An American Observer

By Sam Huntington

Historic Overview

Iraq is a country in West Asia, bordered by Saudi Arabia to the south, Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, and the Persian Gulf and Kuwait to the southeast.  The population of Iraq is over 46 million, making it the 31st most populous country in the world.  Baghdad alone is home to 8 million people.

Iraq is the land of ancient Mesopotamia, which began in the sixth millennium B.C.  The fertile plains between Iraq’s Tigris and Euphrates rivers, collectively known as Mesopotamia, supported the development of the world’s earliest cities, civilizations, and empires — including Sumer, Akkad, and Assyria.  Mesopotamia was the birthplace of writing systems, mathematics, navigation, timekeeping, calendar making, astrology, the invention of the wheel, the sailboat, and a code of laws.  From the Sumerian city of Ur came Abraham, leader of the Hebrew people, whom God led out of the desert to settle in a place where God showed him, they ought to be.

Academics have started several discussions about the origin of the name Iraq.  One of these traces back to the ancient Sumerian city of Uruk.  Today, modern Iraq mostly overlaps with the ancient region of Mesopotamia — often called the cradle of civilization.  The history of Mesopotamia goes back to the Lower Paleolithic period, with important historical milestones.  At the southern tip of Iraq, you will find the country of Kuwait, which some scholars and biblical experts suggest was the site of the Garden of Eden.  Kuwait’s location near the modern mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers seems to support this idea.  The only thing missing from that debate is proof.

The Islamic Period

After the Muslim conquest of Mesopotamia, Baghdad became the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate and a major center of culture and learning during Islam’s golden age.  Following the Mongols’ destruction of Baghdad in 1258, Iraq was controlled by various empires, and from the 16th to the 20th century, it was governed within the Ottoman system, known as the Iraq Region.  Today, Iraq holds religious importance in Christianity, Judaism, Yazidism, and Mandaeism.

Note: Yazata is the Avestan liturgical term for a Zoroastrian concept that has many meanings but generally signifies a divine being.  The word literally means worthy of worship or veneration and is also used for certain prayers that are considered sacred.

Note: Mandaeism is a Gnostic, monotheistic, and ethnic religion influenced by Greek, Iranian, and Jewish traditions.  Its followers, the Mandaeans, hold in reverence figures such as Adam, Abel, Seth, Enos, Noah, Shem, Aram, and John the Baptist.

Modern Period

Since gaining independence in 1932, Iraq has experienced periods of notable economic and military growth along with times of instability and conflict.  Part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I, Iraq was reestablished by the United Kingdom in 1921.  It became an independent kingdom in 1932.  After a coup d’état in 1958, Iraq became a republic, initially led by Abdul Karim Qasim, then by Abdul Salam Arif and Abdul Rahman Arif.

In 1968, the Ba’ath Party gained power, establishing a one-party state under Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and later Saddam Hussein, who led the war against Iran from 1980 to 1988 and then invaded Kuwait in 1990.

In 2003, a U.S.-led coalition of military forces invaded and occupied Iraq, overthrowing Saddam Hussein and sparking insurgency, sectarian, and civil violence.  The conflict, known as the Iraq War, ended in 2011.  From 2013 to 2017, Iraq battled another war with the rise and defeat of the Islamic State of the Levant (ISL).  Today, post-war conflicts persist, although at a much lower level, still hindered stability alongside the growing influence of Iran.  Of course, U.S. President George W. Bush deserves much of the credit for this.

As a federal parliamentary republic, Iraq is seen as an emerging middle power.  It has a diverse population, geography, and wildlife.  Most Iraqis are Sunni Muslims, while significant minorities include Christians, Mandaeans, Yazidis, Yarsanis, and Jews.  Ethnically, Iraqis are Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidis, Assyrians, and Armenians.  The official languages are Arabic and Kurdish, but other languages are spoken regionally.

Iraq has one of the largest oil reserves in the world and a major oil and gas industry.  It is also well known for its agriculture and tourism.  Currently, with support from wealthy foreign nations, Iraq is rebuilding what George W. Bush destroyed during his war against Saddam Hussein.

One of the main sources of public frustration in Iraq from 2019 to 2021 was the lack of reliable electricity and clean water.  The electrical grid faced systemic issues due to fuel shortages, damaged infrastructure from war, and increasing demand.  Corruption remains deeply entrenched throughout the Iraqi government, while the U.S.-backed sectarian political system has contributed to more violence and sectarian conflicts.

During this period, Iraq experienced widespread droughts.  Nationwide protests erupted in Iraq in October 2019, demanding systemic reform, an end to the party-based quota system, disarmament of non-state militias, and a halt to foreign interference.  Despite heavy repression, hundreds of deaths, and many injuries, the movement remained united around calls for institutional reform and greater accountability.

In 2020, Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi was ousted by popular demand.  His successor, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, faced the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic during his tenure, which triggered a macroeconomic shock that caused oil prices to plummet, damaging the Iraqi economy, which heavily relies on oil.  The country also endured a prolonged drought from 2020 to 2024.

In October 2022, the Council of Representatives elected Abdul Latif Rashid as president, and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani became his prime minister.  Since taking office in October 2022, Prime Minister al-Sudani has overseen a period of relative political, security, and economic stability.  Government officials have cited increased regional diplomacy, improved international relations, and economic diversification initiatives such as the Iraq–Europe Development Road project as key signs of recovery.

In August 2023, al-Sudani established the Iraq Development Fund to boost the private sector and finance projects with significant social and environmental value.  By February 2025, the fund had attracted $7 billion in foreign direct investments and had signed Memoranda of Understanding with several countries, including the United Kingdom and Japan.  In May 2025, the Iraqi Ministry of Planning announced that the unemployment rate in Iraq had fallen from 17% in 2022 to 13% in 2025.  A report published in July 2025 stated that ISL “is at its weakest” in Iraq since its emergence.

However, the recent escalation of conflict in the Middle East greatly affects Iraq, impacting its internal stability, economy, and geopolitical standing.  The country has been pulled into broader regional conflicts through cross-border attacks, while also managing delicate relations with major global and regional powers, including the U.S. and Iran.

Following the start of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023, Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq increased attacks on U.S. forces stationed in Iraq and Syria, as well as launching strikes toward Israel.  In response, the U.S. carried out retaliatory airstrikes within Iraqi territory in 2024, targeting militia leaders and prompting some Iraqi officials to call for a withdrawal of U.S. troops.  What some Iraqi officials did not do was address the issue of illegal militias operating inside Iraq with impunity.

Illegal militias and the activities of regional proxies have heightened the risk that Iraq could once again become a battleground between the U.S. and Iran, which weakens the government’s ability to maintain sovereignty and economic stability.

