched itself during and after the war, with the 2009 election being the most recent episode in what some have called the militarization saga. Ayatollah Khomeini’s legacy matters a great deal also. Unlike his quietist Shia contemporaries, Khomeini turned the faith into a political model and built, he believed, an Islamic utopia worth preserving. Stated plainly: Iran’s leadership has never pursued policies that would ruin the spoils of the revolution. Regime security reigns and is wholly rational. A rational actor can be deterred–and so, Iran can be deterred.
The second major shortcoming is the remedy itself. Interventionists assume the US military can derail or destroy Iran’s nuclear program. But remember that the program is spread across dozens of facilities in a country slightly larger than Alaska. The operation would be complicated, sustained, and perhaps even require boots on the ground to verify destruction. And most importantly, if US forces–the best in the world–were unsuccessful, Washington might be left with a nuclear regime convinced it is facing an existential threat. Action, in this case, may produce unpredictability.
The third shortcoming is not specific to Iran: hawkishness generally requires threat inflation. Iran is not an existential threat or grave enough to warrant armed intervention. Iranian power in its hard and soft forms is manageable and will remain so for some time. As I wrote in October for The Washington Note, “Every tool at Iran’s disposal comes with serious limitations: the ‘oil weapon’ is self-defeating; Iran’s conventional military is too modest; any asymmetric attacks would be small-scale or prompt massive retaliation; and nuclear intimidation is evaporating with the deployment of new anti-missile systems.” A nuclear weapon would not alter this formula if regime security is paramount. Any future bomb–and remember that Iran is more than a decade away from a consequential nuclear arsenal –will function as a deterrent rather than a real weapon: the US will not be blackmailed out of any Persian Gulf port; Israel will keep killing militants because Iran will not bet the crown jewels on proxies; explicit American security guarantees could stem an arms race; and the Gulf would most likely grow more hostile to Tehran, further degrading their position economically and diplomatically.
Dovish observers argue for reconciliation. Proponents include Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett (Race for Iran) and Stephen Kinzer, whose newest book (Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future) focuses on how the US and Iran are compatible. Members of this camp believe a new partnership will dramatically enhance America’s position. Think of this as the “skeleton key” approach, whereby a “grand bargain” opens doors where the stakes are highest, say in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reconciliation, however, requires more wishful thinking than hawkish proposals. Poisonous history prevents good relations for the moment. Iran’s veto-wielding conservatives would never endorse rapprochement. And American politicians will, for the foreseeable future, relentlessly vilify Iran.
Where US-Iranian interests diverge, Washington does not need Iranian cooperation though it would be preferable. The Iraqi elections of 2010 and the December agreement, which finalized the appropriation of government posts, placed those amiable to American designs in the most important positions. Prime Minister Maliki remains, as does President Talabani. Iyad Allawi will head the new National Council for Supreme Policies. Beyond this, the Sadrists–who fought Americans in the streets and are closest to Iran–were given posts related to society and services. The most important offices are still staffed by those more intimately connected to Washington. Iran’s ability to manipulate outcomes across the border has serious limitations.
Afghanistan is no different. Interests converge there since neither party wants the Taliban to return. Because Iran and the US share this ultimate goal, Iran’s participation is not required, and might not even be helpful. There is evidence Iran supports the Taliban but Defense Secretary Gates knows it’s “limited.” It certainly isn’t changing the outcome on the battlefield, where the US military is now convinced it has arrested Taliban gains. If the US achieves something like victory in Afghanistan it will be the product of new resources and continued sacrifice; it will not be because Iran proved to be the “missing piece.” The Islamic Republic enjoys no diplomatic pull with the Taliban or al Qaeda and it will not fight for any peace there. In short, the Iran has very little to offer.
Both extremes of the Iran debate fail because they overstate the country’s hard and soft power. American strategy should be calibrated accordingly.
