The origin of China’s dominance of rare earths can be traced to an iron ore mine near Baotou in the country’s north, 50 miles from the Mongolian border.

中國稀土主導地位的起源可以追溯到該國北部包頭附近的一個鐵礦，距離蒙古邊境約80公里。

It was April 1964 and Chinese geologists had discovered that the mine also held the world’s largest deposit of rare earths, a set of 17 metals that have become essential ingredients for today’s global economy. Deng Xiaoping, then a high-ranking Chinese Communist Party official, visited the remote desert mine, owned by a military steel maker, to inspect the massive cache.

那是1964年四月，中國地質學家發現，這座礦藏中還擁有世界上最大的稀土礦床，這種由17種金屬組成的礦物如今已成為全球經濟的重要組成部分。當時身為中國共產黨高級官員的鄧小平前往由軍工鋼鐵企業擁有的偏遠沙漠礦山，視察這座巨大的礦藏。

“We need to develop steel, and we also need to develop rare earths,” declared Mr. Deng, who over a decade later would emerge as China’s top leader.

「我們要發展鋼鐵，也要發展稀土，」鄧小平表示。十多年後，他將成為中國的最高領導人。

Rare-earth metals and the magnets made from them are widely used in a long list of civilian and military applications, from cars to fighter jets. China’s position as the leading supplier has given it enormous leverage over manufacturing and leadership in clean energy technologies like electric cars and wind turbines. Companies all over the world depend on Chinese exports of those magnets.

稀土金屬及其製成的磁體廣泛用於從汽車到戰鬥機的眾多軍民領域。中國作為主要供應國的地位令其擁有巨大的製造業優勢，並在電動汽車、風力渦輪機等清潔能源技術領域佔據主導地位。全球公司都依賴中國出口的這些磁體。

China’s centrality in rare earths didn’t happen by accident. It is the result of decades of planning and domestic and overseas investment, often directed from the highest levels of the party and the Chinese government.

中國在稀土領域的核心地位並非偶然。這是數十年來規劃以及國內外投資的結果，而中共和中國政府最高層時不時會發出直接的指令。

In the early 1970s, the People’s Liberation Army launched a little-known research program to develop potential military uses of rare earths.

20世紀70年代初，中國人民解放軍啟動了一個鮮為人知的研究項目，開發稀土的潛在軍事用途。

Mr. Deng kept pushing China’s rare-earth advancement forward in the 1980s and 1990s together with Wen Jiabao, a geologist by training who went on to serve as China’s premier from 2003 to 2013. Under Mr. Wen, China consolidated what was a highly splintered web of mostly private companies into a tightly run arm of the Chinese government. Mr. Wen closed mines run by smugglers and cleaned up the industry’s most severe pollution. The sector grew in size and expertise.

鄧小平在20世紀80、90年代與溫家寶一同繼續推動中國稀土的發展，後者是地質學家出身，於2003年至2013年擔任中國的總理。在溫家寶領導下，中國將原本高度分散、主要由私營企業組成的網路整合成一個由中國政府嚴格管控的部門。溫家寶關閉了走私者經營的礦山，並清理了行業中最嚴重的環境污染。該行業在規模和專業知識上均得到提升。

In 2019, seven years into his reign as China’s top leader, Xi Jinping described rare earths as “an important strategic resource.” And he has shown this year that he is willing to use rare earths as a chokehold on global supply chains and a powerful tool in China’s trade war with President Trump.

2019年，在擔任中國最高領導人七年之後，習近平稱稀土為「一種重要的戰略資源」。去年的事態發展表明，他會將稀土作為扼制全球供應鏈的工具，以及在中國與川普總統貿易戰中的強大武器。

In April and again in October, China enacted new export controls that allowed it to withhold supplies of rare earths and rare-earth magnets and force Mr. Trump to compromise on tariffs. The October order “pointed a bazooka at the supply chains and the industrial base of the entire free world,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said.