While some militias are officially part of the Iraqi state security forces as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), they also operate with a degree of independence and have, at times, pursued their own regional agendas, which challenge the authority of the central government.  Currently, Prime Minister al-Sudani is trying to strike a balance by managing relations with the U.S. while accommodating the demands of influential Iran-backed political factions.

U.S. retaliatory strikes have further complicated the security relationship between these two countries.  Although a joint commission has been established to negotiate a transition of U.S. military presence, the regional crisis increases pressure to both speed up the withdrawal of foreign troops and justify their continued presence.

Additionally, the regional crisis has worsened existing political divisions within Iraq.  For example, the federal government, the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and various political and militia groups hold different positions, reflecting competing interests and alliances.

Like other oil-producing Arab countries, armed conflicts disrupt fragile oil industries.  Any extended closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran would significantly damage Iraq’s economy, which relies almost entirely on oil export revenues.  Worse still, increased regional instability and the risk of broader conflict could jeopardize critical energy and trade routes, threatening far more than just Iraq’s economy.  The escalation of fighting has led major international oil companies to evacuate expatriate staff from Iraq’s southern oilfields, creating operational uncertainty.  Some expatriates, once evacuated for safety, may not be able to return to continue their skilled work.

By Sam Huntington

An overview

Kuwait is a city-state in West Asia and the geopolitical region known as the Middle East.  It is located at the northern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, at the head of the Persian Gulf, bordering Iraq to the north and Saudi Arabia to the south.  Its coastline stretches about 311 miles, and it shares a maritime border with Iran across the Persian Gulf.

Most of the country’s population lives in the urban area of Kuwait City, which is the capital and largest city.  As of 2024, Kuwait has a population of 4.82 million people.  Only 1.53 million of these are Kuwaiti citizens; the remaining 3.29 million are foreign nationals from over 100 countries.

Humans have inhabited this region for tens of thousands of years, mainly because of its location at the head of the Persian Gulf near the mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.  Some scholars believe that Kuwait is where the Garden of Eden once was, but there’s no way to prove or disprove this claim since Eden’s existence, if it ever existed, was prehistoric.

In the early 18th century, the area now known as Kuwait was under the control of the Bani Khalid tribe.  At that time, it was called the Sheikdom of Kuwait, a British protectorate since 1899.  Before oil fields were discovered in 1938, the territory had a regional trade port that became the main source of Kuwaiti wealth.  The protectorate agreements with the United Kingdom ended in June 1961, when Kuwait officially gained independence.

From 1946 to 1982, Kuwait experienced a major period of modernization, supported by its oil income.  In the 1980s, Kuwait faced geopolitical instability and an economic crisis after the American stock market crash.  Because Kuwait supported Iraq during its war with Iran, it became the target of pro-Iranian attacks.

Then, in 1990, largely due to the gross incompetence of U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie, a Canadian national, Kuwait was invaded by Iraq and annexed by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, following disputes over oil production and border boundaries.  Despite the numerous murders and rapes committed by Iraqi forces, Glaspie stated in a 2008 interview with a Lebanese newspaper that she has no regrets because “It is over.” The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait ended on February 26, 1991, after American ground forces expelled Iraqi troops during the First Gulf War.

Present Day

Like many other Arab states in the Persian Gulf, Kuwait is an emirate where the emir is the head of state, and the ruling Al Sabah family controls the country’s political system.  Kuwait’s official state religion is Islam, specifically the Maliki school of Sunni Islam.  Kuwait has a high-income economy supported by the world’s sixth-largest underground oil reserves.  It is a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council and also belongs to the United Nations, the Arab League, and OPEC.

Kuwait is mainly impacted by the Middle East Crisis through a cautious, diplomatic approach to regional conflicts and its vulnerability to the economic effects of instability and changing oil markets.  As a small country with a semi-democratic government, Kuwait’s security is also threatened by regional powers like Iran and internal political struggles.  In this context, Kuwait relies heavily on other powers for its physical security.

Diplomatically, Kuwait has long used a hedging strategy to balance its relationships with rival regional powers, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia.  A hedging strategy in diplomacy is a risk-management approach where a country maintains ties with multiple, often competing, great powers at the same time to avoid relying too heavily on any one foreign power.  This involves combining cooperative and competitive actions to gain economic, political, and security benefits from different sides without forming a strict, one-sided alliance.  For example, despite past tensions, Kuwait seeks balanced relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran to prevent conflict.  Additionally, Kuwait did not fully cut off ties during periods of heightened Saudi-Iran tensions—opting for a flexible diplomatic approach to safeguard its national security.

As it should, Kuwait consistently advocates for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.  It condemns Israeli military actions and provides humanitarian aid to Gaza, while refusing to normalize relations with Israel until a Palestinian state is established.  However, in complete fairness, the lack of recognition of Israel is normal for the Arab states.

In October 2025, Kuwait, representing the GCC at the UN, and, as expected, warned that “Zionist violations” endanger regional security and undermine international law.  This followed a joint Arab and Muslim statement in June 2025 calling for de-escalation between Israel and Iran — even though the entire war was engineered by Iran and its proxy, Hamas in Gaza.  However, the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry regularly calls for the de-escalation of regional conflicts and advocates for diplomatic solutions as its primary means of maintaining political stability.

Currently, Kuwait’s economy relies heavily on oil, making it vulnerable to regional and global market fluctuations.  Regional political instability further increases the risk to its economic prospects.  The truth is that political instability and conflict can lead to swings in oil prices and disrupt global supply chains.

A rentier state is a country that relies heavily on revenue from external sources, like natural resources (especially oil) or foreign aid, rather than taxing its own citizens.  This can lead to a social contract where the government provides economic benefits to citizens in exchange for political quiescence, often resulting in less democratic or more authoritarian governance.  Kuwait is a rentier state; its fiscal stability is highly sensitive to oil market developments/fluctuations.  One should also note that over 60% of Kuwait’s oil exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, which increases geopolitical tensions between Iran and the United States, which also poses a direct threat to the Kuwaiti economy.

Finally, internal conflicts between the royal family and Kuwait’s parliament are causing political gridlock that hampers efforts to diversify the economy.  Kuwait’s lack of institutional stability discourages foreign investment and slows down initiatives to build a nation less reliant on oil as its main source of income.  The World Bank projects that regional instability and other factors will weaken growth prospects across the Middle East in 2025 and 2026, affecting Kuwait’s efforts to develop its non-oil sector.

By Sam Huntington

Historical sources indicate that today’s Syria gets its name from the 8th-century B.C. word Surai and the ancient Greek name Syroi, both of which come from Assyria in Northern Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq and Northeastern Syria).  However, around 323 B.C., the name was also used for the Levant, a region of West Asia along the eastern Mediterranean coast.  Scholars point out that the ancient Greeks did not distinguish between the Assyrians of Mesopotamia and the Arameans of the Levant.  Modern researchers believe that the Greek word is linked to Assyria and is derived from the Akkadian word Assur.  The Greek name most closely matches the Phoenician word Assur, recorded in the 8th century B.C.