Explaining the Sadrists: Part VI
One of the key questions regarding the Sadrists is the relationship between the group and Iran. The anti-Sadrists position of the U.S. government has driven the Sadrists into the arms of the Iranians and has prevented the ideological and practical differences between the two to emerge. The Sadrists have been left dependent on the Iranians for funding and support. Repeated efforts on the part of the U.S. to form a broad-based unity coalition which excludes or minimizes the Sadrists has also left the Sadrists dependent on the pro-Iranian Iraqi parties, like the ISCI, in order to secure political power. International and regional support to the Sadrists is lacking. The only source of political support and funding for the group are the pro-Iranian parties within Iraq and Iran as a regional supporter. These trends subsume the Sadrist-Iranian tensions to short-term political and financial needs and work to prevent fundamental ideological differences from coming to the fore.
Despite the Sadrists avowed anti-Iranian position, Iran has been willing to provide support, funding, weapons, and a degree of sanctuary to the group. This has been in response to Iran’s larger foreign policy goals within Iraq and within the larger Shia community. Iran, at the minimum seeks a non-threatening Iraq. Iran has attempted to show that Iran, and not Iraq, is the dominant regional power through military actions. Iran has, on several occasions sent troops across the border and has increased its military presence along the Iraqi border. Iran has also pursued Kurdish “terrorists” across the Iran-Iraq border and launched several incursions into the Kurdish regions of Iraq. Iran is also funding terrorists and militias in an attempt to keep Iraq weak and prevent a strong Iraq from arising to challenge Iranian regional power.
Ultimately, though, Iran is seeking an Iraq which is friendly and stable as well as non-threatening. In pursuit of this goal Iran has sought to unify the Shia of Iraq into a stable unity coalition. Iran’s main strategy is to “strengthen and support the [Shia dominated] central government in Baghdad” in order to secure a friendly Iraq. The large number of Iraqi Shia, approximately 60% of the population, virtually guarantees Shiite domination of the Iraqi government and led Iran to support the inclusion of Shia groups in the electoral process from 2003-2005.[1] Iranian pressure was key in the formation of the UIA bloc. Iran has major ideological ties to all Shia parties and was host to much of the Shia leadership during the Saddam years. In the case of the Sadrists, Iran also has extensive family ties as well. As such Iran is well placed to exert its influence on all Shia parties within Iraq.
Iran has sought to build balanced relations with all Shia factions in pursuit of its interests in Iraq. Iran fears both a destabilized Iraq as well as one which could ally with the U.S. or Israel against it. Iran has therefore attempted to promote moderate Shiite parties like Da’wa and ISCI while attempting to limit the damage done by the more extremists Shiite factions. This would enable a pro-Iranian regime to form in Iraq but one which would not be radical enough to spark regional instability or U.S. intervention. Iran has sought to build relations with all Shia factions and then to play them off against one another in order to pursue its own policies. This “may have been the case when the Tanzim al-Daawa branch threatened to withdraw from the UIA in June 2008” and Iranian pressure on other members of the coalition, most likely, prevented the split.
Iranian support for the Sadrists began as early as 2003 when Muqtada al-Sadr agreed to use Kazom al-Haeri, a very pro-Khomeini cleric, as his source of emulation; although this relationship rapidly deteriorated. In 2005 Iran began to establish contacts with small cells of the Sadrists and to use them in attacks against occupation forces thus exacerbating the U.S.-Sadrist divisions. Iran has also provided the Mahdi Army and other Sadrist militias with extensive supplies of weapons and training. This support is, however, relatively limited overall, and, since 2007, Iran has been steadily reducing the level of support it offers to militias throughout Iraq. The relatively limited amount of support Iran provides to the Sadrists suggests “a tactical rather then long-term or strategic partnership.” Iran has been willing to overlook the Sadrists anti-Iranian goals and to use the Sadrists to support its more favored clients, the Da’wa and the ISCI, but it is purely a marriage of convenience on the part of Tehran.