去年4月與10月，中國兩度出台新的出口管制措施，限制稀土及稀土磁體供應，迫使川普總統在關稅問題上做出讓步。財政部長史考特·貝森特稱，10月的這道禁令「無異於將火箭炮對準了整個自由世界的供應鏈與工業基礎」。

Not since the Arab oil embargo in late 1973 and early 1974 had the United States experienced such a drastic loss of access to critical minerals. And while the oil embargo affected a third of the world’s oil supply, China produces 90 percent of the world’s rare earths and rare-earth magnets.

自1973年末至1974年初的阿拉伯石油禁運以來，美國從未遭遇如此嚴重的戰略礦產供應斷裂。那次石油禁運影響了全球三分之一的石油供應，而中國的稀土及稀土磁體產量佔全球總量的90%。

China’s actions this year on rare earths were “undeniably a major moment in geoeconomic history and international relations,” said Nicholas Mulder, a historian of embargoes and sanctions at Cornell University.

康乃爾大學專攻禁運與制裁史的學者尼古拉斯·穆爾德指出，中國今年在稀土領域的舉措「無疑是地緣經濟史與國際關係史上的一個重大轉折點」。

China’s rare-earths industry leaped ahead in a military operation more than 50 years ago during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Mao’s Red Guards had almost completely closed most schools and universities. It seemed an unlikely time for a technological breakthrough.

中國稀土產業的跨越式發展源於50多年前文化大革命動盪時期的一項軍方行動。當時，毛主席領導的紅衛兵幾乎令所有大中小學關停，這本是一個不太可能實現技術突破的年代。

The father of the industry was Xu Guangxian, a tall, thin man from Shaoxing, a town near Shanghai. He loved Go, an ancient Chinese board game, and devoured martial arts novels.

來自上海附近的紹興的中國稀土產業之父徐光憲身形瘦高，他酷愛中國古老的圍棋，也沉迷武俠小說。

Shortly after World War II, Mr. Xu completed a doctorate in chemistry at Columbia University. He returned home to teach and do research at Peking University in Beijing. Mr. Xu discovered a new way to process uranium, a breakthrough in China’s efforts to build an atomic bomb that presaged the role he would later play in rare earths.

二戰結束後不久，徐光憲在哥倫比亞大學獲得化學博士學位，隨後回國任教於北京大學，投身科研工作。他率先發現了一種鈾加工的新工藝，這一突破為中國研製原子彈立下汗馬功勞，也預示了他日後在稀土領域將扮演的關鍵角色。

Then, like many intellectuals, Mr. Xu was imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution. But in 1971 he was politically rehabilitated and brought back to Peking University. The People’s Liberation Army had a job for him: Invent a new way to refine pure samples of rare-earth metals. The Chinese military wanted the samples to experiment with battlefield lasers.

後來，和許多知識分子一樣，徐光憲在文革期間遭到關押。但到了1971年，他獲得平反，重返北京大學。中國人民解放軍此時交給他一項重任：研發一種提純稀土金屬單質的新方法。軍方需要這些高純度稀土樣品，用於研發軍用戰場雷射設備。

Purifying rare earths is extraordinarily difficult. Early chemists named them rare not because they were hard to find — they are not — but because of the challenge of separating them from one another.

稀土提純難度極高。早期化學家之所以將其命名為「稀土」，並非因其儲量稀少——事實恰恰相反——而是因為要將各種稀土元素彼此分離，是一項極為艱巨的挑戰。

At Peking University, Mr. Xu and his wife, Gao Xiaoxia, also an accomplished chemical engineer, holed themselves up in a laboratory. They had a revolutionary breakthrough: Rare earths could be purified using inexpensive hydrochloric acid and cheap plastic holding tanks rigged together.

在北京大學的實驗室裡，徐光憲與同為傑出化工專家的妻子高小霞潛心鑽研。他們最終取得了一項革命性突破：只需價格低廉的鹽酸和簡易搭建的塑料儲槽，即可實現稀土提純。

Mixed rare earths were poured in one end, and specific kinds of rare earths, after binding to various solvents, emerged from different outlets at the other end. It was the first rare-earth assembly line, a crude version of a process still used today. Production costs plummeted with Mr. Xu’s techniques.