Archaeologists tell us that people have lived in this region for the past 13,000 years.  It is also where agriculture and cattle breeding first appeared.  The oldest known structure in the world is located at the site called Tell Qaramel, dating back to 10,650 B.C.  The Syrian cities of Aleppo and Damascus are among the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world.

Note: The word Semitic refers to a group of languages that includes Hebrew, Arabic, Aramaic, and ancient languages like Phoenician and Akkadian, forming the core subgroup of the Afro-Asiatic language family.

Thus, various Semitic peoples appeared in the area of present-day Syria in the 14th century B.C., including the semi-nomadic Suteans, who engaged in an unsuccessful conflict with Babylonia to the east, and the West Semitic-speaking Arameans, who absorbed the earlier Amorites.  They, too, were subjugated by Assyria and the Hittites for centuries.

The Egyptians were constantly at war with the Hittites for control over western Syria — a conflict that peaked in 1274 B.C. at the Battle of Kadesh.  The western region remained part of the Hittite empire until its collapse around 1200 B.C., while eastern Syria became part of the Middle Assyrian Empire.

With the destruction of the Hittites and the decline of Assyria in the late 11th century B.C., the Aramean tribes gained control of much of the interior, founding several essential and long-lasting states.  From this point forward, the region became known as Aramea (also, Aram).

The Canaanite group known as the Phoenicians came to dominate the coasts of Western Syria, Lebanon, and the area now called Roman Palestine.  From these coastal regions, the Phoenicians eventually spread their influence across the Mediterranean, establishing colonies in Malta, Sicily, the Iberian Peninsula, and along North Africa’s coast.  Their most important city, known as Carthage, was founded in the 9th century B.C. and later grew into a powerful empire rivaling the early Roman Republic.

Syria and the western part of the Near East then fell under the control of the vast Neo-Assyrian Empire (911–605 B.C.).  The Assyrians introduced Imperial Aramaic as the common language of their empire.  This language remained dominant in Syria and throughout the entire Near East, serving as a medium for spreading Christianity.  This dominance lasted until after the Islamic conquest in the 7th and 8th centuries A.D.

In 1516, the Ottoman Empire invaded the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, conquering Syria and incorporating it into its empire.  The Ottoman system was not burdensome to Syrians because the Turks respected Arabic as the language of the Quran and accepted the role of defenders of the faith.  Damascus became the major entrepôt for Mecca, gaining a holy status for Muslims because of the many pilgrims passing through on the Hajj.

During World War I, the Ottoman Empire joined the conflict as a Central Power, allied with Imperial Germany, Imperial Austria-Hungary, and the Kingdom of Bulgaria.  It ultimately faced defeat and lost control of the entire Near East to the British and French empires.

During World War I, two Allied diplomats, Mark Sykes (Great Britain) and François Georges-Picot (France), secretly agreed on the post-war division of the Ottoman Empire into zones of influence in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916.  Initially, the two territories were separated by a border that ran nearly in a straight line from Jordan to Iran.  However, the discovery of oil in the Mosul region just before the war’s end led to further negotiations with France in 1918, resulting in the cession of this region to the British zone, which later became the country we now know as Iraq.  The status of the intermediate province of Zor was left uncertain; its occupation by Arab nationalists eventually led to its attachment to Syria.  This artificial border was recognized internationally when Syria became a League of Nations mandate in 1920 and remains unchanged today.

In 1920, an independent Kingdom of Syria was briefly established under Faisal I of the Hashemite family.  However, his rule over Syria lasted only a few months.  French troops took control of Syria later that year after the San Remo conference recommended that the League of Nations assign Syria a French mandate.

Syria successfully negotiated a treaty for its independence in September 1936, and Hashim al-Atassi became the first president elected under the modern Syrian republic.  Disappointingly for the Syrians, this treaty was never implemented because the French Legislature refused to ratify it.  With the fall of France in 1940 at the start of World War II, Syria fell under the control of Vichy France until British and Free French forces occupied the country in July 1941.  Ongoing pressure from Syrian nationalists and the British Foreign Office forced the French to withdraw their troops in April 1946, leaving the country in the hands of a republican government that had been established during the mandate.

The instability that followed the 1961 coup d’état led to the March 1963 Ba’athist coup.  The takeover was planned by members of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, led by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar.  Ba’ath members led the new Syrian cabinet.  From that point until the fall of the Assad government in 2024, the Ba’ath party governed Syria as a totalitarian dictatorship — a label some scholars dispute.  Nevertheless, it is accurate that Ba’athists strongly controlled Syria’s politics, education, culture, and religion, and, similar to Saudi Arabia’s government, monitored all aspects of civil society through its secret police.  The Syrian Armed Forces and secret police were merged after the elimination of traditional civilian and military elites by the Assad regime.

Note: the Ba’ath movement was an Arab nationalist ideology and political party that mixed pan-Arabism and revolutionary socialism.  The meaning of Ba’athist is “renaissance” or “resurrection.”  Founded in Syria in the 1940s, the movement sought to unite the Arab world into a single state, free from foreign (Western) influence.

On February 23, 1966, the neo-Ba’athist Military Committee launched an intra-party rebellion against the Ba’athist Old Guard (Aflaq and Bitar) and imprisoned President Amin al-Hafiz.  A few days later, Nureddin al-Atassi became the official head of state, with Salah Jadid serving as the head of government from 1966 until November 1970, when defense minister Hafez al-Assad overthrew him.

In the first half of 1967, a low-key state of war existed between Syria and Israel.  The conflict focused on Israel’s development of land in the Demilitarized Zone, which led to several aerial clashes.  When the Six-Day War broke out between Egypt and Israel, Syria joined the fight on Egypt’s side and attacked Israel as well.  In the final days of the war, Israel turned its attention to Syria, capturing two-thirds of the Golan Heights in less than 48 hours.

This defeat caused a split between Jadid and Assad over how Syria should move forward.  Jadid controlled the Ba’athist Party apparatus, but Assad held control of the military.  The 1970 retreat of Syrian forces sent to support the Palestine Liberation Organization, led by Yasser Arafat during the “Black September War of 1970,” reflected this disagreement.

Hafez al-Assad died on June 10, 2000.  His son, Bashar, was elected president in an election where he ran unopposed.  His election marked the beginning of the Damascus Spring and sparked popular hopes for political reforms in Syria, but within a short period, Ba’athist officials suppressed the movement, imprisoning some of its leading intellectuals.  Instead, reforms have been limited to minor market changes.