Iran has been willing to support the Sadrists in Iraq, despite their position opposing Iranian leadership, because Iran sees value in the Sadrist faction. Popular, nationalistic, firebrand clerics pose a threat to Iranian leaders, like Khamenei, and engaging with the Sadrists could potentially weaken the independent Iraqi clerical establishment overall. Providing support, and sanctuary, to the Sadrists has also given Iran leverage over the group and particularly over Muqtada al-Sadr who is in Qom and directly under the Iranian regime’s thumb. Muqtada al-Sadr’s presence in Iran limits his ability to spark a Mahdi uprising which could have disastrous impacts on the stable Iraq sought by Iranian foreign policy. Al-Sadr‘s reported return to Iraq comes directly after the extensive Iranian pressure to back al-Maliki as Prime Minister and could be an attempt by al-Sadr to get some of his independence back, although it is still unclear if he will remain in Iraq or what al-Sadr hopes to gain by returning. Iran uses its leverage with the Sadrists in order to pursue its larger goals of a stable and friendly Iraq. Iran used its leverage in order to push Muqtada al-Sadr to support al-Maliki in his bid to be re-elected as Prime Minister. Even then, however, it took months of deadlock and pressure to get Sadrist support. Iran certainly has influence with the Sadrists but fundamental tensions and disagreements remain between the two.
The Sadrists-Iranian alignment is one based solely on the greater interests of each party. The Sadrists are a nationalistic Islamist group which is both anti-American and anti-Iranian and seeks Iraqi leadership of the Iraqi Shia. Within Iraq the Sadrists are in a competition with Da’wa and ISCI over the Shia constituency. This competition is about the “Iranian question” as well as the Iraqi-U.S. relationship, and the nature of the Iraq state itself. The Sadrists became international and regional pariahs due to the insurgency against the U.S. and their strong anti-occupation stance. This resulted in U.S. hostility and moves to limit Sadrist influence and strength. Regionally the Shia nature of the Sadrist groups has re-awakened fears of a Shiite crescent and internal subversion among Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The only regional actor willing to provide the Sadrists with the support the group needs is Iran. Iran is attempting to build a stable and friendly Iraq led by moderate Shia groups. In pursuit of this Iran has attempted to build relationships with all Iraqi Shiite groups in order to maximize Iranian options and to play each Shia group off the other when necessary. By supporting the Sadrists Iran has gained a degree of influence and control over a vehemently anti-Iranian movement which it uses to pursue its goals within Iraq. The alignment of the Sadrists with Iran is one of necessity and convenience, forced by the regional and international situation, and driven by the demands of the Iraqi intra-Shia political struggle.
This post concludes my series on the Sadrist Movement in Iraq.
1. Katzman, Kenneth, “Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq,” Congressional Research Service, June 4, 2009, Code RS22323, 1
Explaining the Sadrists: Part V
Beyond being estranged from the U.S., the Sadrists are also regionally isolated. Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states are worried by the Shia nature of the Sadrists and fear the Iraqi “experiment” in Shia government could radicalize the Shia in their own countries. Such a radicalization could seriously threaten many of these states which contain significant minorities, or even majorities, of Shia which are politically and economically often second-class citizens. Saudi Arabia, particularly, has a large Shia population which is geographically concentrated in the eastern oil-producing districts and, should they radicalize, would be a serious threat to the regime.
The Gulf states, Saudi Arabia in particular, have distanced themselves from the U.S. attempt to give political power to the Shia in Iraq and have pursued what could be called an actively inactive policy in regards to Iraq. The Saudis and the Gulf states have refused to give any large-scale funding or support to U.S. attempts to stabilize Iraq, despite close proximity, in protest at the Shia nature of the government. The Gulf states are worried of the example that Shia-led government might provide to their own oppressed Shia populations.
There are also fears of Iranian influence both among the Sadrists and among their own Shia populations which prevent the Gulf states from taking an active role in Iraq. The sectarian violence that grips Iraq has brought in many Shia from the region and increased fears that the extremism, sectarian violence, and Iranian influence will spread.
The Saudi’s have attempted, during the 1980’s and 1990’s, to brand the Shia as a unified global un-Islamic enemy. This propaganda drive followed the 1979 Iranian Revolution and has driven an ideological wedge between the Saudi’s and any Shia group. While steadily becoming less vocal over the course of time, this policy of branding the Shia an enemy is a long-standing policy of the Saudis. The Iraq War has reawakened these fears among the Saudis about sectarian violence and internal fifth columns.