混合稀土原料從一端注入，經過與不同溶劑的結合，特定種類的稀土元素會從另一端的不同出口析出。這便是全球首條稀土提純生產線，這一工藝至今仍在使用，只不過更為精細。徐光憲的技術方案大幅降低了稀土生產成本。

Mr. Xu installed his first production lines, in Baotou and at a chemical plant in Shanghai, and started training engineers from all over China.

他隨後在包頭以及上海的一家化工廠建起首批生產線，並開始培訓來自全國各地的工程師。

After the death of Mao, Mr. Deng began consolidating power with an economic program that emphasized science and technology and selected Vice Premier Fang Yi to oversee it in 1978. Mr. Fang traveled with an entourage of scientists and engineers to Baotou to inspect the rare-earth industry.

毛澤東逝世後，鄧小平開始鞏固權力，推行一套重視科技發展的經濟綱領。1978年，他任命方毅副總理分管這方面的工作。方毅率領一眾科學家與工程師趕赴包頭，考察當地稀土產業。

A Five-Year Plan drafted by Mr. Deng and Mr. Fang, covering 1981 to 1985, ordered that China “increase the production of rare-earth metals.”

在鄧小平與方毅起草的1981-1985年的「五年計劃」中，明確提出中國要「增加稀土金屬和稀有金屬的生產」。

More than 100 towns and villages across China built rare-earth refineries in the 1980s, many of them state-owned and few with meaningful pollution controls. By 1986, China was the world’s largest producer of rare earths.

整個80年代，中國各地百餘座城鎮鄉村建起了稀土冶煉廠，其中多數為國有企業，且鮮有配套的污染治理設施。到1986年，中國已躍居全球最大稀土生產國。

Overseas refineries also adopted some of Mr. Xu’s techniques — and, to his lasting annoyance, they paid no royalties because he had not patented his inventions. “We didn’t have any sense of secrecy back then,” Mr. Xu said in an interview with a Chinese journal many years later.

海外的稀土冶煉廠也紛紛採用徐光憲的技術——但令他終身耿耿於懷的是，由於當時沒有為這些發明申請專利，這些海外廠家並未支付任何專利使用費。多年後，徐光憲在接受一家中國期刊採訪時坦言：「我們那時候沒有保密意識。」

Rare earths were used in fairly low-tech manufacturing at the time, to make steel stronger or refine oil and polish glass.

當時，稀土的應用還是在相對低端的製造業領域，比如用於增強鋼材硬度、石油精鍊和玻璃拋光等工序。

But in laboratories in Michigan and Japan, engineers were starting to discover how to turn rare-earth metals into extremely powerful magnets. Rare earths were about to become central to advanced manufacturing, and the creation of a modern world of computers, smartphones and cars.

而在密西根與日本的實驗室裡，工程師們已開始探索將稀土金屬製成超高強度磁體的技術。稀土即將成為高端製造業的核心材料，推動由計算機、智慧型手機和汽車構成的現代世界誕生。

In 1983, engineers at General Motors and the Japanese magnet maker Sumitomo Special Metals each announced they had developed powerful rare-earth magnets. The magnets were immediately put to use in electric motors in the auto industry and beyond.

1983年，通用汽車公司與日本住友特殊金屬公司的工程師幾乎同時宣布，各自研發出高性能稀土磁體。這種磁體隨即被應用於汽車行業及其他領域的電動機生產中。

China lacked expertise to turn rare earths into magnets. It would purchase that know-how from the United States.

當時的中國還不具備將稀土加工成磁體的技術，因此只能從美國購入。

General Motors had turned its discovery into a thriving magnet manufacturing subsidiary in Indiana, called Magnequench. But a decade later, G.M. decided to stop making many of its own auto parts.

通用汽車曾將這項發現轉化為一家盈利豐厚的磁體製造子公司——位於印第安納州的麥格昆磁公司。然而十年後，通用汽車決定不再自主生產許多汽車零部件。

Magnequench was sold in 1995 to a consortium of investors that included two Chinese companies led by sons-in-law of Mr. Deng: Wu Jianchang and Zhang Hong. Under President Bill Clinton, the U.S. government allowed the transaction to proceed because a majority of the owners were American.