On October 5, 2003, Israel targeted and destroyed a terrorist training center for Islamic Jihad members near Damascus.  In March 2004, Syrian Kurds and Arabs clashed in the al-Qamishli province, and signs of rioting were observed inside Qamishli and Hasakeh.  In 2005, Syria withdrew its military presence from Lebanon.  That same year, the assassination of Rafic Hariri prompted international condemnation and sparked a popular uprising called the Cedar Revolution.  These events compelled Syria to end its 29-year military occupation of Lebanon.  In September 2007, a foreign aircraft suspected of being part of the Israeli Air Force conducted a bombing raid on a suspected nuclear reactor under construction by North Korean technicians.

In 2011, the nepotism of Ba’athist ruling elites and the authoritarianism prompted the Syrian Revolution as part of the wider Arab Spring uprisings.  Public demonstrations across Syria began in late January and grew into a nationwide uprising.  Protesters called for Assad’s resignation, the ousting of his government, and an end to nearly five decades of Ba’ath Party abuses.

President al-Assad’s response to these demands was to deploy the Syrian army to suppress the uprising, and several cities were besieged.  Still, civil unrest persisted, and some witnesses reported that soldiers who refused to shoot unarmed civilians were themselves summarily executed.  The Syrian government denied reports of army defections, blaming armed gangs for causing trouble.  This was, in fact, true; agitators armed and supervised by the Saudi government contributed to the Syrian crisis.

While this was happening, both China and Russia avoided condemning the Assad government or imposing sanctions, arguing that such actions could lead to a period of foreign intervention.  The Arab League, mostly controlled by Saudi Arabia and its allies, suspended Syria’s membership over the government’s response to the crisis.  At this point, one might conclude that there are no honest brokers in the Middle East.

According to the United Nations (which, contrary to its reputation, has never been a genuine broker in the Middle East), by the end of 2024, the Syrian civil war had caused over 600,000 deaths, with 90% of the blame placed on Dr. Bashar al-Assad.  What is true is that the Syrian crisis has created a massive refugee problem.  Some experts now say that 7.6 million people have been displaced by the conflict and that it has effectively destroyed the Syrian economy.  One might argue that if anything, the Saudi government is as skilled at destroying things as the Israelis are at building them.

Despite the fall of the Assad regime, the conflict persists, with various armed groups battling for control of Syria and the Islamic State of the Levant (ISL) maintaining a continuous presence in the region.  The Syrian conflict has evolved into a proxy war, with multiple nations involved, contributing to the broader Middle Eastern crisis.

By Sam Huntington

The Republic of Yemen, a unitary provisional republic, is a country in West Asia located in southern Arabia.  The country borders Saudi Arabia to the north, Oman to the northeast, the southeastern part of the Arabian Sea to the east, the Gulf of Aden to the south, and the Red Sea to the west.  Yemen shares maritime borders with Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia.  It is the second-largest country on the Arabian Peninsula.  The capital and largest city is Sanaa.  Its population is approximately 34.7 million people, with 99.9% being followers of Islam.

Because of its geographic location, Yemen has served as a crossroads for many civilizations over the past 7,000 years.  After converting to Islam, Yemen became a center of learning and a recruiting ground for Islamic armies.

During the 19th century, Yemen was divided between the Ottoman and British empires.  The Kingdom of Yemen was established after World War I.  Then, in 1962, following a coup d’état, it became the Yemen Arab Republic (also known as North Yemen).  Five years later, the British Aden Protectorate gained independence and became the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)—the first officially socialist state in the Arab world.  The two countries united in 1990 to form the modern Republic of Yemen, with Ali Abdullah Saleh as president until his resignation in 2012 in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring.

Since 2011, Yemen has faced an ongoing political crisis characterized by civil unrest, high unemployment rates, corruption, and President Saleh’s attempt to remove presidential term limits.  By 2015, the country was caught in a continuous civil war with various groups vying for control, including Houthi rebels.  Officially called Ansar Allah, the Houthis are a revivalist movement that originated in Yemen in the 1990s.  They have been a key player in the Yemeni civil war.  The Houthis have faced widespread international condemnation for human rights abuses, such as deliberately targeting civilians and using children as fighters.  Iran is the main supporter of the Houthis, employing them as a proxy force against Saudi Arabia.

Yemen is one of the least developed and poorest countries in the world.  If there were such a thing as a Fifth World Country, Yemen would qualify.  According to the United Nations in 2019, Yemen has the highest number of people in need of humanitarian aid — about 24 million, or 75% of the population.

The Middle East Crisis has devastated Yemen and is the main cause of its humanitarian disaster.  There is no healthcare system, people are starving, and years of conflict have destroyed much of the country’s economic infrastructure.  Recent Houthi attacks in the Red Sea on maritime interests have worsened its economic decline and delayed any efforts by outside parties to address the humanitarian crisis.

Since 2019, the Yemeni economy has shrunk by more than half, with a 58% decrease in real GDP.  Currently, Yemen has two competing economic zones — neither of which appears to be successful.  Ninety percent of the country lacks electricity.  The people are starving.  There is no healthcare system, and cholera, pneumonia, and diphtheria have reached epidemic levels.  There is no quality of life in Yemen.

By Sam Huntington

We know that humans have inhabited the region of present-day Saudi Arabia for about 125,000 years.  To clarify: if they were not homo sapiens, they were very close to it.  Some scholars now contend that the Saudi Peninsula is crucial to understanding human evolution and migration.  In late 2017, archaeologists uncovered engravings dating back 8,000 years.  Four years later, researchers announced the discovery of a human settlement site believed to be as old as 350,000 years.  The credibility of these claims depends on how willing archaeologists are to accept the dating estimates.

The earliest inhabitants of the peninsula before Islam were part of the Ubaid culture from early Mesopotamia.  At that time, what is now desert was probably a lush, green area.  Climate changes, which have been happening since Earth’s formation, led to the end of the Ubaid period.  There is very little archaeological evidence of significant human activity in present-day Saudi Arabia during the following thousands of years.  The settlements that did exist were all in the eastern part of the peninsula.  Around 2200 B.C., the people living in these settlements migrated to the island of Bahrain, although scientists cannot explain why this migration took place.

During the period from the seventh to the third centuries B.C., the people living in this region were mainly nomadic traders who either traveled in caravans or engaged in highway robbery, looting, and murder.  Throughout this time, the people of Arabia remained tribal.  The Nabataean people controlled most of what is now the northern peninsula until around 9 B.C., when the Romans took over the region and renamed it Arabia Petraea.  The Romans continued to rule the peninsula until 630 A.D.  What follows is the Islamist period, which began around 632 A.D.