Of particularly concern for the Saudis is the close cooperation between the U.S. and the Shia of Iraq. This cooperation angers the Saudis who see the U.S. as taking sides in a sectarian struggle to suppress Sunnis. There is also a perceived danger that the U.S. might de-emphasis its alliance with the Sunni Saudis and turn to a Shia Iraq. There has also been a “wave of foreign pressure” on the Saudi’s to give their Shia population a greater political voice which only furthers the fears of the Saudi monarchy. With these perceptions dominate within Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, neither are useful, or willing, regional partners for the Sadrists, leaving Iran as the only potential regional partner for the otherwise isolated group.
Explaining The Sadrists: Part IV
This segment will examine the U.S. position towards the Sadrists. The U.S. considers the Sadrists a terrorist organization and has worked to isolate the group. The U.S. has attempted to marginalize the group within Iraq and has lobbied hard to keep the Sadrists out of the Iraqi government. U.S. moves have similarly driven the Sadrists away from any relationship with the U.S. and towards Iran.
Beginning with the 2003 invasion Washington favored SCIRI as the conduit to the Shia population of Iraq. American support of the rival SCIRI, renamed ISCI, served to distance the Sadrists and the Americans. The American position was only solidified by the death of Abd al-Majid al-Khu’i who was an American supported cleric who had significant influence and authority among the Iraqi Shiites and was a competitor for influence with the Sadrists. Al-Khu’i was killed by a pro-Sadrist mob after attempting to retake control of the Imam Ali’ shrine. This served to solidify American antipathy to the Sadrists and Muqtada al-Sadr in particular.
The Sadrists anti-Israeli and anti-occupation stances prevented the U.S. and the Sadrists from coming to any understanding. The anti-occupation stance of the group also led to Sadrists attacks on U.S. forces, further poisoning the relationship. The U.S. considered the Sadrists to be Iranian controlled despite the explicitly anti-Iranian rhetoric of the Sadrists. Muqtada al-Sadr has consistently opposed the U.S. presence in Iraq labeling the U.S. as a “cancer that has spread and must be removed.” Muqtada al-Sadr has also rejected making any long-term deal with the U.S. While Muqtada al-Sadrs’ position has moderated somewhat since 2003, for instance calling for a defense pact with the U.S., the cleric has continued to reject U.S. occupation forces and the Status of Forces Agreement.
Attacks on U.S. forces began almost immediately following the invasion, Sadrist attacks picking up in 2004. Initially Muqtada al-Sadr refused to sanction killing Americans and favored giving the U.S. time to stabilize Iraq but this stance eventually broke down. The clashes between U.S. and Iraqi security forces and the Sadrists occurred initially in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala in 2004.
At the same time the Sadrists pursued sectarian violence, particularly after the 2006 bombing of a Shia mosque in Samarra which left an estimated 1,300 Sunni’s dead. The U.S. thus saw the Sadrists as an Iranian controlled sectarian terrorist organization which was destabilizing Iraq. The Sadrists were put on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations and were targeted as the number two most dangerous threat to Iraqi stability right behind Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
The U.S. views the Sadrists as destabilizing and dangerous to the internal stability of Iraq. Due to the Shia nature of the group, as well as the funding and supplies received from Iran, Washington views the Sadrists as puppets subject to Iranian control. This view was only strengthened by Muqtada al-Sadr’s self-imposed exile in Iran following the 2007 crackdown by the U.S. and Iraqi forces on his militia groups. 
Even his more moderate positions, such as a timetable for U.S. withdrawal and support for a defensive pact, have been overlooked by the U.S. Similarly the peaceful elections and the disbanding of the militias has not resulted in any change in U.S. policy towards the Sadrists, the U.S. still seeks to isolate them financially and politically.
A Vision in Manama
The Washington Note published an article by this Mezze contributor earlier today, titled “A Vision in Manama.” It focuses on what the United States needs to do in the Persian Gulf and what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton should do when she visits Bahrain this weekend.