1995年，麥格昆磁公司被出售給一個投資人財團，其中包括兩家中國公司，其負責人分別是鄧小平的兩位女婿吳建常與張宏。在柯林頓執政時期，美國政府批准了這筆交易，理由是多數股東為美國人。

The American owners were mainly institutional investors. Mr. Deng’s sons-in-law had led companies with deep ties to low-cost magnet manufacturing in China. Magnequench started moving its equipment in 2001 to Tianjin and Ningbo, China, and shut down in Valparaiso, Ind., by 2004.

這些美方股東多為機構投資者，而鄧小平的女婿們所領導的中國公司與中國低成本磁體製造領域聯繫緊密。2001年起，麥格昆磁公司開始將生產設備遷往中國的天津與寧波，並於2004年全面關停了位於印第安納州瓦爾帕萊索市的工廠。

“A lot of equipment in Valparaiso was decommissioned, disassembled and put on pallets prepared for ocean shipment,” said Jeff Calvert, who was a Magnequench manager assigned to oversee the installation of the equipment at a magnet factory in Tianjin. He said the Chinese factory had previously been using processes “that were at least 10 years behind” what Magnequench had developed in Valparaiso.

傑夫·卡爾弗特曾是麥格昆磁公司的一名經理，負責監督天津一家磁體工廠的設備安裝工作。他回憶：「瓦爾帕萊索工廠的大批設備被停用、拆解，然後打包裝上海運托盤。」他還表示，那家中國工廠此前採用的生產工藝「至少比麥格昆磁在瓦爾帕萊索研發的技術落後十年」。

The move by Magnequench, which was then bought in 2005 by a Canadian rare-earth processor with operations in China, taught China how to make rare-earth magnets.

麥格昆磁公司這一舉措幫助中國掌握了稀土磁體的製造技術，麥格昆磁於2005年被一家在華開展業務的加拿大稀土加工企業收購。

But increased magnet production made pollution from rare-earth mines a bigger problem that Beijing needed to address.

但磁體產量的提升也使稀土礦開採帶來的污染問題愈發嚴峻，亟待北京出手整治。

Rare-earth refineries in Baotou were dumping large quantities of radioactive waste into a repository that threated to contaminate the Yellow River.

Starting in 2006, Wen Jiabao, by then China’s premier, imposed annual quotas on Chinese rare-earth exports to limit processing and stem pollution. Cleanup measures began at mines in Baotou. The government took greater control of rare-earth companies, consolidating them under state ownership.

2006年起，時任中國總理溫家寶開始對稀土出口實施年度配額管理，旨在限制稀土加工規模，遏制污染蔓延。包頭的稀土礦也隨之啟動環境整治工作。政府加強對稀土企業的管控，將其整合為國有企業。

In late September 2010, two dozen of the most powerful executives in China’s rare-earth industry were summoned to a conference room deep inside China’s Ministry of Commerce, a Stalinist building in the heart of Beijing. China was confronting Japan over uninhabited islands north of Taiwan.

2010年9月下旬，中國稀土行業20餘位最具影響力的企業高管被召集至位於北京核心城區、具有史達林時代建築風格的商務部大樓深處的一間會議室。當時中國正因台灣以北的幾座無人島嶼的問題與日本產生激烈爭執。

A senior ministry official gave the executives their orders: no more rare-earth exports to Japan, their biggest market. No extra exports to other countries that might forward supplies to Japan. And not a word was to be spoken publicly about the ban.

商務部一位高官向這些高管下達指令：立即停止向最大出口市場日本供應稀土；嚴禁向其他可能轉售稀土給日本的國家追加出口配額；此外，此事嚴禁向外界透露一字一句。

The embargo was never formally announced, but it forced the Japanese government to compromise on the territorial issue after two months. Yet the ban also exposed a weakness for Beijing.