Mohammad of Makkah is believed to have been born in 570 A.D.  By 632 A.D., he had successfully united the Arabian tribes and established a single religious state.  When he died in 632, his followers expanded their territory under Islamic rule.  This impressive effort led to the conquest of regions from Arabia westward across North Africa, into the Iberian Peninsula, northward into Central Asia, and eastward into South Asia.  Conquest was achieved within a hundred years, making Saudi Arabia a key region within the Islamic world.  The Caliphates of that time included the Rashidun, Umayyad, Abbasid, and Fatimid.  Between the 10th and 20th centuries, Saudi Arabia was governed locally by an Arab leader known as the Sharif of Makkah (Mecca).  He was, in turn, subordinate to rulers based in Baghdad, Cairo, or Istanbul.  During this period, most of Saudi Arabia consisted of loosely connected tribal groups, often in conflict with one another.

The formation of the Israeli state in 1948 resulted from a complex series of events spanning several decades, including the growth of Zionism, European diplomacy during World War I, the British Mandate period, World War II, the Holocaust, and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.  I will share more about this in future posts.

The Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) is now Saudi Arabia’s state-owned petroleum and natural gas company.  As of 2024, it ranks as the fourth-largest company in the world by revenue.  Saudi Arabia has the second-largest proven crude oil reserve in the world (270 billion barrels) and the highest daily oil production among all oil-producing nations.

ARAMCO’s origins trace back to the oil shortages during World War I and the exclusion of American companies from Mesopotamia by the United Kingdom and France under the San Remo Petroleum Agreement of 1920.  During that decade, the American government gained public support for its Open Door policy, which Herbert Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce, initiated in 1921.  Standard Oil of California was among those U.S. companies seeking new sources of oil overseas.

Saudi Arabia responded to the establishment of Israel in 1948 by rejecting the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, sending troops to fight against Israel in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and joining the Arab League’s official boycott of the new state of Israel.  The Saudi kingdom voted against the partition plan, supported military intervention by Arab forces, and initially opposed any diplomatic recognition of Israel.

The Saudis, in partnership with the Arab League, continued to boycott Israel after 1948, a policy that established a long-standing stance of non-recognition and opposition to the Israeli state.  Furthermore, the Saudi government kept supporting the Palestinians in British Palestine and called for Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied in 1967.  Note: I refer to the Arabs living in British Palestine as Philistines because that’s who they are, historically and culturally.  No Arab society today holds the people of British Palestine in high regard, but since 1948, the Palestinians have become a useful tool for creating problems for the State of Israel.

Saudi Arabia’s actions in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine have often been controversial, especially between 1970 and 2017.  They were usually driven by complex and evolving geopolitical rivalries with Iran, internal security concerns, and religious ideology.  Accusations of “Saudi mischief” relate to its use of financial aid, arms, and diplomatic pressure to pursue its interests.  Recently, Riyadh has shifted toward more pragmatic diplomacy in some areas.

In the early years of the Syrian Civil War, Saudi Arabia was a major supporter and supplier of weapons to various rebel groups fighting to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad, a key ally of Iran’s rival.

While Riyadh supported moderate Free Syrian Army factions, it also backed powerful Islamist rebel groups such as the Army of Conquest.  Critics have pointed out that this broad support helped fragment the opposition and strengthened extremist groups like al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

Saudi Arabia collaborated with the American CIA on a secret program called Timber Sycamore to supply arms and train Syrian rebels, despite concerns from some U.S. officials about the rebels’ links to al-Qaeda.  Note: U.S.-supplied weapons to rebels in Libya eventually ended up with al-Qaeda fighters, who used those weapons against American contractors during the Benghazi attack.

After years of military stalemate and the growing influence of Iran and Russia, Saudi Arabia shifted its stance toward the Assad regime.  Since late 2024, following Assad’s removal, Saudi Arabia has been moving toward normalization with Damascus, promising significant financial aid for reconstruction to counter Iranian and Turkish influence and to address security issues such as drug trafficking. 

After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Saudi Arabia declined to engage with Iraq’s new Shia-led government, viewing it as suspicious and an extension of Iranian influence.  This diplomatic isolation intensified sectarian tensions and drew Iraq’s government closer to Iran.

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki accused Saudi Arabia and the State of Qatar of supporting terrorism and civil war in Iraq and Syria.  Saudi Arabia denied these claims, but reports indicate that Saudi citizens have traveled to join Islamist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS in Iraq.

Saudi Arabia has long exercised influence over certain Iraqi Sunni groups, tribes, and even rival Shia politicians through financial and security agreements.  In recent years, recognizing that its previous policies backfired by drawing Iraq closer to Iran, Riyadh re-engaged with Baghdad.  As a result, the two countries restored diplomatic relations in 2015, and Saudi Arabia has since offered investments and promoted regional security cooperation.

In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia, in partnership with Pakistan and the U.S., supplied significant funding to the Mujahideen to oppose Soviet occupation.  This included support for factions that would later become the Taliban.  In 1996, Saudi Arabia was one of only three countries that recognized the first Taliban government.  Saudi intelligence provided the Taliban with financial aid in an unsuccessful effort to persuade them to hand over the Saudi-born al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

After the 9/11 attacks, during which most of the hijackers were Saudi citizens, Riyadh engaged in a treacherous game against the United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan.  While outwardly cooperating with the U.S. war on terror and opposing the Taliban, the Saudis secretly provided arms to certain Pakistani “freedom fighters” and Taliban forces to oppose U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan.  It was nothing less than betrayal.  Following the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, Saudi Arabia has used a “leading from behind” approach, working through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to deliver humanitarian aid instead of granting direct diplomatic recognition.  Riyadh aims to reassert its influence and counter Iran and Qatar without risking damage to its reputation. 

Historically, Saudi Arabia supported fundraising for Hamas within its borders as a way to pacify Saudi Shi’a.  The Saudis did not directly fund the group, but relations with Hamas worsened after Hamas aligned with Iran in the early 2000s.  In recent years, Saudi Arabia has cracked down on Hamas fundraising and arrested individuals suspected of supporting the group financially.  This move aligned with Riyadh’s support for the Trump administration’s Middle East policies, including pressure on the Palestinian Authority.

Following Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, official Saudi rhetoric sharply turned against Hamas terrorists.  For example, Saudi-funded media labeled Hamas militants killed in Gaza as “terrorists,” and the government shifted its support for the Palestinian Authority by sending humanitarian aid to its civilian population.

Saudi Arabia has reiterated its position that Palestinian statehood is crucial for broader regional peace — reaffirming support for a two-state solution.  While the Saudi-Israeli normalization talks have stalled after the Gaza war, Riyadh’s focus remains on pressuring Israel to agree to a ceasefire and achieve a lasting resolution.