The US will not leave the Persian Gulf any time soon because so many strategic imperatives are concentrated in the region. When delegates arrive to discuss the role of the US and regional security cooperation–the focus of the conference’s first two sessions–Secretary Clinton should come ready with a strategic vision that envigorates those countries within America’s security orbit and checks those outside it. It’s time to end speculation about American resolve and call Iran’s ascendancy into question. A new vision in Manama is necessary.
Why Lebanon Won’t Relapse…Maybe
Beautiful Beirut
Lebanon has become the obsessive interest of Middle East analysts this past fall. For good reason. The import of SCUD missiles to Hezbollah from Syria/Iran, the border skirmish between LAF and IDF, and the upcoming revelations of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) all make the Levant an interesting place. Or tense depending on where you live.
The current narrative places Lebanon in the middle of what could be the next great conflict in the Middle East. A Sunni-Shia conflict in Lebanon could escalate into a regional proxy war between Saudi Arabia and its “Axis of Moderation” versus Iran and its “Axis of Resistance.” However vague and muddy those terms may be, it is the current alliance structure in the region. But however prone Lebanon is to internecine conflict, the release of the STL’s findings won’t necessarily lead to the next great war in the Middle East because the costs of such a conflict aren’t in the interest of the main players.
The first reason is that Hezbollah has a lot to lose in a civil war. By being active and willing participants in the Lebanese government, Hezbollah chose to legitimize their role in Lebanon through politics. This was an important move in order to reassure the Lebanese that their only motivation was to fight Israel to the south, not to take Lebanon by force. The 2008 occupation of Beirut by Hezbollah forces was looked upon with consternation by the populace and it doesn’t seem like Nasrallah wants to repeat that PR blunder. Furthermore, Hezbollah has taken drastic steps to bring into question the legitimacy of the STL among its constituency. So if/when the STL indicts members of Hezbollah, there won’t be an outcry for action amongst the Shia population. This move in itself indicates that Nasrallah wants to avoid conflict.
The Sunni confession of Lebanon is in a tougher spot. The STL’s announcement might stoke feelings of anger and rage towards the Shia, seeking retribution for Rafik Hariri’s assassination, but the Sunnis are too weak to do anything about it. So what is Saad Hariri to do? He can’t possibly fight Hezbollah, that is completely out of the question. And after months of supporting the STL and standing by it for the sake of his family’s honor, he can’t discount its findings lest he wants to be viewed as appeasing Hezbollah. Hariri could resign his post as prime minister, therefore making the matter private instead of public. However, is he willing to put his signature on the death of the March 14 Movement? An alternative would be to publicly denounce those who were involved (thereby separating the assassins from Hezbollah) while privately reach an understanding with Nasrallah.
So while the STLs findings have definitely ratcheted up tensions in Lebanon, an all out war will be unlikely. The opportunity costs for both sides of the fight don’t justify any type of armed conflict. The Sunnis can’t win and Hezbollah can’t risk its popularity among Sunni populations as the David to Israel’s Goliath. The most likely outcome is that there will be a deal struck where both sides can claim to save face. While Hezbollah has denied any involvement in the death of the elder Hariri, perhaps they would be willing to acknowledge rogue elements in their ranks and play up some sort of plausible deniability that would be accepted by the Prime Minister in public. Seeing that Syria has had a hand in this process throughout and has improved relations with Hariri, Damascus could play mediator here.
So what is the implications for the United States? First, the US should, and has recently, fund the further development of the LAF. The LAF is seen as a non-sectarian national armed force which is based on national pride instead of sectarian loyalties. While it isn’t strong enough to challenge Hezbollah in the south, some reports say that it has a good presence on the coast, the Syrian border, and the north. Furthermore, the US can’t really do much besides support Hariri and March 14 by backing the STL and its findings. Since relations with Hezbollah are beyond the bounds of reality, there isn’t much consequence to this because it is to be expected.