這項禁運從未正式對外公布，但僅僅兩個月後便迫使日本政府在領土爭端問題上做出讓步。不過，這場禁運也暴露了北京的一大軟肋。

Chinese crime syndicates, which controlled about half of China’s rare-earth production, had continued smuggling rare earths from China to Japan even during the embargo.

中國的犯罪集團控制著國內約半數的稀土產量，即便是在禁運期間，這些團伙仍在持續將稀土走私出境，銷往日本。

Mr. Wen ordered police campaigns to break the syndicates. Security forces stormed illegal mines and put them under Beijing’s direct control.

溫家寶隨即下令警方開展專項行動，打擊這些走私團伙。執法部門迅速查封了非法稀土礦，將其置於北京的直接管控之下。

From a distance of 15 years, it is clear that the Japan embargo was a turning point for China’s rare-earth industry. Once-lawless areas of industrial activity were tamed and brought under the government’s thumb, and Beijing learned it could use that control to force geopolitical and trade partners to bend.

時隔15年回望，這場對日稀土禁運堪稱中國稀土產業發展的一個關鍵轉折點。一度無法無天的稀土產業被全面整頓，納入政府管控，而北京也意識到，憑藉對稀土的控制，就能迫使地緣政治與貿易夥伴做出讓步。

Today, China is working to cement its lead in rare earths by churning out more trained technicians and researchers than any other country. Programs in rare earths are offered by 39 universities.

如今，中國正致力於鞏固其在稀土領域的領先地位，培養的專業技術人員與科研人員數量遠超其他任何國家。全國共有39所高校開設了稀土相關專業課程。

The United States and Europe have no such programs — not even at Iowa State University, an institution that once trained generations of American engineers in rare earths. Iowa State has not offered a course in rare earths for the last several years and has one graduate student doing independent study in the field. It plans to offer a course next year.

美國與歐洲卻沒有這樣的課程——就連曾經培養出數代美國稀土工程師的愛荷華州立大學也不例外。該校近年來一直未開設稀土相關課程，目前僅有一名研究生在該領域從事獨立研究，校方計劃於明年恢復相關課程教學。

China has hundreds of scientists exploring rare-earth technologies. Technicians at a refinery in Wuxi, a city near Shanghai, spent seven years doing experiments to refine dysprosium, a rare earth, to extraordinary purity. The refinery is now the world’s sole source of that rare earth, which is used in capacitors — tiny devices to control electricity — found in Nvidia’s Blackwell artificial intelligence chips.

中國有數以百計的科學家致力於稀土技術研究。在上海附近的無錫市，一家稀土精鍊廠的技術人員經過七年的實驗，最終將稀土元素鏑提純至極高純度。如今，這家精鍊廠已成為全球唯一供應這種稀土元素的來源。鏑用於製造電容器，這種微型電子元件用來進行電流調控，英偉達公司的布萊克威爾人工智慧晶片中就採用了這種電容器。

Most of the refinery’s shares were until this year owned by Neo Performance Materials, the Canadian company that acquired Magnequench in 2005. A Chinese state-controlled company bought most of the shares on April 1. Then on April 4, Beijing halted exports of dysprosium and six other kinds of rare earths to the United States and its allies.

直至2025年，這家精鍊廠的多數股權仍由2005年收購麥格昆磁公司的加拿大企業尼奧性能材料公司持有。但在2025年4月1日，一家中國國有控股企業收購了該廠的多數股權。緊接著，4月4日，中國政府宣布暫停向美國及其盟友出口鏑及另外六種稀土材料。

China is determined to guard its technological lead. Beijing has halted most exports of rare-earth processing equipment. It has also taken away the passports of rare-earth technicians to prevent them from leaving the country with valuable information.

中國決意捍衛其技術領先地位。政府已暫停大部分稀土加工設備的出口，並收繳了稀土領域技術人員的護照，以防他們攜帶核心技術情報出境。

During a visit in late November to the Wuxi refinery, a shiny steel national security sign at the front gate warned: “Caution: Key Confidential Unit.”

11月下旬，記者走訪了這家位於無錫的稀土精鍊廠。大門處閃亮的鋼製國家安全標牌做出了警示：「重點保密單位」。