Today, Saudi Arabia’s current Middle East strategy focuses on its plan to diversify the country’s economy and ensure its long-term stability.  This plan is called Vision 2030.  Even the Saudis recognize the possibility that the future might render the use of gas and oil for fueling motor vehicles obsolete.  From this perspective, the main goal is to transform Saudi Arabia into a major independent global power, which requires a stable regional environment for investment and development.

The success of Vision 2030, which aims to reduce the country’s dependence on oil, is essential to its foreign policy.  Additionally, economic stability is vital for large-scale projects like Neom — an architectural and ecological development launched in 2017 on the northern edge of the Red Sea, directly east of Egypt and south of Jordan.  The planned size of this new city is 10,200 square miles, covering multiple regions, including a floating industrial complex, a global trade hub, tourist resorts, and a linear city powered by renewable energy sources.

The stability required for large-scale projects like Neom and the need to attract foreign investments are vital to the interests of the Saudi kingdom.  They are leveraging the country’s vast wealth to reshape the Saudi economy and develop new sectors, including tourism, technology, and renewable energy.

The Saudis are also focusing on their own national interests rather than strictly aligning with any single superpower, such as the United States, China, or the Russian Federation.  While the United States remains a key security partner, the Saudis are expanding their ties with other global powers like China to maintain a strategic balance.  This approach of hedging their bets ensures that the Saudi government isn’t overly dependent on one ally and allows them to benefit from other competing interests.

Saudi de-escalation with regional rivals beginning around 2023 represents a major shift from previous policies, when the Saudis supported Wahhabist terrorism, implicitly approved the 2001 attack on the United States, funded the Taliban, and backed Pakistani “freedom fighters” against Saudi allies like the United Kingdom and the United States.

However, the fact remains that while the Saudi royal family and most of the population follow Sunni Islam, about five million residents of Saudi Arabia adhere to Shi’a Islam.  Therefore, the number of Shi’ite followers, although clearly a minority within the overall Saudi population, still represents “an enemy within” to the royal family.  The number of Shi’ites in Saudi Arabia is enough to worry Saudi royals about the potential for factional radicalism to develop within Sunni communities.  It therefore makes sense for the Saudis to support anti-Western radicals, anti-Syrian rebels, and anti-Israeli policies.

The shift also explains why Saudi Arabia agreed to the China-brokered normalization of relations with Iran, which has involved military and diplomatic cooperation despite ongoing suspicions.  The Saudis hope that their de-escalation strategy will prevent regional conflicts that could threaten their economic growth and long-term security.

The Saudis leverage their unique strengths — such as being the custodian of Islam’s holiest site, their vast financial resources, and energy dominance — to pursue a more proactive and self-fulfilling foreign policy.  This includes using financial aid to build alliances, provide humanitarian assistance, and mediate conflicts.

Although Saudi and Iranian diplomats have eased tensions, deep mistrust still exists.  Ongoing proxy wars and the threat of a larger regional conflict—particularly related to Iran’s nuclear ambitions—continue to endanger Saudi security and its Vision 2030 plans.

However, despite efforts to diversify, the Saudi economy remains vulnerable to oil price fluctuations.  Fiscal and external deficits are anticipated as the kingdom heavily invests in its Vision 2030 projects, which carry long-term financial risks.

Furthermore, the kingdom’s strategy is vulnerable to regional and global instability.  Geopolitical events, such as the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, could redirect Saudi Arabia’s focus and resources, potentially weakening their diplomatic and economic objectives.  Domestically, while Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has started societal liberalization, political dissent remains suppressed.  The catch-22 is that the government must balance its modernization efforts with public opinion, especially on sensitive issues like the Palestinian crisis, to maintain internal stability.

By Sam Huntington

Background —

The word Aryan (or Arya) originates from the ethno-cultural self-identification of the Indo-Iranians. It contrasted with nearby outsiders, whom they called non-Aryan. In ancient India, the term was used by the Indo-Aryan peoples during the Vedic period, both as an endonym and to describe a region called Aryavarta (Land of the Aryans), where their culture grew. Similarly, according to the Avesta, the Iranian peoples used the term to identify themselves as an ethnic group and to refer to a region called Airyanem Vaejah (Expanse of the Arya), their mythical homeland. The word root also forms the etymological basis for place names such as Alania (Aryāna) and Iran (Aryānām).

Note: Nineteenth and twentieth-century Germans, especially the Nazis, saw themselves as Aryan because the term became a central part of the period’s pseudoscientific and racist ideologies that claimed an ancient, superior master race. These theories falsely claimed that people of Germanic and Nordic descent were the purest and most advanced Aryans and, therefore, destined to dominate all inferior races. The concept was a misrepresentation of the historical and linguistic term Aryan, used to justify Nazi policies of discrimination and violence.

In ancient times, the Western world often called Iran Persia. Likewise, the modern term Persian was frequently used as a demonym for all Iranian people, regardless of whether they were ethnic Persians. However, this inaccurate terminology persisted until 1935, when the Iranian king Reza Shah Pahlavi officially asked foreign delegates to start using the endonym Iran in formal communication. Afterward, Iran and Iranian became the standard terms for the country and its people. Later, in 1959, Pahlavi’s son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, stated that it was appropriate to use both Persia and Iran in formal correspondence. Scholars note that the change from Persia to Iran in 1935 was an effort to reclaim a national identity that is deeply connected to the country’s long history.

Iran is home to one of the world’s oldest continuous major civilizations, with historical and urban settlements dating back to 4000 B.C. The western part of the Iranian plateau participated in the traditional ancient Near East with Elam (3200–539 B.C.), and later with other cultures, such as the Kassites, Mannaeans, and Gutians. The earliest Iranian people arrived from Central Asia in the 2nd millennium B.C.

The Islamization of Iran was a long process. As Persian Muslims gained more control, the Muslim population increased from about 40% in the mid-9th century to nearly 90% by the end of the 11th century. Scholars say that this quick growth was partly due to Persia’s rulers being Persian. Even though these Aryans adopted the religion of their conquerors, they spent many years working to preserve and revive their unique language and culture. Note: Currently, about twelve languages are spoken in Iran. The main language, spoken by 50%, is Persian, although Iranians call it Farsi.

The modern times —

Currently, while there is no hostility between Iranian and Arab Muslims, a deep-rooted and complex rivalry exists between Iran and several influential Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. This rivalry is driven more by sectarian, ethnic, and geopolitical issues than by widespread discord. 

The ancient division between Sunni and Shia Islam is often used to fuel political rivalry. Some scholars argue that sectarian differences are not the main cause of modern conflicts between Iran and Saudi Arabia; others believe that each side aims to impose their specific Islamic beliefs as the global standard, thereby trying to establish a new worldwide Caliphate.