Then again, Lebanon being Lebanon…
Explaining The Sadrists: Part III
The Sadrist role within Iraq is a complicated one in which the group attempts to navigate between the two major outside influences, Iran and the United States. The Sadrists have rejected the U.S. occupation but were initially supportive of U.S. attempts to establish a new Iraqi government. Muqtada al-Sadr rejected attempts in 2003 to have him join into leadership talks because he “didn’t want to be controlled by the U.S. government” and declared his reservations that the U.S. could establish a just government in Iraq. [1]
The Sadrists were excluded from the Interim Governing Council and were excluded from the cabinet appointed in September 2003. The Sadrists, in keeping with Muqtada al-Sadr’s anti-U.S. line, boycotted the first Iraqi elections in January 2005 which left his group out of the process and left them with little political clout and little say in the formation of a new Constitution. Nonetheless, the Sadrists were given five government positions but, due to intra-Shia disagreements, Muqtada al-Sadr pulled out of the government in 2007.
With limited means to secure political change, Muqtada al-Sadr began an upsurge in violence and sectarianism seeking to expand his influence at the expense of the U.S. and national Iraqi government. In 2007-2008 the Sadrists, in an attempt to gain an electoral victory, or at least prevent one for their opponents, focused particularly on the south of Iraq where provincial elections were due to be held.
This southern focus threatened the position of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, head of the Da’wa party, and the position of the ISCI, both of which were heavily supported by Iran. In response in March 2008, Maliki launched a security campaign in the south, focused on Basra, to eliminate the influence of the Sadrists militias, primarily the Mahdi Army or JAM. The Iraqi government campaigns were heavily supported by the U.S.
This campaign, and others launched afterwards, were successful in heavily damaging Sadrist militias and weakened Sadrist influence. This drove Muqtada al-Sadr to seek refuge in Iran and to announce the formation of a new social wing to his organization in June 2008. This was followed by statements by Muqtada al-Sadr that his fighters should not target civilians or government forces and should not carry weapons unless they were members of the specialized Mahdi Army units.
The Sadrists fully participated in the Iraqi elections of March 2010 and Muqtada al-Sadr called for fully informed participation in elections. Sadrist parties also control 39 seats in the new parliament, making them one of the more important parties in the Iraqi parliament and one of the few parties to gain seats. Internal tensions rose again between the Sadrists and Nuri al-Maliki during the post-election government formation talks. Muqtada al-Sadr was vehemently opposed to supporting the reelection of al-Maliki as Prime Minister. This reluctance was due to Maliki’s attempts to suppress the Sadrists and to the increasingly pro-Iranian leaning of al-Maliki. It took months of strong Iranian pressure and governmental stalemate, which included Sadrist talks with the secular candidate for Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, to force Muqtada al-Sadr to give in and support the re-nomination of al-Maliki.
In Iraq the Sadrists are locked in an intra-Shia struggle over the political loyalties of dominant Shia constituency. The pro-Iranian Da’wa and ISCI are battling the anti-Iranian Sadrists for Shia political support within Iraq. This battle was most clear in the 2008 Basra battles between Maliki and the Sadrists. These Iranian tensions are heightened by other conflicts between the two groups. The Sadrists oppose federalism and see an withdrawal of U.S. troops necessary for long-term security. Da’wa and SCIRI, however, encourage federalism and want to continue the U.S. troop presence to combat Sunni extremism.
Due to his anti-U.S. stance Muqtada al-Sadr remained outside of government in 2005. The Sadrists were co-opted into the political process with a few token positions but intra-Shia disputes caused Muqtada al-Sadr to pull out of the political process in 2007 and attempt a violent solution. This gave the pro-Iranian groups a chance to regain some of their lost position in the south with a military offensive against the Sadrists. This military offensive poisoned relations between the two Shia camps but, due to the Sadrists reliance on Iran as a result of the successful security campaign, the Sadrists were forced, by Iran, to cobble together a very shaky Shia alliance in Oct. of 2010.
Within Iraq the Sadrists have been anti-American but have also failed to be supportive of the pro-Iranian Shia parties. The Sadrists have attempted to remain a Shia nationalist group that is independent from outside influence but have been forced into a de facto, and much begrudged, alliance with Iran due to intra-Shia rivalry and U.S. opposition.
NOTES
[1] Cole, Juan, “The United States and the Shi’ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba’thist Iraq,” Middle East Journal 57: 4 (Autumn 2003); Accessed through Academic Search Premier.
The Mezze - المزة 