Leadership in both Iran (Shia) and Saudi Arabia (Sunni) has often fueled sectarian tensions to advance its geopolitical goals and secure domestic support. Saudi Arabia, home to Islam’s holiest sites in Mecca and Medina, has long positioned itself as the leader of the Muslim world, but the 1979 Iranian Revolution presented a rival model of Islamic governance that challenged Saudi Arabia’s authority. Historically, the sects coexisted (more or less) peacefully, but since 1979, political conflicts have increased divisions.

Furthermore, centuries-old ethnic and cultural differences between Arabs and Persians also influence their relationship, and modern nationalism seems to have intensified these differences. Accounts in Persian literature often depict Arabs negatively, while Arabs have historically used the derogatory term “Ajam” for Persians. The rise of nationalism in the 20th century further strengthened divisions and created a distinct Arab-Iranian divide, replacing centuries of cross-cultural interactions. The Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, during which Saddam Hussein framed the conflict along ethnic lines, escalated these tensions.

The current tension between Iran and certain Arab states, especially Gulf monarchies, mainly centers on a power struggle for regional influence. The 1979 Revolution and the creation of a Shia theocracy substantially changed regional dynamics. Although the Iran-Iraq war mostly ended in a stalemate, George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 elevated Iran to a major regional power. Iran’s new leadership role was viewed as a direct threat by conservative Sunni monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Iranian foreign policy challenges the traditional order led by Arab states and seeks to reduce Western influence. Meanwhile, Gulf Arab monarchies like Saudi Arabia rely on Western security guarantees. They view Iranian actions as destabilizing. This regional rivalry has caused multiple proxy conflicts across the Middle East. Iran and Saudi Arabia have backed opposing sides in devastating conflicts, including civil wars in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Israel.

Iran’s Middle East strategy is fundamentally based on deterrence and forward defense, designed to protect Iran by projecting power beyond its borders. In Tehran’s view, this approach (often called offensive defense) is necessary because of perceived threats from regional rivals, mainly Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the ongoing pressure from the United States and its sanctions.

Lacking a traditional military or one comparable to its rivals, Iran has developed asymmetric capabilities to extend its strategic reach, allowing it to absorb and respond to enemy strikes. The strategy relies on a network of allied stateless actors known as the Axis of Resistance. This approach enables Tehran to avoid direct state-on-state conflicts while still sustaining regional influence.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has faced isolation and strict economic sanctions from its opponents. In response, it has built a resistance economy aimed at reducing dependence on external actors and forming economic connections outside the Western sphere. This includes increasing economic and military cooperation with countries like China and Russia, both of which are eager to use Iran for their own benefit. Recent analysis shows that Iran’s economy has remained resilient despite sanctions, demonstrating its ability to adapt and develop a stable economy from within.

While pragmatic interests influence many internal decisions, Iran’s foreign policy is also rooted in revolutionary ideology that supports oppressed Islamic groups. This has fostered an anti-status quo, anti-American, and anti-Israel stance that drives the funding and arming of militant organizations in the region.

A key part of Iran’s strategy is fostering and supporting allied groups to promote its interests and create a buffer zone against perceived threats. For example, Iran has used cultural ties to increase influence within the Iraqi government and security forces. It has supported powerful militias like Kata’ib Hezbollah and leveraged its economic relationships to help lessen the impact of sanctions.

Furthermore, Iran’s long-standing relationships with the Syrian regime and Hezbollah provide a crucial strategic route to the Mediterranean and serve as a base for actions against Israel. Support for the Houthis in Yemen allows Iran to extend influence across the Arabian Peninsula, target its regional rival Saudi Arabia, and disrupt international shipping in the Red Sea.

In the Palestinian territories, Tehran provides military aid and funding to Palestinian groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to pressure Israel and demonstrate its commitment to the Palestinian cause. Iran uses its network of proxies and missile programs to challenge the United States and its allies, deter attacks from Israel, and undermine rival security alliances. Iran’s goal is to weaken America’s dominant position in the Middle East.

Regarding the nuclear issue, Tehran views such a program as essential for its strategic deterrence and as a means to pressure Western powers into lifting their sanctions. Despite external pressure and targeted strikes in 2025 that damaged some nuclear facilities, Iran has continued its efforts to develop nuclear capabilities.

The Iranians have engaged in diplomacy for 2,500 years. While pursuing its Axis of Resistance, Tehran also employs pragmatic diplomacy to normalize relations with neighboring countries and build alliances with global powers outside of the Western bloc, such as China and Russia.

Recent events, such as the 2025 war with Israel and the loss of key allies, have weakened Iran’s regional standing. However, Tehran is working to regroup and bolster its strategic abilities. While state media promotes stories of resistance and success, not all Iranians support the government’s regional approach.

Before the 2025 conflict, many citizens voiced frustration over the costs of supporting regional allies. A popular slogan now is Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran. After the 2025 conflict, some nationalist feelings were reignited, and many grew more distrustful of the U.S. and Israel. Still, divisions within the country remain.

Although the Supreme Leader of Iran holds ultimate authority, Iranian foreign policy is a complex process involving multiple government bodies, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. State policies require a consensus-building process that the new administration under President Pezeshkian must navigate, especially in matters of diplomatic overtures to the West.

By Sam Huntington

—An overview—

Modern Israel is named after the ancient Kingdom of Israel.  According to Biblical tradition, after wrestling with an Angel of the Lord, the Jewish patriarch Jacob received the name Israel.   The word Israel means “He who struggles with God.”

Since 1948, Israel has established itself as a regional economic and military power, leveraging its thriving high-tech sector, large defense industry, and legitimate concerns about the Islamic Republic of Iran to build worldwide partnerships.

In 1947, the U.N. General Assembly proposed dividing the British Mandate for Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states.  The Jews accepted this plan, but the Arabs did not.  As a result, the State of Israel was established in 1948, with the United States becoming the first country to recognize it. The Arabs responded to this by declaring war on Israel.

During the Israel–Arab War (1947–1949), the Israelis emerged as winners.  Subsequently, Israel joined the United Nations in 1949.  Initially, its rapid population growth was due to Jewish refugee migrations from Europe and other parts of the Middle East.

Israel and its Arab neighbors fought wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973, and Israel signed peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994.  During the 1967 war, Israel seized the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights.  Between 1979 and 1982, Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt but has continued to control the other territories through its military presence.

Israeli and Palestinian officials signed interim agreements in the 1990s that established a period of Palestinian self-rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza.  Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005.  The most recent official efforts between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to negotiate final status issues took place in 2013 and 2014.  The United States continues its efforts to broker peace between the Israelis and the surrounding Arab nations and interests. 

In 2020, Israel signed the US-brokered normalization agreements (the Abraham Accords) with Bahrain, the UAE, and Morocco, and reached an agreement with Sudan in 2021.  Meanwhile, immigration to Israel continues from numerous locations around the world, including the United States.  In 2023, Israel received more than 44,000 new immigrants, most of whom were Jewish.

On October 7, 2023, HAMAS militants launched a combined attack using unguided rockets and ground assaults from Gaza into southern Israel.  That same day, Israel’s Air Force carried out airstrikes inside Gaza and initiated a sustained air campaign targeting HAMAS positions throughout the Gaza Strip.  The following day, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu officially declared war on HAMAS.  On October 28, the Israel Defense Forces began a large-scale ground invasion of Gaza.

—Israel and the Middle East—

It may be true that no other industrialized country in the world is as disorganized as Israel, unless, of course, it’s the United States.  Both nations are democracies, and both seem to be politically divided to some degree.  In each country, moderate views are in the minority.  The point is that there isn’t just one Israeli perspective, just as there are at least 335 million Americans with their own opinions on nearly every topic.  Both Israel and the United States experience the pendulum effect caused by their government systems.

I believe the key to understanding Jewish psychology is to recognize, and if possible, internalize, how deeply (non-American) Jews are connected to their Temple of God.  From the destruction of the Second Temple, which Jesus of Nazareth prophesied, came the most tragically significant diaspora in human history.  It is a complex story – and not one that many people are keen to read.  It was Europe’s abusive discrimination against the Jewish people that led to the Holocaust and, ultimately, drove European Jews back to their Biblical homeland.

Let me also note that it is not hard to understand how Arabs living in British Palestine might have felt when tens of thousands of Jews started arriving from Europe to reclaim their homeland.  I would compare it to how American southerners might feel every time they see a car with New York plates pulling a U-Haul trailer heading south.  But life is interesting.  Some Arabs welcomed the Jews home in 1946, but declaring the establishment of the state of Israel probably changed many minds.  Essentially, Israel and its people have been living in a state of war for nearly 80 years.

Unfortunately, there is another reality – one I’ve learned from my time in the military: trusting any Arab who is also an Islamist is a mistake.  No thoughtful person would turn their back on an Islamist, a painful lesson many of our soldiers and Marines have learned while serving in the Middle East.  Some of these good men (and women) paid for this mistake with their lives.  Many Americans and Israelis have concluded that there is nothing honorable about a devoted Muslim.

Now, enter Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who seems to have learned the same lesson.  He tried to warn the United States against giving the Palestinian Authority billions of dollars as an incentive to abandon terrorism and embrace democracy.  However, the experts in the U.S. State Department didn’t listen, and as a result, Arab extremists used American taxpayer money to acquire weapons to kill innocent Israelis.  I often wonder if George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice have trouble sleeping at night.

The main point of the previous paragraph is to strongly suggest that, in many ways, the United States has caused more harm than good in the Middle East. I believe this is just one of many reasons (possibly hundreds) why the average American has lost trust in their federal government.  Despite claims by Anthony Blinken to the contrary (who is more Democrat than American), the Biden administration acted intolerably toward the Israelis after they were attacked, murdered, and raped by Hamas terrorists in Gaza.  When the Israeli government decided to hold Iran responsible for their role in the Hamas attack, the U.S. government and other socialist groups worldwide unfairly criticized Netanyahu for defending his country and people.

Note: I am not here to offer blind praise to Israel. I have observed that, in too many cases, the Israeli government has acted impulsively regarding the Arab-Islamist issue. In other words, the Israelis are not blameless.  It takes two to tango, and there is plenty of blame to go around — and what we are talking about here is at least two interesting perspectives.

That said, from the Israeli perspective in late 2025, their strategy in the Middle East centers on maximizing internal security through overwhelming offensive power and projecting military dominance across the region.  This approach has been reinforced by events since the October 7, 2023, attacks, which have shifted the focus away from diplomatic solutions toward a more coercive, military-first stance.  However, I must say this is entirely understandable given that the Israelis cannot trust anything the Palestinian Authority Arabs tell them.

The key elements of Israeli strategies include directly engaging with Philistines living in and near Israel, explicitly rejecting the idea of an independent Palestinian state, and moving toward permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza.

In Gaza, following the October 2025 ceasefire agreement, Israel is working toward the complete demilitarization of the enclave and disarming the population.  I fully support the right to self-defense, but access to lethal weapons implies a high level of responsible behavior.  Based on my observations over several decades, the Philistines have not consistently shown responsible or trustworthy conduct.  Under Netanyahu, the Israeli government opposes Hamas’s involvement in future governance and is ready to use force if the group refuses to disarm.

In the West Bank, Israel is expanding settlements and shifting control of that region from military to civilian agencies — an intentional effort aimed at further annexation.  This move has decreased the space available for future Palestinian independence.  It is reasonable to establish rules and regulations for people planning to live within the state of Israel.  If they fail to comply, they could (and should) move to Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, or Saudi Arabia.  As a side note, none of these countries are interested in creating more neighborhoods for Palestinians.  Arab rulers not of Palestinian origin consider the Philistines to be among the least productive people on the planet.

Israel views Iran as its primary strategic threat due to its nuclear program and regional proxies.  By 2025, this perception resulted in large-scale military actions against Iran and its allies.  During these operations, Israel demonstrated it is fully capable of military retaliation and should not be underestimated by anyone with above-average intelligence.  In June 2025, Israel conducted a major strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, military sites, and infrastructure to prevent Iran from reaching nuclear breakout capacity. 

Israel has also taken aggressive steps against Iranian proxies to weaken Tehran’s regional influence. This includes targeting Hezbollah leadership and sites in Lebanon, acting against Iranian-backed forces in Syria, and prioritizing military dominance over normalization with regional states.  Some Israeli strikes against Iranian targets have strained relations with Gulf Arab states.

To advance its offensive capabilities, Israel invests heavily in military equipment and upgrades.  For example, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is adopting and integrating AI and network-centric warfare technologies.  The IDF leverages its technological advantages and effective intelligence services to deliver a continuous flow of aerial targeting and ground combat intelligence updates.  Israel’s strategic approach has clearly shaped its relationships with regional and international partners.

One key aspect of the Middle East situation is that Israel maintains ties with Arab partners but does not fully trust them.  For some Israelis, the goal of the Abraham Accords to improve relations with Arab states, especially after the 2023 attacks, has become less important than the IDF’s focus on military strength.  In Israel, the phrase “Peace through Strength” genuinely means something.

Are there long-term risks to a strong IDF?  The answer would be yes if Israeli leadership started to focus more on it rather than remaining open to diplomatic and political solutions as well.

Israel has learned another key lesson since 2023: it can no longer rely on a Democratic American administration during critical domestic issues.  Not once during the Hamas attack and Benjamin Netanyahu’s response did Joe Biden consider how the United States might react to a similar assault.  Moving forward, the Israeli government might depend less on the United States than it has in past years.  I wouldn’t be surprised if Israel has already started building its own tanks and missiles, making itself even less dependent on the U.S.